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THE 



ELEMENTS 



Intellectual Philosophy 



REV. L DE CONCILIO, 

Author of '■'■Catholicity and Pantheism,'''' '■'■KnoiDledge of Mary,'''' etc. 




' How charming is divine philosophy I 
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose; 
But musical as is Apollo's lute, 
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets. 
Where no crude surfeit reigns." 

— Milton's Comtis. 




D. & J. SADLIER & CO., 31 BARCT-AY STREET. 
Montreal : 275 Notre Dame Street. 

1878. 



^ 



^t 



THE LIBRARY 
or CONGRESS 

WAIHINGTON 



Copyrigbt, 
D. & J. SADLIER & CO. 



H. J. HEwrrr, pmnter, 27 rose street, new yoek. 



ERR A TA—CORRIGE. 



Pag^e 249. — For "superior," twenty-fifth line, eighth word, read inferior: 
" It must be the substance of the inferior nature," etc. 

Page 262. — For " inferior," first hne, third word, read superior : "It would 
produce an effect superior to its cause." 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Preface, i 

Introduction to Philosophy, 7 



LOGIC. 
Introduction, 21 

Part First. 

CHAPTER 

I. — Matter of Reasoning, 25 

II. — or the Different Objects which a Universal Idea may 
Represent, and of the Different Modes of Represent- 
ing them, ......... 44 

III. — Of the Expression of Ideas or of Terms, ... 54 
IV. — Proximate Matter of Reasoning ; and, first, of the Na- 
ture of Judgment and Proposition, .... 59 

V. — Different Species and Properties of Propositions, . . 65 

-VI. — Truth of Judgments and Propositions, .... 74 

Part Second. — Form of Reasoning. 

I. — Of the Essential Structure of Reasoning, ... 78 

II. — Different Species of Reasoning, 95 

in. — Of the Expression of Reasoning, 102 

IV. — Faults of Reasoning, 104 

Part Third. — End of Reasoning. 

I. — Of the Nature and the Necessity of Method, . . . 107 

II. — Elements and Means of Method, 113 

III. — Division of Method — that is, of Method of Invention and 

of Discipline, ........ 120 



iv C 071 tents. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IV. — Of Science according to its Strictest Acceptation, inas- 
much as it is Knowledge, ...... 125 

V. — Of Science in its more Enlarged Signification, inasmuch 

as it is a System of Truths, 131 

ONTOLOGY. 

Introduction— Object of Metaphysics — Definition of 

Ontology, . . 141 

I. — Of Being, considered in Itself and in a most General 

Way, 143 

II. — Of the Determinations of Being in General — Essence 

and Existence, . 152 

III. — Of the Manner in which Essence and Existence co-ope- 
rate to form a Real Being, 161 

IV. — Of the Properties of Being, 164 

v.— Of the Causes of Beings, 1S5 

VI. — Division of Being, 206 

VII. — Of the Use of Ontology, 230 

ANTHROPOLOGY. 

Introduction, 241 

I. — On the Nature of Man in General, 242 

II. — On the Principles from which the Nature of Man Re- 
sults — Soul and Body — and, first, of the Soul, . . 252 
III. — Of the Human Body, ....... 274 

IV. — Of the Manner according to which the Soul and the 

Body are united together and conspire to form Man, . 276 



PREFACE. 



THE author who should attempt to write a book 
on the elements of intellectual philosophy 
should in our opinion strictly attend to, and be - 
guided by, the following principles, which have re- 
ference to the language, to the style, and to the 
matter of the book. 

I. The book should be written in English. The 
matter treated of in philosophy is hard enough to 
understand, even by the brightest intellect which 
just comes from the study of belles-lettres, fascinated 
by the matchless beauties of the ancients clothed 
in the finest language, to undertake to master hard, 
dry things, without flesh and blood, but abstract 
and immaterial. Now, to present such things in a 
foreign language is to render the difficulty of appre- 
hending them unnecessarily greater, and to heighten 
the aversion which young minds naturally feel for 
abstract ideas. It is like covering a beautiful paint- 
ing with a double veil. For language, after all, is a 
veil which covers the idea. Now, if you clothe an 
idea in language foreign to the student, no matter 
how well he may be supposed to know it, you oblige 
him, in order to look at the idea, first to uncover 



2. Preface. 

the veil of the foreign language to make room for 
the veil of his own native language, and then to 
catch the idea. In other words, you oblige the 
student first to translate into his own language, and 
then to grasp the matter. In the second place, to 
write a book on the elements of philosophy in the 
Latin language is to confine the study of this most 
necessary science only to those who have gone 
through a classical course ; whereas we know by sad 
experience how necessary and how important it is 
for all our young men to be imbued with proper, 
true philosophical principles, to the absence of which 
we may attribute all the errors and evils which afflict 
society. 

With regard to the style, of course it must be of 
a didactic nature — that is, brief and concise, but 
above all perfectly clear. Nor would we be averse 
now and then, when the occasion presents itself, 
from changing the nature of the style for one a 
little more pleasing and attractive, so as to lighten 
the difficulty and mix the useful with the sweet. 

Finally, with regard to the matter, a book of 
elementary philosophy should contain nothing but 
the doctrine received by the best and greatest of 
Christian schools, the doctrine most received in the 
Church, that upon Avhich the Holy See has always 
looked upon with marked and never-ceasing partial- 
ity. 

These are the principles which have guided us in 
writing these Elements of Intellectital Philosophy. 



Preface, 3 

As to the language, not only have we written it in 
English, but we have been most chary and particu- 
lar in our choice. Whenever we had two words to 
choose from, we always preferred that which was the 
easiest of comprehension and of Anglo-Saxon origin. 
We have thought proper to discard, whenever it was 
possible, all words which may remind one too much 
of the schools, always translating into the best 
English we could muster, anything of such a na- 
ture ; so that in reading our Elements the young 
student will meet with no hard word which may 
require the use of the dictionary, or which may 
stop him in his endeavor to catch the idea. 

With regard to the style, it has been our constant 
effort to make it as clear as possible, at the same time 
that we have tried to be brief. There is hardly a 
theory laid down which is not illustrated by one or 
more examples. And we venture to assert that owing 
to this lucidity of style ov^x Elements could be studied, 
and in great part understood, without a teacher by 
any young man of parts. We have also, whenever 
we possibly could, tried to illustrate our theories by 
quotations from the poets, to loosen the tension of 
the mind by something pleasing and interesting. At 
the end of Ontology we have shown by an abstract of 
all the natural sciences how they are an application of 
the principles of Ontology. 

With regard to the matter, we have followed 
throughout the philosophy of the " Angel of the 
Schools," in which we were brought up from our youth, 



4 • Preface, 

and from which we have never swerved in our man- 
hood, experience and more profound studies having 
led us to adhere to that philosophy more tenaciously 
and more ardently. Every one knows that all modern 
errors have originated in the abandonment of Catholic 
philosophy as embodied in the Catholic schools, and 
especially in that of St. Thomas. Consequently the 
only way to put a barrier to these errors, to refute 
them, is to turn back to that grand philosophy created 
by geniuses as great as Plato or Aristotle, and guided 
by the truth of God, which those heathen geniuses 
had not. 

Of course, these being only elements, we have used 
a great moderation in the treating of all the questions 
connected with this science ; yet it will be found 
that no single important question has been omitted 
of which it is necessary for the student to know 
something. 

Besides the usual parts, our Elements will close 
with a book on the external and internal evidences of 
Christianity as a complement of this science — that is 
to say, we shall in an elem.entary way, and without 
going too deeply into the matter, show the philoso- 
phical force of the proofs of the divinity of Chris- 
tian revelation. 

All this we have attempted to do. But have we 
succeeded ? No effort on our part has been or will 
be spared to make this book come nearer to these 
principles we laid down for our guidance. As for 
the rest, it is not for us to pronowice judgment, 



Preface. 5 

but others, and especially for the learned professors of 
this study scattered throughout the land, from v/hom 
we shall thankfully receive any suggestion or correc- 
tion which they shall see fit to make. 

At present only Logic, Ontology, and the first part 
of Anthropology are published. Next year, if God 
gives us strength, we shall publish the rest. 

Jersey City, Feast of SS. Peter and Paul. 



ELEMENTS OF 

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 



ARTICLE L 

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Q. What is the meaning of the word philosophy? 

A. It means love of wisdom, and a philosopher is 
a lover of wisdom. This word was used for the first 
time by Pythagoras, who, on being asked wliat art he 
professed, answered that lie was a philosopher. 

Q. What did the ancients mean by the science 
of philosophy ? 

A. They meant the knowledge of everything. 
This could well be in olden times, when, sciences 
being in their infancy, all human knowledge could be 
collected into one science. In this sense philosophy 
was defined by Cicero tJie science of all Jminan and 
divine things and of their causes. 

Q. Does it embrace the same objects now? 

A. Sciences being so much developed in our times, 
it would be utterly impossible to comprehend them 
all in one. Hence they have been divided, a particu- 
lar object being set apart for each one ; therefore the 
object of philosophy has been also narrowed down. 

Q. Explain the object of philosophy. 

A. The better to do so we will premise a few 
remarks. 

7 



8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

1st. Science consists in understanding tlie princi- 
ples from which a thing is derived : Scire res per 
caiisas — to know things by tlieir causes. 

2d. There are two kinds of knowledge, common 
and scientific. The first is satisfied with merely know- 
ing the existence of a thing; the second goes beyond 
that, and is not content with merely apprehending 
the existence of a thing, but wants to find out why 
the thing is so and not otherwise, and what is the 
principle which causes it. 

For instance, who had not seen, from the time of 
the first man who made a lamp and suspended it to 
the wall of his cottage or to the roof, that when first 
hung in its place it oscillated for some time from 
side to side until at length it came to a perpendicu- 
lar? Men before Galileo perceived this fact, and 
passed on without seeing anything more in it. This 
is common knowledge. One day Galileo, observing 
this very fact, and noticing by more accurate observa- 
tions that the oscillations were regular, perceived 
in this fact the principles of the law of gravitation 
and motion, and invented the pendulum. This is 
scientific knowledge. 

3d. We remark that all the sciences, though dis- 
tinct and different from each other according to their 
different objects, are yet connected together by the 
necessary fact of the dependence of one upon the 
other. For particular sciences depend upon those 
which are less so, and these in their turn upon those 
which are more general. Chemistry, for instance, is the 
science of the elements of bodies and of their proper- 
ties, but it could not exist without another less par- 
ticular science which must precede it, called physics. 
This latter science, which treats of the phenomena of 
bodies and their causes, could not exist without an- 



Introduction to Philosophy. 9 

other science more general which treats of the nature 
and properties of bodies and of all the material world, 
together with their causes, and which is called cos- 
mology. But the world is a being, an existence, and 
therefore it could not be properly understood without 
the science of being in general, its properties and causes, 
which is called ontology. We conclude, therefore, 
that, as every particular science depends upon another 
science less particular and more general, there must be 
a science which investigates the most common princi- 
ples of being, and which depends on no other, but on 
which all others depend. This science is philosophy. 
The objects, therefore, of philosophy are the most 
common principles of being. 

Q. What do you mean by the most common prin- 
ciples of being ? 

A. As St. Thomas has remarked, the most common 
principles of being are the first and supreme principles, 
beyond which there can be no other. Thus the last 
end, being common to all beings, is also the first and 
supreme end ; the most common cause, being that 
from which all things are originated, is the first cause, 
upon which every other cause depends ; the idea of 
being, as it is the most common idea and the simplest, 
is also the first idea, on which all others depend and 
from which all others originate. Therefore by the 
most common principles are meant the first and su- 
preme principles, from v/hich everything proceeds and 
draws its existence. And because principles of this 
kind are not the property of this or that particular 
being, but of all beings in general, it follows that the 
objects of philosophy are the supreme principles of 
everything, and not of this or that particular thing. 

O. Give the definition of philosophy according to 
the preceding remarks. 



lo Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

A. Philosophy is tJiat science ivJiicJi investigates the 
first and supreme principles of being. 

It is called science because it investigates principles 
and cause, and therefore is a knowledge of an object 
by its causes. 

Of the first and supreme principles, because the 
other sciences investigate this or that principle and 
cause ; philosophy only investigates the supreme and 
highest principles. 

Of being, because philosophy does not take as its 
object any particular thing, but whatever comes 
under the denomination of being. 

ARTICLE II. 

DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Q. How is philosophy divided } 

A. The objects of philosophy are the supreme prin- 
ciples of being. Therefore the parts of this science 
must be as many as there are natural divisions or 
parts of being. Now, being may be divided into 
three parts, rational, real, and moral. The rational 
is that which exists only in the mind as its own 
work. The real is that which has true existence 
outside and independent of us. The moral is that 
which originates in the will of man in its relation with 
moral law. The rational is called logic, and has for 
its object the order which our mind puts in its ideas. 
The moral is the science of ethics, and treats of the 
free actions of men as directed and guided by moral 
law. The real is called metaphysics, and is subdi- 
vided into three parts, because, as St. Thomas ob- 
serves, real being may be classified under four heads. 
It may be either material or separated from matter. 
If separated from matter, this may proceed from 



Introdicdion to Philosophy. 1 1 

two causes. It may be separated from matter, not 
because it is so in reality, but because our mind, 
in considering a material object, may choose to leave 
aside the material part of it, and fix its attention only 
on the interior nature of the thing, which operation 
of the mind, as we shall see, is called abstraction, and 
the thing thus obtained an abstract ; or it may be 
separated from matter because it is so in reality, as 
spiritual substances, of which there are two, God and 
the human soul. The objects of metaphysics are, 
therefore, the material being, the abstract being, the 
soul, and God. Hence there are four parts of philo- 
sophy — cosmology, which treats of the material world ; 
ontology, which speaks of being in common and in the 
abstract ; anthropology, which treats of man, and of the 
human soul especially ; and theology, which treats of 
God as he can be known from reason. 

ARTICLE III. 

USE OF PHILOSOPHY ; OR, ITS CONNECTION WITH 
ALL THE SCIENCES AND ARTS. 

Q. What is the use of philosophy ? 

A. The use of philosophy cannot be fully pointed 
out in this introduction, but will be seen at the end 
of the course. Yet, to excite in the student an ardent 
desire and love for such a study, we shall briefly point 
out its use and its connection with all the sciences 
and arts by developing the following argument. All 
the sciences and arts depend upon philosophy as to 
their certainty^ as to their principles, '2Si6i as to their 
mctJiod. Therefore all the sciences and arts depend 
upon philosophy and are impossible without it. And, 
first, as to their certainty. Philosophy has for its 
object the supreme principles of everything. Con- 



12 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 

sequently its objects are also those supreme principles 
of certainty and evidence, those criteria of truth, 
supported by which our mind clings to truth without 
hesitation or fear of the contrary, and with perfect 
assurance and satisfaction. In this sense philosophy 
has a character of universality which subjects to it all 
the sciences and arts. For instance, physical sciences ' 
have for their object everything which comes within, 
the observation of the senses. But is what falls 
under the observation of the senses a true and ex- 
terior reality, or merely a sensation and a modifica- 
tion of our soul ? If what falls under our senses is 
not an objective reality, but merely an internal modi- 
fication ; if our souls perceive no more than the im- 
age of objects, as some of the ancient philosophers 
thought ; if odors, colors, figures, and forms are not 
qualities of real bodies ; if these bodies and these 
qualities are not the determining causes of taste, of 
smell, of sight, etc., is it not evident that the base 
of. all physical sciences crumbles down, and that all 
those sciences play about mere fictions of our mind, 
sheer and useless idealities ? The natural philosopher 
studies the bod3^ But what is a body? Is it an 
illusion, a sheer appearance, as was pretended by the 
Indian pantheists, and as was held by Berkeley only a 
century ago ? And is it not clear that upon the solu- 
tion of all these questions depends the certainty of 
all physical sciences ? Again, the natural philosophers 
seek for the causes of all the operations of bodies. 
For, by examining a sufficient number of operations 
and constant facts, they endeavor to explain the 
causes of such operations and assign laws by which 
the material world is directed. Now, if, as Hume pre- 
tends, the idea of cause is a chimera, the certainty of all 
physical sciences is shaken, and we must consider as 



Introdtiction to Philosophy. 1 3 

dreams and visions all those pretended laws of the 
universe of which natural sciences endeavor to demon- 
strate the reality, generality, and permanence. Then 
all the relations of causality become simple relations 
of succession and time, all the operations of nature 
beco.me isolated ; we have no longer any co-ordination 
or union among beings, and that magnificent and ad- 
mirable connection which binds the facts of the sensi- 
ble world to each other and to their universal princi- 
ple vanishes from our eyes to make room for a com- 
plete chaos. In the second place, all the sciences and 
arts depend upon philosophy for their principles, 
because the objects of philosophy are the supreme 
principles of everything. Thus physical sciences are 
founded upon the idea of being, of substance, of 
matter, of quality ; upon the ideas of cause and effect. 
Without these ideas they could not proceed one step 
in these investigations. But what is being? What is 
substance ? What is matter, and what distinguishes 
it from spirit ? All these ideas must be given by 
philosophy. 

Mathematical sciences depend upon it. Arithmetic 
is founded upon the idea of member, and consequently 
upon the ideas of unity and distinction; algebra upon 
the idea of signs representing known and unknown 
quantities ; geometry upon the ideas of form and 
size, and consequently upon the Idea of extension 
and space ; mechanics upon the Ideas of force, of move- 
ment, and of weight. Consequently, all mathematical 
sciences depend upon philosophy for their principles. 

Moral sciences depend upon it, because they depend 
upon the ideas of the good and the just. Now, to deter- 
mine what Is really good and just depends absolutely 
upon a true and correct system of philosophy. For 
If we hold, with the sensists, that man Is but an ag- 



1 4 Elements of Intell&C'hml Philosophy. 

gregate of sensations, we shall have the consequence 
that that only is good which is agreeable or which is 
useful, and hence the moral of pleasure and of in- 
terest. 

Political sciences, legislation, civil and social right, 
the right of nations, social and domestic economy, 
public and private education — in fact, all the sciences 
which have more or less connection with the govern- 
ment of nations, of the family, and of the individual, 
borrow from philosophy their principles and their 
rules ; because none can govern a man, a family, or a 
nation without having studied the human soul, its 
laws and its destiny ; without knowing its nature, its 
faculties, the motives which can influence the human 
heart and the human will ; Avithout knowing the 
objects which one must propose to it for its actions. 
And are not all these things the essential province of 
philosophy ? 

Medical sciences are closely allied to psychological 
and moral sciences. Our soul and body are united 
with a bond too intimate to permit the physiologist 
to ignore the influence of the organism on the soul 
and of the soul on the organism. The most perfect 
knowledge of the organs, and of the physical causes 
which derange them, would be incomplete and almost 
useless, if he who practises the art of healing, directing 
his attention exclusively to physical causes, were to 
disregard moral causes ; if a deep knowledge of the 
passions, of habits, of their influence, could not enable 
him to combat the derangement of the organism by 
re-establishing order and tranquillity in the thoughts 
and mental functions of the patient ; because man is 
not merely passive, and none can determine how far 
the free development of his activity may modify the 
power which he has of imagining and of feeling, and 



Ijitrodiiction to Philosophy. 15 

in a certain way cliange all his different modes of 
existence. 

But does philosophy rule over the aesthetical sci- 
ences, over literature as forms of our thoughts, over 
arts? Certainly, because it furnishes the idea of the 
beautiful, as well as of truth and goodness. All 
ideas depend on it, and by the very fact that it 
seeks truth in all things it is its office to determine 
what is really beautiful. And, first of all, is not truth 
eminently beautiful ? What strikes the intellect more 
than the splendor of evidence, than the light of com- 
plete knowledge which illumines objects? What 
more j^leasant and more keenly delightful than that 
which arises from the contemplation and possession 
of truth? 

Order also has a secret charm- for us which entices 
us and causes us to reproduce it in all our works. But 
what is order? Order in the disposition of objects, 
order in the distribution of colors, in the reproduction 
of sounds and forms, is regularitv, fitness, and harmo- 
ny ; order in the Imagination is the conformity of our 
fancy images with the realities of nature ; order in our 
thoughts is their logical concatenation ; order in our 
actions is the accomplishment of our ,duty, the con- 
formity^ of the same actions with moral law ; order 
in society is subordination, in the family obedience 
and love, in the individual is the subjection of his 
passions to his will, and of the latter to God ; order 
in the exercise of authority is the general good, in the 
exercise of the intellect is truth, in the object of our 
love is perfection. Now, all this is assuredly beautiful 
and is taught by philosophy ; and this science does 
not leave it to the individual caprice to determine the 
notion of the beautiful, but from the constant expe- 
rience of all that which mankind calls beautiful in 



i6 , Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

nature and art, in man and in society, rises to the 
essential and universal idea of the beautiful and de- 
termines its laws. If the idea of the beautiful were 
something changeable, individual, and relative ; if its 
essence could be modified according to the difference 
of sensations, of tastes and temperaments, then all 
arts would be at an end, because there can be no art 
where science has not discovered fixed principles and 
laws. All aesthetic sciences, therefore, depend upon 
philosophy. 

All industrial sciences depend upon it for its prin- 
ciples, because all these sciences have for their object 
that which is useful, and that which is useful is inse- 
parable from the true, the good, and the beautiful. 
Run over all the arts which are destined to provide 
for the wants of men, to increase the sum of their en- 
joyments, and you will not find one which can be con- 
sidered truly useful if it is in opposition with the im- 
mutable ideas of the true, the just, and the beautiful. 
Let human industry create and multiply wants unna- 
tural and fictitious, contrary to man's true nature, and 
it will be highly injurious to man ; let human in- 
dustry create and multiply wants contrary to his intel- 
ligence, to his morality, to the physical laws of his 
body, and their usefulness disappears, and they be- 
come dangerous, and sap the very foundation of 
man's happiness. 

History depends upon philosophy ; for devoid of it, 
it would be a catalogue of facts and events without any 
connection, without cause, without any warrant of 
authenticity, if it confined itself to gather up indiffer- 
ently whatever is transmitted to it by the memory, too 
frequently fallacious, of men and peoples. But history 
becomes science when one seeks the laws and the moral 
causes of events, when a sound criticism discusses 



Introduction to Philosophy. ' ly 

with severity tlie proofs and motives of credibility — 
in one word, vvlien one studies to reconcile in all the 
annals of nations human liberty with the providen- 
tial action of God, and thus creates a philosophy of 
history. 

Finally, all the sciences depend upon philosophy 
for their method. Man, in all his investigations, must 
use certain rules to discover truth, to prove it when 
found, to illustrate, to defend it from the attacks of 
its enemies, to explain it to others. All this is called 
by the general name of method. And where shall we 
find the proper rules to discover truth, to prove it, to 
defend it, and to explain it to others, if not in philoso- 
phy — in that part which teaches the laws for directing 
and guiding human thought in its researches ? And, 
last of all, our faith, without which we cannot attain 
our eternal destiny, depends in a certain sense upon 
philosophy. 1st. Philosophy must enable us to find 
out the true Church, by examining the motives of cre- 
dibility upon which it rests and recommends itself to 
our minds, and by proving the necessity of an infal- 
lible guide for the solution of problems which it 
cannot solve, and which it is absolutely important for 
it to know. When this infallible guide is found and 
accepted, it is true that philosophy must bow then 
in silent submission to the dogmas which the Church 
proposes as the object of its acceptance as solution 
of philosophy's own problems, and of others far 
greater, because the Church teaches the philosophy of 
God, who, being infinite, has truths to tell far above the 
ken of human philosophy ; but even after accepting 
this philosophy of the infinite, this supreme science of 
man is eminently useful in putting these supernatural 
and superintelligible truths in scientific order, in illus- 
trating them by means of created images and simili- 
tudes which may bear a faint impression of those 



1 8 Elemeji ts of In tellectua I PIi ilosophy. 

truths, and which may serve to recommend their ac- 
ceptance to man, and in defending them from the at- 
tacks of their enemies. 

These are in a few words the use of philosophy, so 
neglected and despised by the ignorant crowd. We 
will conclude these remarks with the words of the poet : 

"With thee, serene Philosophy, vvith thee 
And thy bright garland let me crown my song. 
Effusive source of evidence and truth ! 
A lustre shedding over the ennobled mind. 
Stronger than summer noon, and pure as that 
Whose mild vibrations soothe the parted soul 
New to the dawn of celestial day. 

Hence through her nourished powers, enlarged by thee, 
She springs aloft with elevated pride 
Above the tangling mass of low desires 
That bind the fluttering crowd, and, angel-winged, 
The height of science and of virtue gains. 
Without thee what were unenlightened man ? 
A savage running through the woods and wilds 
In quest of prey, and with the unfashioned fur 
Rough clad ; devoid of ever}^ finer art 
And elegance of life. Nor happiness 
Domestic mixed of tenderness and care, 
Nor moral excellence, nor social bliss. 
Nor guardian law were his ; nor various skill 
To turn the furrow or to guide the tool 
Mechanic ; nor the heaven-conducted prow 
Of navigation bold that fearless braves 
The burning line or dares the wintery pole, 
Mother severe of infinite delights ! 
Nothing save rapine, indolence, and guile. 
And woes on woes, a still revolving train, 
Whose horrid circle had made human life 
Than non-existence worse ; but, taught by thee. 
Ours are the plans of policy and peace •, 
To live like brothers, and conjunctive all 
Embellish life. While thus laborious crowds 
Ply the tough car, Philosophy directs 
The ruling helm ; or, like the liberal breath 
Of potent heaven, invisible, the sail 
Swells out and bears th' inferior world along." 

— Thomson, Stimmef,- 



LOGIC 



*' He that is of reason'' s skill bereft, 

And wants the staff of wisdom him to stay, 
Is like a ship in the midst of tempest left, 
Without an helm or pilot her to sway." 

— Spenser. 
19 



LOGIC. 



IN TROD UCTION. 



Q. Give a general idea of logic. 

A. Logic may be generally understood as meaning 
the right use of those faculties which are destined to 
acquire knowledge. 

Q. How many kinds of logic are there? 

A. Two, natural and scientific. The first is that 
disposition of our mind by which we are enabled to 
use rightly the faculties destined to acquire know- 
ledge. Every one knows by experience that men 
without education acquire ideas of many things, pass 
their judgment upon them, deduce one idea from 
others, and this they do more or less happily in pro- 
portion to the talent which nature has given them. 
This natural aptitude or facility to use rightly the fac- 
ulties destined to acquire knowledge is called natural 
logic. But as natural aptitudes are mostly imperfect, 
and must go through a certain training and discipline 
to become perfect, so it is with the natural faculty of 
reasoning. It must be regulated and trained to dis- 
charge its office properly and perfectly. And as rea- 
son, reflecting upon the operations of other faculties, 
has invented so many arts, so, reflecting upon its own 
acts, it has given origin to a science which directs and 
brings to perfection the natural ability for reasoning. 
This science is called artificial or scientific logic, and 
in this limited sense may be defined : that science or 
part of pJiilosopJiy wJiich treats of reasonitig in order 
to direct the mind in the acquisition of truth. 

Q. Explain the definition. 



2 2 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

A. It is called scierice because logic is neither art, 
nor science and art together, but simply a science, since 
a science is a knowledge of a thing deduced from its 
principles. Now, logic treats of reasoning not merely 
by inventing rules to form it, but by considering it in 
the principles which originate it. Therefore logic is a 
science and not an art. 

Q. What is the exact difference between science 
and art ? 

A. Art is that which gives certain rules how to do a 
tiling. For instance, the art of building is that which 
gives rules how to build ; grammar is the art which 
gives rules how to write and speak correctly ; rhetoric 
the art which gives rules how to convince and to per- 
suade. Science, on the contrary, is a knowledge of a 
certain object drawn from the cause and principles of 
the object. From this distinction it is clear that sci- 
ence also may give rules how to do a thing, but it 
draws them from the principles constituting the thing, 
whereas art only gives rules and knows nothing of the 
principles from which they are derived. A carpenter 
applying his level carries out a rule of his art to see 
if a piece of wood is perfectly level, but he knows 
not from what principles that rule is derived. He 
has art, but not science ; if he knew the principle 
of that rule, then he would have science. 

Q. Continue the explanation. 

A. We have said that logic treats of reasoning in 
order to state its peculiar object. For if logic be a 
science, it must have an object to treat about. Now, 
this object cannot be words, as some of the ancients 
thought ; nor can it be the acts of the mind, inasmuch 
as they really exist, because real things are the object 
of metaphysics ; therefore the object of logic is that 
order which our reason puts in its conceptions to 
form reasoning. Finally, we have said : In order to 



Eleme7its of Intellectual Philosophy. 23 

direct the mind in the acquisition of truth, to deter- 
mine the true nature oC logic ; because the true na- 
ture of logic is not to give directions how to act ex- 
ternally, as moral sciences, but how to speculate, how 
to enquire after truth. 

O. How is logic divided ? 

A. Philosophers have distinguished three things in 
reasoning: the materials of reason, called the matter ; 
the combination and construction of those materials, 
called \.\\Q forin ; and the purpose or object for which 
we reason, called the end. Take, for instance, this 
reasoning : 

That which is spiritual is immortal. 

But the soul is spiritual. 

Therefore it is immortal. 

In this reasoning the propositions and ideas are what 
philosophers call the matter; the order and the locat- 
ing of the propositions is called the form ; the result 
of the reasoning is called the end. Now, in view of 
these three elements, we shall divide logic into three 
parts. The first will treat of the matter of reasoning ; 
the second of the form, and the third of the end, of 
reasoning. This division is both clear and accurate, 
because, to have a scientific knowledge of a thing, one 
must know its principles and causes. Now, there are 
four different causes for everything — the material, the 
formal, the efficient, and the final. Take, for example, 
a building. What is its material cause ? Bricks, mor- 
tar, lumber, etc. What is its formal cause? The de- 
sign in the mind of the architect, and which, carried 
out, gives it shape and form. The efficient causes are 
the architect and all those who construct it. The 
final cause is the object for which the building is 
wanted — for instance, to live in it in comfort and 
elegance. Say the same of reasoning. The efficient 



24 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

cause of reasoning is our intellect, of which we shall 
speak in anthropology, or the science of man and his 
faculties. The material cause of reasoning are ideas 
and propositions ; the formal cause is the order and 
location of the propositions ; the final cause is the 
science which we intend to acquire and which results 
from our reasoning. 



PART FIRST. 



CHAPTER I. 

MATTER OF REASONING. 

Q. How many kinds of matter has reasoning? 

A. Two kinds ; one is called remote, the other 
proximate or near. The remote matter are ideas or 
terms, the proximate are judgments and propositions ; 
because, strictly speaking, reasoning results from judg- 
ments and propositions, and these, in their turn, from 
terms and ideas. We shall speak first of ideas, and 
then of judgments. 

Q. Of what ideas shall we treat in logic? 

A. It has been remarked by eminent philosophers 
that in logic we consider ideas, not inasmuch as they 
are ideas of this or of that particular object, but in- 
asmuch as they can be the object of all sciences. 
Now, no other idea can represent the object of all 
sciences except a universal idea. Therefore, in logic 
we treat of universal ideas. For instance, if in logic 
we gave the idea of a body as an extended substance, 
then this idea of body could not be applied to all the 
sciences treating of bodies, but only to geometry, 
which is founded on extension. We must, therefore, 
in logic treat of ideas in such a way as to render them 
applicable to all sciences ; and this can be said only 
of universal ideas. 

We shall divide this chapter into three articles. 
The first will treat of universal ideas considered in 
themselves ; the second will treat of that thing \\\\\z\\ 



2 6 Elemen ts of In tellectual Ph ilosoplty. : 

universal ideas represent ; the third will treat of the 
expression of ideas — that is, terms or words. 



ARTICLE FIRST. 

0/ Universal Ideas considered in themselves ; and, first, 
of Idea in general. 

Q. What remarks must be made in order to under- 
stand what an idea is in general? 

A. Reflecting upon the fact of our knowledge, we 
find that we cannot know any object, of whatever 
nature it may be, unless the object enters in some 
way or other into our minds, and thus presents itself 
before it ; because, on the one hand, we know from 
experience that the operation of knowing takes place 
within us, and for that reason is called an iyninanent 
act, to distinguish it from those acts which are called 
transient, or passing, because they are accomplished 
outside of us. On the other hand, we cannot deny 
that, in order to effect an operation, the subject and 
the object must come in a certain kind of contact wit! 
each other. Therefore, if the act of knowing is accom 
plished within us, and if to do that the intellect muif 
come in contact with the object it wants to know, it I 
absolutely necessary that the object should enter ii 
some manner or other into our minds. But how cai 
this be done? It is certainly impossible that object: 
could enter as they are in nature into our intellect. 
for this would be absurd, and we might say with tht 
poet: 

" Then what vast body must v/e make the mind, 

Wherein are men, beasts, trees, towns, seas, and lands, 
And j^et each thing a proper place doth find, 
And each thing in the true proportion stands."* 

* Davies' Poems. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 27 

How, then, can the act of knowing be accomplished? 
Thus : As objects, to be known, cannot enter into our 
mind as they exist in nature, they must enter therein 
by means of their image and similitude. This image, 
as it may be called, or similitude, or impression, of 
the objects which enter into our minds is called ideaJ^ 
An idea, therefore, taken in this sense, may be defined, 
the image of the nature of things existing in our intel- 
lect, by means of wJiicJi %ve apprehend them. 

O. What consequences can you draw from said 
definition ? 

A. The following: i. An idea is neither exclusively 
objective — that is, the object itself — nor exclusively 
subjective, mere work of the mind, but something 
between the two. It is objective inasmuch as it repre- 
sents the nature of things ; it is subjective inasmuch 
as it is an image dwelling in the subject or intellect, 
and is the principle and cause of its knowledge. 

2. That, though the image or idea represents ob- 
jects to the intellect, yet it is not the image that the 
intellect apprehends. The idea is only a means by 
which objects enter in communication with the intel- 
lect and present thems,plves before it to be known. 
Suppose I want to know my own face, what do I do? 
I go before a mirror, and an image of my face is in- 
stantly reproduced in the glass. But is it an image of 
my face which I know, or my own face by means of 
that image ? Surely my own face through that image. 
Or suppose I want to see an object at a distance from 
me which my ordinary power of vision cannot reach, 
what do I do? I use a telescope, which puts me in 
contact with the object I want to see. But is it the 
telescope I see, or the object? The object, certainly; 

*St. Thomas, P.P. qu. 12, art. 2 ; qu. 79, ait. 3. 



28 Elements of Inte Hectical Philosophy. 

the telescope is only a means to put me in communi- 
cation with the object. Likewise, the intellect cannot 
know any object except it comes in contact with it. 
But it cannot come in contact with it as it is in nature, 
substance and modification together. Therefore it 
comes in contact with it by its similitude.* But, this 
done, is it the idea I perceive or the object ? Evi- 
dently the object, as the idea is only a means of con- 
tact. 

3. The idea, strictly speaking, resides in the intel- 
lect, and does not represent anything else except the 
nature of the object, and, in this sense, it differs from 
the sensible image, which, as we shall see, is also 
necessary to render sensible knowledge possible ; be- 
cause a sensible image is also necessary for sensitive 
knowledge, and is both objective and subjective. 
When I see a geranium or a rosebush, the image of 
those objects must enter into my eyes, else I could 
not see them. When I touch a hard body, such as 
stone or iron, an impression of those bodies or an 
image must enter the sense of touch, or I would never 
feel them. But a sensible image differs from the idea 
in this : that the former resides in the senses and re- 
presents the exterior qualities of bodies, whereas the 
latter is in the intellect and represents the nature of 
objects. Hence we have defined it an image of the 
nattire of an object residing in the intellect. 

4. Finally, the idea being a means and principle of 
knowledge, it is followed by an act of the mind called 
apprehension. This may be defined that operation 
of the mind by which it knows an object without 
affirming or denying anything about it. I hear the 
words " soul," " body," " world " mentioned ; the act 

* How this similitude is effected will be seen in anthropology. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 29 

of the mind by which I know these objects is called 
apprehension. We have added, witJioiU affirming or 
denying anything about it, to distinguish apprehen- 
sion from judgments, which always affirm or deny a 
predicate of a subject. 

O. How many kinds of ideas are there? 

A. Ideas are intellectual images. Now, images can 
differ from each other for two reasons : either because 
the objects they represent are different, or because 
they have a different way of representing them. The 
picture of a flower-garden and that of a shipwreck are 
two different images, because each represents a differ- 
ent object ; as likewise the representation of a storm 
in verses and another in music are also two different 
images, because, though they represent the same 
object, they exhibit it in different ways. The differ- 
ence of ideas, therefore, may originate from the differ- 
ence of the objects which they represent, or from the 
different way of representing objects. 



ARTICLE SECOND. 
Difference of Ideas according to the Difference of Objects. 

Q. How many kinds of ideas are there according to 
this difference? 

A. There are, first, concrete and aJjstract ideas. Be- 
fore defining them we must remark that whatever 
exists in nature either exists in itself, not requiring 
anything to lean upon, to cling to, in order to exist, or 
it must lean on something to exist. When a thing 
does not require any other object to lean on in order 
to exist, but is self-supporting, it is called substance ; 
when it requires something to hang on in order to ex- 
ist, it is called accident, modification, or qiiatity. The 



30 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

tendrils of the vine winding around the oak for sup- 
port may be an image of the accident, whereas the 
strong and robust oak which defies wind and storms 
may be taken as- an image of the substance, but 
only as an image, because, after all, in nature both 
the vine and the oak are substances. Here is a better 
example : a table is a substance because it exists in 
itself; the roundness or the squareness of the table are 
an accident, because neither could exist without the 
table. 

We must remark, in the second place, that all ob- 
jects in nature are substances accompanied by their 
accidents or modifications. But it is clear that our 
mind, which is endowed with the faculty of analysis or of 
dividing, can separate one from the other and consider 
them apart. In the example just given the mind may 
consider the substance of the table independently of 
its form or shape ; or it may lay aside the substance 
of the table and fix its attention upon the size and the 
shape. The apprehension by the mind of an object just 
as it is in nature, substance and modification together, is 
called a concrete idea. The apprehension by the mind of 
a substance without its modifications, or of modifications 
without their substance, is called an abstract idea. 

Again, ideas according to this difference may be sim- 
ple or composite : they are simple when they repre- 
sent an object not composed of parts, as God, soul; 
they are composite when they represent an object com- 
posed of parts, as the idea of a building, a steam- 
engine. Absolute and relative : they are absolute when 
the object represented by the idea does not involve 
any relation with any other, as existence ; they are 
relative when it does involve it, ^s, father, son, effect. 
Positive and nemtive : the first is such when the idea 
represents the reality of a thing, as fruitful, perfect ; 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 3 1 

the second is such when it represents that which a 
being is wanting in, as barren, imperfect. 

Finally, it may be collective.^ singular, particular, and 
utiiversal. An idea is called collective when it repre- 
sents the union of various individuals, as an army, a 
congregation, a people. It is singular when it repre- 
sents an individual, such as Napoleon, Washington, 
Irving. It is called particular when it represents an 
object less extensive in relation to another, as the idea 
of man is a particular idea in relation to that of ani- 
mal. We shall speak of universal ideas in the next 
article. 

Q. How many kinds of ideas are there in respect to 
the manner in v;hich they represent objects? 

A. It is an ordinary fact that sometimes our mind 
perceives objects in such a way that it can easily dis- 
tinguish them from all others ; and oftentimes it per- 
ceives them in such a way that it cannot distinguish 
them from others. For instance, if I should see the 
hemlock, the pine, the oak-tree, I could easily distin- 
guish them from all other trees, my acquaintance with 
those trees being very accurate. But if an exotic plant 
were put before me I could not distinguish it from 
others. When we perceive an object in such a way as 
to be able to distinguish it from all others, then our 
idea of the object is called clear ; otherwise, obscure. 
But if we have such an idea of the object as to be able 
not only to distinguish it from others but to distin- 
guish its particular properties from the particular pro- 
perties of other objects, then our idea of the object 
is called distinct ; otherwise, indistinct. But if we 
should have such an idea of the object as to be able 
not only to distinguish it from others in itself and in 
its properties, but could tell the peculiar nature and 
characteristics of the properties of that object from 



3 2 Elements of Intellectual P-hilosophy. 

the peculiar nature and characteristics of the proper- 
ties of other objects, then our idea of it is called ade- 
qjcate, and its opposite inadequate. To give an in- 
stance of both distinct and adequate ideas, we will 
take a plant with which we are so well acquainted 
that we can tell the particular size, shape, and color of 
its trunk, its bark, its foliage, its flowers, and its fruits. 
This certainly would be having a distinct idea of that 
plant. But a botanist could go further, and be able 
to tell not only the particular nature and properties of 
that plant, but the particular nature and properties of 
each part of the plant. He would have an adequate 
idea of the plant. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
On Universal Ideas. 

Q. What is the meaning of a universal idea ? 

A. If an idea be an image, a universal idea must 
mean a universal image. The word universal is derived 
from the Latin words nnnni versus alia, and signifies a 
thing which refers to many ; so that, in order to call a 
thing universal, these two elements are required, one 
and many. Hence a universal image means an image 
representing a thing common to many. Now, the ques- 
tion arises — Is it possible that an idea can represent 
something common to many? This question, upon 
which all philosophy rests, has been discussed at 
all times, and more especially from the eleventh cen- 
tury to the fourteenth, and has been answered dif- 
ferently, but the principal opinions may be reduced to 
four. 

Q. State distinctly the state of the question and 
give the opinions of the various systems. 

A. As an idea is an image, we repeat, a universal idea 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 2)^ 

must be a universal image. Now, an image represents 
a reality, as it must be the image of something. There- 
iorea universal image must represent a universal reality, 
or some real thing common to many. This is agreed 
upon by all philosophers. But the question comes 
up. Is there in nature such a thing as a universal object 
which a universal idea may represent ? According to 
the different answers which philosophers have given 
to this question have arisen different opinions with re- 
gard to the nature of universal ideas. The first opin- 
ion, held by philosophers called Nominalists, holds that 
in nature there is no such thing as a universal object 
common to many, and that consequently what we call 
universal ideas are mere words or names, or at most 
certain conceptions of our mind representing a number 
of individual things. In the first sense this opinion 
was held by the Epicureans, and in the eleventh cen- 
tury probably by Roscellinus. In the second sense it 
was taught by Occam in the middle ages, and was held 
in modern times by Hobbes, Robinet, Condillac, and 
other sensists. 

The second is the opinion of the Conceptualists. 
They maintain that a universal nature or object cannot 
possibly exist either actually or potentially — that is to 
say, that it neither exists nor is there any cause which 
could ever make it exist ; but they contend that the 
mind can conceive such a thing as a universal nature 
merely as its own offspring, not as representing anything 
reall}^ existing or possible to exist, and consequently 
universal ideas are nothing more than' mere concep- 
tions of our mind, representing nothing real. This 
opinion was held by the Stoics of old and by Abelardus 
in the middle ages, and is maintained by all the 
idealists of our time. 

The third is the opinion of the Realists. They 



34 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

teach that universal natures do really exist, and that 
therefore they can be represented by a universal image. 
This opinion was held by the Platonists, and is held by 
the Pantheists of our days, with this difference: that 
Platonists taught that these universal natures existed 
in themselves and were the types of individual things, 
whereas Pantheists contend that they exist in indi- 
vidual natures but with a distinct existence. 

The fourth is the opinion of St. Thomas, and lies 
between the opinion of the Realists and that of the 
Conceptualists. He teaches that natures represented by 
universal ideas are not mere intellectual offspring" and 
forms with no foundation in nature, as is held by the 
Idealists, nor that such universal natures exist in fact, 
but that such ideas are formed by our mind not arbitrar- 
ily, but with a foundation in reality. Hence St. Thomas 
holds that universal natures exist formally in their 
universal form in the mind, but fundamentally in re- 
ality ; and consequently a universal idea is formally so 
in the mind, but receives its foundation from reality. 
To give the four opinions in a few words, we say a 
universal idea is like a universal portrait. Now, a por- 
trait must have an original. Is there a universal 
original in nature from which to draw this portrait ? 
Some answer no, and say that this universal por- 
trait is a mere word having no meaning whatever. 
Others answer : There is not, nor can there be, a univer- 
sal original, but the mind may invent one as its own 
fancy work. Others say : To be sure there is such a 
universal original, and the portrait may represent it 
exactly. Finally, St. Thomas comes in and says : Let 
us distinguish ; in nature there is no such thing as a 
universal original from which to draw a universal por- 
trait, and yet this universal portrait, which we call uni- 
versal idea, is not altogether a fancy work of our mind, 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 3 5 

because the mind has a reason and a foundation for 
this work, as it makes the universal portrait from find- 
ing in reality one nature common to many individuals. 
Hence this universal portrait as such is a work of the 
mind, but the original is supplied by that one nature 
found in real things to be common to many indi- 
viduals. I see, for instance, Peter, John, James, etc., 
all with their peculiar and individual differences. But 
amid all these differences I perceive two elements 
common to them all, rationality and animality. I 
form of these two elements an idea which is com- 
mon to all three ; I compare this notion with all the 
men I can see, and find in them the same common 
elements. I have therefore good reason to form the 
universal idea of the species man, consisting of the 
elements of animality and rationality. But everyone 
can perceive at a glance that that universal idea, as 
such, does not exist in nature, for in nature I find 
those two elements determined and contracted by in- 
dividual conditions in each man, and therefore form- 
ally the universal idea exists only in the mind. But 
can any one say that I have no foundation in reality 
for such an idea, since I have drawn it from the obser- 
vation of many individuals of the species in which it 
is found contracted, and I have formed it by elimi- 
nating from those two elements all individual con- 
ditions, and then by comparing the notion of those 
two elements with as many individuals of the species 
as I can observe, and by finding it always as agreeable 
to them ? 

ARTICLE THIRD. 

True Opinion about the Nature of Universal Ideas. 

Q. What do you think of the opinion of the Nomi- 
nals ? 







6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 



A. They say that universal ideas are mere sounds 
or conceptions of a number of individuals. Now, 
such opinion is false. i. Universal ideas cannot 
be mere words, for words, as every one knows, are 
signs of ideas. Now, a sign cannot exist without a 
thing signified by the sign ; therefore all these words 
which the Nominals call universal must always sup- 
pose a universal conception of the mind. 

2. It will not do to say that the best part of the 
Nominals admit that a certain conception of the mind 
corresponds to these words, because this conception is 
not a universal idea, but a conception of a plurality 
and number. For how could such a conception re- 
present a plurality of individuals? Only in two 
ways — either they represent this number of indi- 
viduals distinctly and severally, or they represent it 
in common and confusedly in consequence of a cer- 
tain similitude among them. The first supposition 
is impossible, because individuals are surrounded by 
so many qualities and accidents that each one of 
them has an existence all its own and distinct from 
that of others. Therefore each one of them implies 
an idea and a conception all its own, and consequently 
it is impossible that one idea could represent distinctly 
and severally a number of individuals as individuals. 
How could I, for instance, express distinctly and seve- 
rally by one idea Washington, Shakspere, Homer, 
Michael Angelo, Titus Oates, Arnold, Robespierre, 
and Joan d'Arc ? If it is said that one conception re- 
presents a number of individuals in consequence of a 
certain similitude among them, then we say that, by 
the admission of the Nominals themselves, that which 
is represented by universal ideas are not individual 
things as such, but that in Avhich they resemble each 
other. Therefore a universal idea must be something 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 3 7 

common to many. 3. Besides this, we always attribute 
to individuals that which is signified by the universal 
idea, or words, as the Nominals call them. For in- 
stance, we say Peter is a man, the horse is an animal. 
Now, in the opinion which we are refuting such expres- 
sions would be absurd, because they would mean no- 
thing, as they would amount to this : Peter is a mere 
name, the horse is a mere sound. We conclude with 
the remark of Leibnitz, that if the opinion of the 
Nominals were true, all the sciences which rest on 
universal ideas would be a mere empty sound and 
sceptics would win the day. 

O. What is to be said of the second opinion ? 

A. That it is also false. i. Because it is a fact 
that we divide all real existences and individuals ac- 
cording to the various universal ideas of genus, spe- 
cies, and the like ; for instance, we refer Peter and 
Socrates to the genus animal and to the species man, 
and the horse and the lion to the species brnte. Now, 
if nothing real and objective in nature corresponded 
with these universal ideas, by what right could we 
refer the horse and tlie lion to the species brute and 
man to the species man ? We could only say that 
Peter corresponds with a certain fancy work of our 
brain called man. 

2. In the second place, if the opinion of the Concep- 
tualists were admitted, all the sciences would be at 
an end, because all the sciences cannot be possible 
without universal propositions and ideas. If, there- 
fore, universal ideas represented nothing real and ob- 
jective, the sciences founded upon them would be 
mere fictions of our mind and not sciences of real 
things. 

Q. Examine the third opinion. 

A. I. Universal natures cannot exist in reality. 



2,S Elemejits of Intellectual Phiiosophy. 

This will be demonstrated when we speak of the 
essences of things. We conclude, therefore, that the 
third opinion must be false. Besides, ideas must re- 
present that to which they are applied. If universal 
ideas, therefore, represented universal natures, we 
could not apply them except to universal natures. 
But all mankind applies them to individual things or 
persons ; we say, for instance, Walter is a man, my 
horse is an animal. Therefore universal ideas do 
not represent universal natures. 

Q. Prove the fourth opinion. 

A. According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, uni- 
versal ideas, as such, exist formally in our mind, 
but fundamentally in individual things. Now, that 
natures represented by universal ideas exist funda- 
mentally in individual things is proved from this : 
the nature which the intellect perceives in the uni- 
versal ideas is the same which, restricted and contracted 
by individual conditions, is found in individual things. 
This is so true that we predicate it of each individual, 
and say Peter is a man, the horse is an animal. 
Therefore it is clear that natures represented by uni- 
versal ideas are the same as those of individual objects. 
But they exist formally, as universal, only in the intel- 
lect, and are its own work. In fact, the natures of 
things may be supposed to be universal in a threefold 
sense : i. In themselves, considered in the elements 
which make them such natures; 2. Inasmuch as 
they exist in individuals; 3. Inasmuch as they exist 
in the intellect. But we cannot admit the two first 
suppositions, because the natures of things cannot, in 
the first place, be supposed to be universal in them- 
selves, for the reason that all that which belongs to 
the nature of an object, considered in itself, must 
belong to every individual possessing that nature ; for 



Elemen ts of Inte Hectical Ph ilosophy. 3 9 

instance, all the elements composing human nature 
must belong to every man. If, therefore, universality 
belonged to human nature in itself, every man would 
be a universal, which is absurd. We cannot admit 
the second supposition, that a nature possesses uni- 
versality as it exists in individuals, because everything 
which is found in an individual is contracted and 
determined by its individual conditions. Therefore 
universality must be attributed to the natures of 
things, inasmuch as they are found in the intellect 
— that is to say, the nature of things, being found in 
the same things contracted by individual qualities, is 
rendered universal by the consideration of the intel- 
lect, which deprives it of its individual qualities and 
considers it as common to all. 

Q. Define, then, a universal idea. 

A. It is an idea representing a common nature, foinid 
ant by the intellect in a number of individuals of that 
nature. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 

Observations respecting the Nature, Elements, and Pro- 
perties of Universal Ideas. 

Q. What remarks should we make in order to illus- 
trate the definition just given ? 

A. I. We must observe in what manner an idea 
is rendered universal. The natures of things, as we 
have said, are singular. In what manner, then, can 
our intellect render them universal? We answer, by 
way of abstraction and reflection. Our intellect is en- 
dowed with a certain faculty of separating, in a given 
object, one thing from another, and of fixing its atten- 
tion and consideration upon one, laying aside all others ; 
as, for instance, having before it the object man, it 



40 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

can separate it in all its elements and take the element 
animality for its present consideration, laying aside 
reason ; or it may put on one side animality and take 
reason for its consideration. Our intellect exercises 
this faculty especially about individual things ; be- 
cause, seeing that its proper object is not the indi- 
vidual and the singular, but the nature of things, and 
on the other hand finding all the objects of nature 
clothed with individual qualities by the faculty of sepa- 
ration, it takes off from those individual objects quality 
after quality until the bare nature is left. The nature 
of things thus deprived of and purified from its indi- 
vidual qualities is called tmiversal metapJiysic, and the 
operation by which the intellect has reduced it to that 
state is called abstraction. The nature thus deprived of 
its individual conditions is neither universal nor singu- 
lar. It is not singular, because it has been stripped of 
all those individual qualities which made it so. It is 
not universal, because it only exhibits the essential 
elements of a nature which, in themselves, are not uni- 
versal ; else all individuals containing those elements 
would be universal. Hence, for an idea to be truly 
universal, it is not sufficient that the essence repre- 
sented by it be only abstracted from its individual 
qualities, but something else is necessary. It is abso- 
lutely necessary that the intellect, having abstracted 
the essence from individual things, should consider it 
fit to be found in all individuals which lie under it. 
Then only can we say with propriety that the idea is 
universal, because then only we find in it unii.y and 
plurality — unity the abstract nature, plurality the 
individuals possessing it. Such an idea is called uni- 
versal logic, or, strictly speaking, universal, and the 
second operation of the intellect, seeking for the same 
nature in individusils, compariso;.i or reflection. By two 



Elements of Intellectiuil Ph ilosophy. 4 1 

ways, then, an idea is rendered universal — by abstrac- 
tion and reflection. 

" Doubtless this could not be but that she* turns 

Bodies to spirits by sublimation strange ; 
As fire converts to fire the things it burns, 

As we our meats into our nature change, 
From their gross matter she abstracts the forms, 

And draws a kind of quintessence from things. 
Which to her proper nature she transforms, 

To bear them light on her celestial wings 
This doth she when from things particular 

She doth abstract the universal kinds, 
Which bodiless and immaterial are, 

And can be only lodg'd within our minds." f 

Q. How is a universal idea distinguished from all 
other ideas ? 

A. It is easy to distinguish it from singular and 
particular ideas. The only idea with which it might 
possibly be confounded is the collective. But it is 
easy to distinguish one from the other if we attend to 
these two observations: i. The universal idea can be 
predicated of all individuals comprised within a spe- 
cies or a genus, whereas the collective idea can only 
be predicated of many, but not of all, which are com- 
prised in a species. For instance, take the species 
man;, that idea, man, applies to all the individuals of 
the species, but the idea army cannot apply to all in- 
dividuals of the species man, but only to a number of 
them. 2. The universal idea can be predicated of 
every individual of the species separately, whereas the 
collective idea cannot be predicated except of all indi- 
viduals taken together. For instance, we apply the 
specific idea man to every individual man taken 
separately, but we could not predicate the collective 

"• The soul. + Davies' Poems. 



42 Elements of Intellechtal Philosophy. 

idea people of every separate individual forming a 
people. 

Q. What are the elements of a universal idea? 

A. -Two : compreJiension and extension. To have a 
universal idea it is necessary that the nature repre- 
sented by it be abstracted from its individual condi- 
tions, and also that it be thought as applicable to 
many individuals. The essential constituents of the 
abstract nature are called the compreJiension of an 
idea. Its capacity of being applied to many is called 
the extension of an idea. 

These two elements are governed by the following 
law : They are always contrary to each other. In pro- 
portion as the comprehension or the contents of an 
idea increases, its extension or applicability to many 
diminishes; and, on the contrary, in proportion as 
its extension increases its comprehension diminishes. 
This law is expressed by the following formula : The 
comprehension of an idea is in the inverse ratio of its 
extension. For instance, if to the idea animal you 
add the element of reason, you increase its compre- 
hension or contents, but you belittle its extension ; as 
in the former state it could be applied not only to the 
human species but also to the brute species, whereas 
by adding that element you can only apply it to the 
human species. 

Q. What are the properties of universal ideas? 

A. A universal idea represents a nature capable of 
being attributed to many individuals or species. This 
capacity of being attributed to many individuals or 
species is called Predicability of an idea. 

Again, this nature included in the universal idea is 
abstracted from all its individual conditions which make 
it belong to this particular individual place or time. 
Now, by the abstraction these particular conditions 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 43 

are thrown aside, and, therefore, in this state the 
nature belongs to all time and place. This property 
is called Perpetuity of an idea. This must not be 
understood in the sense that it does positively exist at 
all time and is eternal; because the actual and real 
existence of the universal idea is in our mind and 
follows the conditions of our mind. Our mind not 
being eternal, neither is the universal idea eternal. 
The universal idea, therefore, is perpetual in a nega- 
tive sense — that is to say, inasmuch as it bears no par- 
ticular traits of this or that time, place, and indi- 
vidual. 



CHAPTER II. 

GF THE DIFFERENT OBJECTS WHICH A UNIVERSAL IDEA 
MAY REPRESENT, AND OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF 
REPRESENTING THEM. 

O. What necessity is there for studying the differ- 
ent objects of a universal idea and the different modes 
3f representing them? 

A. One cannot have a correct notion of an image if 
he does not know the objects it represents and the 
different ways of representing them. Having, there- 
fore, said that a universal idea is an image formed in 
the intellect, to understand it well we must study the 
objects it may represent and the different ways it has 
of representing them. In other words, a universal 
idea represents soinetJiing common to many. We must, 
therefore, study what is this something common, and in 
how many ways it may be attributed to many. We 
shall begin from the ways or modes in which a uni- 
versal idea represents objects — ways or modes which 
have been called by philosophers categorema, or, sim- 
ply, universals. 

Q. How many universals are there ? 

A. The idea is called universal inasmuch as it 
represents an object as attributable to many. There- 
fore the modes or ways of representing an object 
universally must be as many as there are ways of 
attributing a thing to many. Now, a thing may be 
attributed to many in the following ways : It may be 
attributed to them as representing an element of 
their essence ; or as representing that particular ele- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 45 

ment which distinguishes them from all others and in 
which none other can share ; or as representing the 
full and complete essence ; or as something not form- 
ing an element of the essence, but a necessary conse- 
quence of it; or, finally, as something not at all 
necessary to the essence, but accidental to it. For 
instance, take the idea animal in respect to man ; 
what does this idea represent with respect to man ? 
An element of his essence, because animality enters 
as an element in man's essence. Take the idea rea- 
sonable ; what does it represent with regard to man ? 
That peculiar element of his essence which distin- 
guishes man from all other beings inferior to himself. 
Take the idea reasonable animal ; what does it repre- 
sent in respect to man ? His complete essence. 
Take the idea capable of learning ; what does it 
represent with regard to man ? Something which 
necessarily follows from his essence. Take the idea 
white ; what does it represent ? Something not at 
all necessary but quite accidental to the essence of 
man. 

There are, therefore, five modes of representing 
something as common to many: as a part of their 
essence ; as their complete essence ; as that peculiar 
element which distinguishes them from all others ; as 
something necessarily following from, or something 
quite accidental to, the essence. There are no other 
possible ways of representing something as common 
to many. The first — that is, that common thing 
which forms an element of the essence of many — is 
called genus. The second — that is, that common 
thing which represents the complete essence of many 
— is called species. The third is that peculiar ele- 
ment which distinguishes the essence from that of 
others, and is called difference. The fourth is that 



4-6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

which necessarily derives from the essence, and is 
C2i\\Qd property. The fifth is called accident. 

O. Speak of the first universal, genus, and point 
out its offices. 

A. Genus is defined : A universal nature, which may 
be attributed to several species as an element of their re- 
spective essences. Before explaining this definition we 
must remark that we are obliged necessarily to ex- 
plain the genus by means of the species, and vice versa, 
as they are relative terms. That they are naturally re- 
lated is clear from the fact that two things are neces- 
sary to form the nature .of genus — first, it must be 
found in several species, and not in several indi- 
viduals, as some have said, because genus is attribut- 
able only to that which is immediately under it. But 
directly under the genus is the species, not the indi- 
vidual. Therefore genus must be attributable to 
several species. The second is, that genus is at- 
tributed to species as an element of its essence, 
which it has in common with other species. Thus 
a7tinial, which, is genus respecting man and the brutes, 
contains only an element of their essence. 

Q. What is species ? 

A. A universal notion which can be attributed to many 
individuals as their complete essence. To have the 
nature of species, therefore, two things are required : 
I. It must be applicable to many individuals, be- 
cause it is a universal notion, just because it is attri- 
butable to many individuals. 2. It must be attribut- 
ed to many individuals as their complete essence. 
Thus, man is attributable to Peter, John, Walter, and 
all individuals of the human species, as representing 
their complete essence. 

O. What is difference ? 

A. A tmiversal idea which can be attributed to many 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 47 

individuals, as that clement zvJiicJi distingnishcs their 
essence from all otJier essences. Reasonableness in man 
is just the difference which distinguishes his essence 
from all others. And it is to be remarked that differ- 
ence is a universal idea, inasmuch as it is predicated 
of many individuals as the distinguishing element of 
their essence, and not in any other sense. We con- 
clude, therefore : Genus is a universal idea which repre- 
sents a common element of the essence of a number 
of species. Difference represents that element which 
distinguishes the species from each other, species the 
complete essence of many individuals. 

Q. What are the degrees of universals ? 

A. Three : stipreme, middle, and lozvest. Genus is 
called supreme when it has no other above it, as sub- 
stance. It is called middle when it has other genuses 
above and under it, as body, Avhich has the genus sub- 
stance above it and two before it, living bodies and 
inorganic bodies. It is called lowest when it has no 
genus under it but species, as the genus animal, which 
has two species under it, reasonable and iinreasonable 
animals. Likewise species and difference are called 
supreme if they have no species or difference placed 
above them ; middle if they have them above and 
below them ; lowest when they have none but indi- 
viduals below them. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
On Property and Accident. 

Q. Define the universal called property. 

A. It is a universal idea representing something com- 
mon to many individuals, as necessarily emanating from 
their essence. Freedom in man, for instance, is a pro- 
perty, because, though it is a quality which does not 



48 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

enter in the definition of his essence, is yet neces- 
sarily flowing from it. And if so flowing, it is 
clear that it must have the same qualifications as 
the essence. Now, the essence has three qualifications : 
I. It is applicable only to the species, because by 
means of the essence individuals are classified in their 
own species. 2. It must be applicable to all the indi- 
viduals of the species. 3. And that for ever, because 
neither the species nor the individual can ever exist 
without their nature. Property, therefore, must be 
applicable to one species, to all the individuals of the 
species, and for ever. These three qualities distin- 
guish property from all accidents ; from those acci- 
dents Avhich are applicable to the species, but not 
to all individuals. We can say, for instance, that 
every man is free, but we cannot say that every man 
is a poet, the latter being an accident Avhich be- 
comes some of the species, but not all; from those 
which belong to all the individuals of the species, but 
not exclusively to that species. I can predicate free- 
dom, of man alone, but to have two feet or to possess 
teeth I can say of man and many of the species brute. 

Q. Define accident. 

A. It is quite the contrary of property, and may be 
defined : Tiiat universal notion which may be found 
or not in a nninber of individuals without at alt inter- 
fering %u it h their nature. Hence, in order to have the 
idea of accident it is not necessary that it should be 
separable from an individual ; it is enough that we 
may conceive the individual as without that accident, 
leaving at the same time his nature unchanged. To 
be black is inseparable from the raven, yet that quality 
is an accident in the raven, as we can easily think its 
essence without that quality. 

Q. How can universals be predicated of a thing? 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 49 

A. Before answering the question we must make 
two remarks: i. That universals may not only be 
predicated of real objects, but may be predicated of 
each other; as, for instance, accident may have its 
genus, species, difference, property, and accident. 
Thus the accident red is a species under the genus 
color, the difference of which might be determined by 
a given shade of red, etc. 

Second remark. Universals may be predicated in 
the abstract form or in the concrete, as we may say 
animality and animal, reasonable and reasonableness, 
free and freedom, learned and doctrine. 

Having premised these two remarks, we give the 
rules how universals may be predicated of things : 

1st rule. Difference, property, and accident are ?iever 
predicated of a subject in the abstract form, but always 
in the concrete. Because these universals represent a 
quality, and therefore must be applied as adjectives 
which qualify a thing. Now, adjectives are concrete 
and not abstract; hence we must say man is reason- 
able and free, and not man is reasonableness and free- 
dom ; Peter is learned, and not Peter is doctrine. 

2d rule. Genns and species are predicated in the con- 
crete fcrvi zvJien it is question of sztbstances. Hence it 
is right to say Peter is a man, but wrong to say Peter 
is Jinmanity. The reason is that substances are attri- 
buted in their true and complete sense, and therefore 
in concrete. 

3d rule. Genus and species^ lahen it is question of 
accidental tilings, are predicated in the abstract. I can 
say, for instance, whiteness is a color, but not that 
which is white is colored, because when the accident 
is expressed in a concrete form, as when we say 
colored instead of color, the principal idea which is 
meant is no longer the accident but the substance 



50 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

which upholds it, and therefore there would be no 
more question of accidents but of substances, 

4th rule. Uiiiversals are predicated in all their com- 
preJiension, but not in all their extension. Because, in 
order to attribute a universal idea to a thing, it is 
necessary that I should find all the elements compos- 
ing that universal idea in the thing to which I wish to 
attribute it ; but it is by no means necessary that that 
thing should be the only one to which the universal 
may be applied, otherwise it would no longer be. uni- 
versal, 

ARTICLE SECOND, 

Of the Objects of Universal Ideas, or of Being and its 
Categories. 

Q. What is the object of universal ideas? 

A. It is being, or one of its determinations. Because 
the idea, inasmuch as it is an image which represents 
things to be known, is a means of knowledge ; there- 
fore all that Y/hich can be an object of our knowledge 
can be the object of our ideas. But the object of our 
knowledge can only be being or one of its determina- 
tions, as a thing can be known inasmuch as it is. These, 
therefore, are the objects of universal idea. 

Now, that being can stand for the object of uni- 
versal idea is beyond doubt, as we daily say being is, 
being is not. Nothing can be and not be at the same 
time. But we must remark that when the idea has 
being for its object it does not represent it in any of 
the five modes above spoken of — that is, as genus, 
species, difference, property, or accident — because, as we 
shall see in Ontology, being in general cannot be any 
of these things. 

O. How many are the determinations of being? 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 5 1 

They are innumerable, as every being is a determi- 
nation of being. But here we intend to speak only of 
those supreme divisions and classifications of being in 
which all other beings are included, because the object 
of logic is not this or that particular being, but the 
order of the conceptions of our mind. It is necessary, 
therefore, to explain those common divisions and uni- 
versal conceptions which put in order and distribute 
all beings into so many classes and categories. 

O. How man}^ categories are there ? 

Ten ; because being, universally considered, can be 
divided into substance and accident, meaning here by 
accident everything which is not a substance. Sub- 
stance, being the base of all the variety of accidents, 
and hence fixed and determinate in its idea, is taken 
always in the same for all substances, and therefore is 
not divided into other genuses. Accident, being more 
vague and confused and various, in order to determine 
and to fitly classify it, is divided into nine classes. 
Because accident is added to substance and deter- 
mines it. Now, substance maybe determined by nine 
things — by quantity, relation, quality, action, passion., 
tune, place, site, and habit. Hence accident is divided 
into all these classes. Being in general, therefore, is 
divided into tea grand orders, which are called cate- 
gories — ^that is, supreme genuses of things — and which 
are substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, 
time, space, site, habit. This is the celebrated division 
of being accepted and illustrated by the greatest 
thinkers of antiquity. We shall give here the defini- 
tion of substance, accident, relation, and quality, as 
they occur so frequently in logic, and shall speak of 
the rest in Ontology. 

Substance is that which exists in itself, a?id not in. 
another, as Peter, tree, stone. By this substance is 



52 Elanents of Intellectual Philosophy. 

easily distinguished from accident, Avhich is that 
which must lean on another in order to exist, as 
zvJiite, square^ round, etc. — things wliich cannot exist 
without leaning on another. 

It is to be carefully remarked that the essence of 
the substance is to be in itself and no't by itself. The 
first means that the substance requires no other .being 
to lean on in order to exist, which is true ; the second 
would mean that substance does not require a cause 
to create it, which is false of finite substances. 

Relation can be defined tJiat order ivJiicJi an object 
has with regard to another ; hoiv an object lies to an- 
other. For \x\s\.2iX\ZQ, paternity is a relation which im- 
plies the order in which a father stands to his son. 

This category may be real or logical : it is real Avhen 
it exists actually in nature, as the relation of pater- 
nity ; it is logical when it is placed by our mind. 

Quality. This accident may be defined tJuit which 
of itself gives a special manner of being to the sub- 
stance. 

It is called an accident to distinguish it from the 
specific difference, which is also a quality, but consti- 
tutes the essence. The other words distinguish it 
from other accidents because other accidents modify 
the substance more or less, but this they do not by 
themselves, but in consequence of something else; as, 
for instance, quantity qualifies the substance, not 
by itself, but by the extension of parts which it pro- 
duces in it. But when I say Peter is good, this 
quality gives of itself a new mode of existence to 
Peter. 

Q. Recapitulate all we have said in this chapter. 

A. From what we have said in this chapter it is 
evident how many and what are the different species 
of universal ideas. A universal idea is an intellectual 



Ele77ients of Intellectual Philosophy. 53 

representation. Now, these representations or forms 
are as different as are the objects they represent 
and the modes of representing them ; and, as there 
are five modes of representing an object in a universal 
way — genus, species, difference, property, and acci- 
dent — so, under this respect, there are five universal 
ideas — those of genus, species, difference, property, 
and accident. With regard to the object, as there are 
ten most universal objects, so there are ten universal 
ideas — substance accident, and this subdivided into 
relation, quantity, quality, action, passion, time, place, 
and habit, 



CHAPTER III. 

OF THE EXPRESSION OF IDEAS OR OF TERMS. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 
Definition and Division of Terms. 

Q. What are terms ? 

A. Among the many means we have of manifesting 
our ideas, words claim the first place. 

" The words . . . the speaking picture of tho mind, 
The extract of the soul, that labor'd how 
To leave the image of lierself behind." 

— Daniels' Poems. 

Words, inasmuch as they form a part of a proposi- 
tion or reasoning, are called terms, because they are 
the very thing to which a proposition or reasoning may 
be finally reduced ; though the idea itself which forms 
part of the judgment or proposition is oftentimes called 
term. A term, therefore, strictly speaking, may be 
defined that into which a simple proposition may be 
resolved. For instance, God is holy; this proposition 
maybe resolved into God Sixxd holy ; these, therefore, 
are the terms of the proposition. 

Q. How are terms divided inasmuch as they are 
signs of ideas? 

I . A term may be of as many kinds as there are ideas, 
because they are destined exactly to express ideas, 
and everything which has relation with another object 
may easily be called after it, as we say generally 
wholesome food, drink, and so forth, not because such 

54 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 55 

things are subject to health, but because they have 
relation with it, inasmuch as they are either its 
cause or its sign. Likewise, terms having relation to 
ideas may reasonably be called after them. Hence, as 
there are abstract, concrete, collective, particular, 
universal, and individual ideas, and so forth, so there 
are also abstract, concrete, collective, particular, 
universal, and individual terms. But besides, terms 
as signs may be divided into three great classes. 
Some signify a thing by themselves, such as the term 
man; others cannot express anything by themselves, 
but must be joined to others, as so7ne, every, which 
uttered by themselves mean nothing, but have a mean- 
ing when united to those of the former class, as some 
men, every tree ; others, finally, may or may not 
signify something by themselves. The first are called 
by modern philosophers terms significative by them- 
selves ; the second, significative by means of others ; 
the third are called mixed terms. The first, however, 
strictly deserve the name of terms. 

Q. How are terms significative by themselves sub- 
divided ? 

A. I. into positive and negative. The first signify 
something, as w«7/ / the second express the absence 
of something, as impotent — that is, the absence of 
power. About the latter we must remark that some 
of them are negative as to the word, but positive as 
to the meaning, as innocence, immortality, infinity, 
which imply a positive perfection ; others are positive 
as to the word and negative as to the sense, as mortal, 
Corruptible, blind. 

2. Into complex and iiicomplex, the first are those 
which are formed of more than one significative word, 
as Washington Irving ; the second of one, as tree, 
spiritual. 



56 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

3. Into iinivocal, equivocal, analogical. The first are 
those which are applied to several objects under the 
same signification, as animal, which is applied to man 
and to beasts. 

The second are those which are applied to several 
things in a different meaning, as scorpion, which means 
the animal of such name, and is also given to one of 
the signs of the Zodiac. 

The third are those which lie between the two for- 
mer ones, and which are not applied to more than one 
thing in the same meaning, nor in a meaning alto- 
gether different, but are applied to something in con- 
sequence of a certain similarity with other things ; as 
when we say the air is very healthy, the term heal- 
thy is analogical, because, although the term can be 
strictly applied only to the human body, it is yet by 
analogy or resemblance applied to air, to food, to 
color, etc. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Properties of Terms. 

O. How many are the properties of terms? 

A, Five : supposition, alienation, amplification, re- 
striction, and appellation ; because every term may be 
applied either in its proper meaning, and then we 
have supposition; or in a meaning not its own, and 
then wc have alienation ; or in a wider meaning, and 
then we have amplification ; or in more restricted 
sense, and we have restriction ; or it may be added to 
illustrate another term, and then we have appellation. 

The supposition of a term is, therefore, nothing 
more than the use of the word in its proper sense. 
The appellation may be twofold. It is material when 
the term is used not for its object but for itself, as in 



Elements of hitellectual Philosophy. 57 

that sophism mentioned and refuted by Clement of 
Alexandria : " What thou utterest passeth through 
thy mouth. But thou utterest house ; therefore 
house passeth through thy mouth," The supposition 
of the term here is material ; it means the word house, 
but not the object signified by the work. On this also 
is founded that beautiful impersonification of the five 
vowels : 

"We are little airy creatures, 
All of diflFerent voice and features ; 
One of us in glms is set, 
One of us you'll find injef, 
T'other you may see in Hn, 
And the fourth a 6ox within ; 
If the fifth you should pursue, 
It can never fly from you." 

— Swift. 

When the term is used to mean the object, then the 
supposition is formal, as a house must have ivalls and 
roof. 

O. How is formal supposition subdivided ? 

A. I. Into logical and real. It is logical when the 
term expresses that which exists only logically, as 
animal is a predicable called genus. It is real when 
the term is used to express that which really agrees 
with the object, as the animal is sensitive. 

2. Into collective and distributive. It is collective 
when we use a common word for all the objects signi- 
fied and taken together, as the apostles were twelve. 
It is distributive when the term can be used not only 
for all but for each one, as man is rational. But with 
regard to this distributive supposition Ave must remark 
that the individual objects may be either each indi- 
vidual, or not each individual but each species, as all 
animals zuere in Noe's ark. The sense here is that 



5 8 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

not each individual animal was there, but each indi- 
vidual species. 

O. What is appellation, and how is it subdivided ? 

A. It is the application of one term to another, and 
it is formal and material — formal when it naturally 
agrees with the other, as ih^ physician cures ; material 
when it is merely accidental, as the physician sings or 
dances. 

Q. What is alienation ? 

A. The use of a term not in its own proper mean- 
ing, but in another, as the Lion of Jiida, the Sun of 
Justice. 

Q. What is amplification ? 

A. It is the extension of a term from a less compre- 
hensive sense to a greater, as great inen will always be 
honored — meaning not only great men of the present 
timic, but of all time and place ; and that playful 
amplification of Pitt : 

" From the smnll acorn see the oak arise, 
Supremely tall and towering in the skies ! 
Queen of the groves ! her stately head she rears, 
Her bulk increasing with increasing 5rcars ; 
Now moves in pomp majestic o'er the deep. 
While in her womb ten thousand thunders sleep — 
Hence Britain boasts hdr far-extended reign, 
And by the expanded acorn rules the main." 

Q. What is restriction ? 

A. The use of a term which has a broader significa- 
tion in a more narrow one, as Eve was the mother of 
all living. Living, in this phrase, is taken in a more 
restricted sense than it has, naturally meaning every- 
thing which has life, from the plant to God, whereas 
in the phrase it is merely to express men. 



CHAPTER IV. 

PROXIMATE MATTER OF REASONING ; AND, FIRST, OF THE 
NATURE OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Nature and Definition of Judgment. 

Q. What is judgment ? 

A. We have said that our mind acquires universal 
ideas when it considers a quality as appHcable to a 
number of subjects. If, then, the mind applies a 
quality to one or more subjects, or removes it from 
them, we have another act of the mind called judg- 
ment. For instance, our mind may reflect on the 
quality rational, as applicable to Peter, John, Walter, 
Andrew, and to all men, but it may do more: from 
the possibility it may pass to the fact and actually 
apply that quality to them, and say Peter is rational, 
John is rational, all men are rational ; or it may 
deny a quality of a subject, as man is not bird. In the 
first instance we have a universal idea; in the second, 
a judgment. 

Q. In Avhat exactly lies the nature of judgment? 

A. To be able to affirm or to deny a quality of a 
subject it is necessary that the mind should, in the 
first place, compare the idea of the subject Avith the 
idea of the quality; and, next, that it should perceive 
the agreement or the disagreement which may exist be- 
tween the two, otherwise it could not affirm or deny 
one or the other. Now, though the comparing of 

59 



6o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

the quality with the subject be necessary to render a 
judgment possible, yet the true nature of judgment 
lies exactly in the agreement or disagreement of the 
quality with the subject, and in the affirming or de- 
nying one or the other. Because to form a judgment, 
as we liave said, the actual application to, or the re- 
moving of a quality from, a subject is necessary. But 
in the mere comparison of the two terms that appli- 
cation is wanting. When I raise, for instance, a ques- 
tion in my mind, Is Peter honest ? and begin to com- 
pare the two terms, I have not pronounced a judgment 
as yet, because I have made no application. When I 
say Peter is honest, then I have formed a judgment. 
The essence, therefore, of the judgment lies not in 
the comparison of the two terms but in the discovery 
of the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas, 
subject and quality, and in the affirmation or denial of 
the same. And as definition must express the nature 
of a thing, so we may rightly define judgment the per- 
ception of the agreeuient of a quality zvith a subject, 
or the disagreement of a quality from a subject ; or, 
with St. Thomas, that act of the mind by wJdcJi it unites 
or divides by affirming or denying. The thing which 
is affirmed or denied is q.2l\\q.A predicate ; that of which 
something is affirmed or denied is called subject ; and 
the judgment, if it affirm something of the subject, is 
called affirmative ; if it deny, is called negative. 

Q. What conclusions do you draw from the nature 
of judgment? 

A. I. That judgment is a more perfect knoAvledge 
relatively to ideas, because by means of the idea no- 
thing is affirmed or denied of a subject, and hence 
its knowledge is not complete ; whereas the nature of 
judgment consists exactly in that affirmation or nega- 
tion. Therefore judgment is a more perfect know- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 6i 

ledge than simple apprehension, and is therefore a 
proximate matter of reasoning, as being a more per- 
fect knowledge of a thing. 

2. In judgment there is always found a universal 
perception ; because, the essence of judgment consist- 
ing in affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, or, 
in other words, in saying that one of the terms is the 
other, as man is rational, there lurks in that affirma- 
tion the perception of the unity of being between the 
subject and the predicate, man and rational. But to see 
unity common to a plurality is a universal perception ; 
therefore in every judgment there is always a univer- 
sal perception. This is also the case when the judg- 
ment is negative, as when we say Peter is not a phi- 
losopher, because I discover that not to be a philoso- 
pher is common also to Peter, from which it is evident 
how important to reasoning and logic are universal per- 
ceptions. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Nature of Propositions. 

Q. Give the definition and elements of a proposition. 

A. Judgment is so called when confined within the 
mind ; when it comes out of the mind clothed in words 
it is called proposition. Man is a reasonable being is 
a judgment expressed in words, and therefore a pro- 
position. And because judgment affirms or denies 
something of a subject, according to this a proposition 
may be defined a discourse, by which we affirm or 
deny a quality of a subject. Hence three elements 
enter into a proposition — the thing of which something 
is affirmed or denied, and which is called subject ; the 
quality which is affirmed or denied, and Avhich is called 
predicate ; and, finally, the verb is or is not, which, 



62 Elements of Intellechial Philosophy. 

strictly speaking, expresses the essence of judgment — 
that is, the act of the mind forming the agreement 
or disagreement. The first two are called the terms 
of a proposition. The verb is, because uniting them 
together, is called copula. 

Q. What remarks ought to be made as to the 
copula in a proposition ? 

A. I. The copula is always necessary in a proposi- 
tion, and no proposition can be formed without the 
verb to be. Because to establish a proposition it is 
not sufficient to express the subject and the predicate, 
but it is also necessary to express the agreement or dis- 
agreement Avhich one has with the other. Now, this 
agreement or disagreement cannot be expressed by 
means of the predicate only, because the predicate 
without the copula would imply no relation to the 
subject. Therefore the copula is necessary in every 
proposition. 

2. Having established the necessity of the copula, 
and having said that it is a verb, we must pay atten- 
tion to its signification, to its mood, its tense, and to 
the special manner of using it. As to its significa- 
tion, we must remark that to be, in the proposition, 
does not mean to exist, because the copula does not 
express the real existence of the terms ; as, for instance, 
when I say Shakspere is the greatest English poet, 
I do not mean to say that Shakspere does actually 
exist now, I mean merely to unite that predicate to 
Shakspere. Therefore the copula in propositions 
merely expresses the agreement of the predicate with 
the subject, or the act of the intellect applying the 
predicate to the subject. Whether the objects signi- 
fied by the terms exist or not it is no business of the 
copula to express. It is by a different act of the mind 
and by investigating the nature of the terms that it 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 63 

can be found out whether they be real or logical. Nor 
is it contrary to this theory to say that there are some 
propositions in which the copula expresses the real 
existence, as Socrates is ; because that proposition 
amounts to this: Socrates is existing; in which case 
also the copula expresses the union of the two terms. 

Q. Of what mood and tense must the copula be ? 

A. As to the mood, it must be the indicative mood, 
because the copula in a proposition is used to affirm 
and declare a predicate of a subject or to deny it of 
the subject. But of all the moods of a verb only the 
indicative has the office to affirm, to declare, to deny. 
Therefore the copula in a proposition must be in the 
indicative mood. 

As to the tense, it must be the present tense, be- 
cause the copula, as we have said, does not express 
the real existence of the terms, but the act by which 
the mind unites the predicate with the subject or 
separates one from the other. But this act is done 
when the mind judges— that is, in the present time. 
Therefore the copula must be in the present tense. 
If there be any propositions having the copula in the 
past or future tense, the time past or future must be 
applied to the tenses, and not to the copula. The pro- 
position, for instance. The Messias was the Redeemer 
of Israel, must be understood to mean the Messias is 
lie who was the Redeemer of Israel, the predicate 
being zvho was the Redeemer of Israel. 

Finally, we must remark that the copula in a pro- 
position may be incorporated in the predicate, as, 
for instance, in the proposition John is sleeping, the 
predicate sleeping may be incorporated in the copula, 
and we can say John sleeps. From this originate 
those verbs which grammarians call adjective — that is, 
those which contain the verb to be as an attribute to 



64 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

distinguish them from the verb to be as substantive. 
In conclusion one must pay close attention to the 
nature of the copula, because from it all these things 
proceed. The copula is nothing else but the act of 
the mind uniting or separating the predicate from the 
subject, in which the essence of judgment consists. It 
follows from this, ist, that the copula is as necessary 
to the proposition as that act is essential to judgment ; 
2d, that the copula does not express the real exis- 
tence of the subject or predicate, but merely the act 
of the mind uniting or separating them ; 3d, that that 
act being nothing else but an affirmation or negation, 
the office of the indicative mood, the copula expressing 
it must be also in the indicative mood ; 4th, that, the 
act being performed in the present time, the copula 
must be in the present tense ; 5th, that in that act 
the predicate being considered as applicable to the 
subject, it may easily be incorporated in the copula, 
the office of which is just to refer the predicate to the 
subject. 



CHAPTER V. 

DIFFERENT SPECIES AND PROPERTIES OF PROPO- 
SITIONS, 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Difference of Proposition considered as to the Copula. 

O. What causes the difference of propositions ? 

A, From the nature of a being immediately arise 
its different species and properties, because the spe- 
cies of a thing is nothing more than the nature of the 
thing itself differently modified, and its properties are 
an immediate consequence of that nature. Having, 
therefore, determined the nature of judgment and pro- 
position, it will be easy to deduce from it their divi- 
sion and properties. The nature of judgment or 
proposition lies in applying or not a predicate to a 
subject ; therefore propositions must be different, ac- 
cording to the difference of such application. This 
application may vary from two causes, from itself 
and from the way it is made, or from the terms 
which are applied— that is, either from the copula or 
the terms. 

Q. How many different propositions are there, con- 
sidered as to the copula? 

A. In propositions the predicate may either be ap- 
plied to the subject or denied of the subject ; or it 
may be denied of the subject, but at the same time 
insinuating that another may be agreeable to it. 
When the predicate is applied to the subject, then the 
proposition is affirmative, such as God is infinite, the 

6s 



66 Elements of hitellectual Philosophy. 

Church is imperishable ; when the predicate is denied 
of the subject then the proposition is negative — man is 
not a pure spirit, beauty is not imperishable ; when it 
is denied of the subject, insinuating that some other 
predicate may be agreeable to it, then the proposition 
is called indefinite ; as. The brute is not man, in which 
proposition, if we remove the predicate man from 
brute, we insinuate that some other attribute may 
apply to it. Hence, an indefinite proposition- is nei- 
ther affirmative nor negative, but partakes of both. 
These propositions, however, are not so common or 
important ; more common and important are the 
affirmative and the negative. 

Q. To what law are affirmative and negative propo- 
sitions subject? 

A. To the following : In affirmative propositions 
the predicate is applied in all its comprehension or in 
the totality of the elements of which it is composed, 
but not in all its extension — that is, not in its full capa- 
city of being applied. Homer is an epic poet ; Bacon 
is a naturalist ; the predicate epic poet in the first 
proposition is applied to Homer in the totality of , 
elements composing that idea — that is, every quality 
forming an epic poet agrees with Homer — but not in its 
full capacity of being applied, as that predicate may 
be applied, to others, as to Dante, Milton, Virgil, etc. 
In the second proposition the predicate naturalist 
agrees with Bacon in the same sense — that is, in the 
totality of elements forming that idea — but may be ap- 
plied to others, such as Locke, Hobbes, Condillac, 
etc. The reason of this law is drawn from the very 
nature of affirmative propositions, because when we 
affirm a predicate of subject in a proposition we say 
that one thing is the other. Now, we could not say 
that unless all the elements of the predicate agreed 



Ehfnents of Intellectual Philosophy. 67 

with the subject ; therefore, in these propositions, the 
predicate must be taken in its comprehension, but 
not in all its extension, because when we affirm a pre- 
dicate of a subject we want to express the quality 
with which the subject is endowed, and not the num- 
ber of individuals which may have it. 

In negative propositions the predicate is not denied 
in all its comprehension but in all its extension, be- 
cause, in order to say that a thing is not another, it is 
sufficient that a single element of the one is not found 
in the other; but it is denied in all its extension, be- 
cause if that which is signified by the predicate could 
agree wath any part of the subject, we could not sim- 
ply remove the predicate from the subject. For 
instance, when we say The circle is not square we 
mean to say that no possible circle can ever be square, 
otherwise we could not say, absolutely speaking, the 
circle is not square. 

O. In how many ways can we affirm or deny a pre- 
dicate of a subject? 

A. In two ways : by simply affirming or denying the 
predicate of a subject, or by expressing the manner or 
mode in which a predicate may be applicable to a sub- 
ject. In the first case we have simple propositions, in 
the second 7;z^<^(a:/ propositions. Thus, when I say The 
rose is fragrant, I utter a simple proposition ; wdien I 
say ]\Ian is necessarily reasonable, I pronounce TKinodal 
proposition, because I express the manner in which 
the predicate agrees with the subject. 

O. How many ways or modes are there by which a 
predicate may agree or disagree with a subject ? 

A. Four; and hence there can be four species of 
modal propositions. The predicate may agree or dis- 
agree with a sw\y]^z\. possibly ox impossibly , necessarily or 
accidentally ; and, therefore, propositions may express 



68 Elaneitts of Intellectual Philosophy 

the possibility or impossibility of a predicate agreeing 
with a subject, the necessity or contingency of its agree- 
ing or not with it. If they express the possibiHty they 
are called possible, as Man can be a philosopJicr ; they 
are called impossible if they express the impossibility 
of the predicate agreeing with the subject — as, Man can- 
not be infinite ; necessary if they express the necessity 
■ — as, The soul is necessarily immortal ; contingent if 
they express the contingency — as, The Ethiopian is 
black by accident. 

O. What other modes of affirming or denying, and, 
consequently, how many kinds of propositions, are 
there ? 

A. Two, absolute and hypothetical. We can apply 
or not the predicate to the subject absolutely, without 
expressing the case when it may or may not agree 
Avith the subject, or Ave may express the case when 
it may or may not apply to the subject. In the first 
case we have absolute propositions — as, Man is a rea- 
sonable animal ; in the second we have hypotheti- 
cal or conditional propositions — as, Where there is 
smoke there must be fire. These latter propositions 
are threefold, connex, conjunctive, and disjunctive. 
The first is that in which the condition is expressed 
by the word if; as. If there are footprints some one 
must have walked. This proposition is formed of 
two, one which expresses the condition, and is called 
antecedent — as. If there are footprints ; the other 
affirms or denies the predicate, and is called conse- 
quent, because depending on the first — as, some one 
must have Avalked. The truth of these propositions 
does not lie in the truth of the antecedent or conse- 
quent, but in the connection ; if the connection is 
true the proposition is true ; if false, false — as, If 
.donkeys had wings they would fly. This proposition 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 69 

is true, though it is not true that donkeys can have 
wings because the connection is true. On the con- 
trary, if I said, If America exists Rome exists, both 
antecedent and consequent are true, but the proposi- 
tion is false, because there is no connection between 
the two. 

Tlie conjunctive proposition is tliat in Avhich the 
propositions are united by the words and, not ; as, for 
instance, He is not both dead and aHve. Conjunctive 
proposition, then, is that in which is expressed tlie 
impossibility of two things being together, and in 
order to be true it is necessary that there should be a 
repugnance between the two. Hence the following 
proposition is not true : Peter cannot both sleep and 
breathe, because those two things can go together. 

A disjunctive proposition is that in which proposi- 
tions are united together by the words either, or; as, 
for instance. It is either night or day. This propo- 
sition, to be true, two conditions are necessary : i. 
That there be a true opposition between the proposi- 
tions of which it is composed. 2. That the enume- 
ration of parts be complete, otherwise the adversary 
may catch at that which is omitted. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Difference of Propositions, Considered as to their Terms. 

Q. How are propositions divided under this respect ? 

A. The other cause of difference in propositions, as 
we have said, is the difference of terms. Terms may 
be different either on account of their extension or 
of their number. Hence we have difference of pro- 
positions from the difference of terms as to their 
extension and as to their number. 

As extension renders terms singular, particular, and 



/ o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

universal, so propositions under this respect may be 
singular, particular, and universal. They are called 
singular if their subjects be singular — as, Peter is a 
philosopher ; particular if the subjects be particular — 
as. Some men are good writers; and, finally, universal 
if the subjects be universal — as. All men are rational 
animals. Let it be carefully remarked that the ex- 
tension of propositions is taken from the subjects, and 
not from the predicate. Because the predicate is at- 
tributed in the proposition only to the subject men- 
tioned, therefore the subject must determine the ex- 
tension of the proposition ; as when I say Peter is a 
philosopher, Longfellow is a poet, the predicate philo- 
sopher in the example is applied only to Peter, there- 
fore Peter must determine the extent of the proposi- 
tion. 

O. How are propositions divided as to the number 
of the terms ? 

A. Lito single and multiple. Are called single 
when they are formed of one subject and one predi- 
cate — as, Blessed are the meek. Are multiple when 
they are composed of more than one subject or more 
than one predicate ; as, Franklin was a mechanic, a 
philosopher, and a statesman. This proposition is 
equivalent to these three : Franklin was a mechanic, 
Franklin was a philosopher, Franklin was a statesman. 

There are different kinds of single and multiple pro- 
positions. As to the single proposition, it may be so 
by itself or by reduction. The example. The meek are 
blessed, shows a proposition single in itself. They are 
called single by reduction when, though we may affix 
to the subject or to predicate various terms and other 
propositions, yet they can all be reduced to one idea. 
For instance, He who betrayed the cause of American 
independence was Arnold, called emphatically the 



Ele^nents of Intellectual Philosophy. 7 1 

Traitor. All this can be reduced to one idea — Arnold 
betrayed the cause of American independence. 

Multiple propositions are divided into explicit or im- 
plicit. They are called explicit when openly they 
have more than one term or proposition; implicit 
when apparently they seem to be one, but their mean- 
ing is equivalent to more than one, proposition — as, 
Among animals man only is reasonable ; the word 
only turns that proposition into two ; all animals do 
not reason, man reasons. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
Properties of Propositions. 

Q. What and how many are the properties of pro- 
positions ? 

A. Property is called that which follows necessarily 
from the nature of a thing, which always accompanies 
it and is never separated from it. Now, admitting 
the nature of proposition, three things follow from it 
— opposition.^ conversion, and equivalence. These are 
consequent upon every species of proposition ; every 
species of proposition being able to have its opposite, 
its converse, and its equivalent. Therefore there are 
three properties of propositions, opposition, conver- 
sion, and equivalence. 

Q. What is opposition ? 

It is the affirming and denying in two propositions 
the same predicate of the same subject, at the same 
time and under the same respect. This opposition may 
be threefold, contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary, 
and hence there may be contradictory, contrary, and 
subcontrary propositions. Propositions are called con- 
tradictory when of the two propositions one is uni- 
versal, the other is particular — as, All men are inst, some 



72 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

vian is not just. They are called contrary when both 
are universal — as, All men are just, all men are not just ; 
subcontrary when both propositions are particular — 
som^ men are just, some men are not just. Of these last 
St. Thomas observes that, properly speaking, they can- 
not be called opposite, because, in order to have oppo- 
sition, it is necessary that the subject be the same in 
both propositions. Now, in subcontrary propositions, 
the subject, being taken in particular, is not the same 
in both. 

Q. What have you to observe with regard to the 
truth of such propositions? 

A. I. Contradictories cannot be both true or false, 
but one must be true and the other false. Because 
otherwise the same thing would and would not be at 
the same time. As in the example, All men are just, 
some men are not just, it is evident that one of them 
must be false, otherwise one thing would and would 
not be at the same time, since one proposition is in- 
cluded in the other. 

Contraries cannot be both true, because if the 
affirmative is true the negative must be false, since 
the predicate is affirmed and denied of the same sub- 
ject in an universal sense. They can be either one true 
and the other false when the predicate necessarily 
agrees with the subject — as, All men are reasonable, all 
men are not reasonable ; or may be both false when 
the predicate only accidentally agrees with the sub- 
ject — as, All men are philosophers, no man is a 
philosopher. 

Subcontraries cannot be both false, but must be 
either both true if the predicate agrees with the sub- 
ject only accidentally — as, Some men are rich, some 
men are not rich; or one false and the other true 
when the predicate agrees necessarily with the sub- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 73 

ject — as, Some men have a soul, some men have not 
a'soul, 

Q. What is the meaning of equivalence of propo- 
sitions? 

A. When we please we can reduce opposite propo- 
sitions to the same signification, and when this is done 
we have the equivalence of propositions. This is ac- 
complished by means of the particle not, thus : Con- 
tradictory propositions are rendered equivalent by 
placing the particle not before the subject of either 
proposition. For instance, the contradictories, All 
men are rich, some men are not rich, I can make 
equivalent by saying not all men are rich, and I re- 
duce to the same sense as some men are rich. Con- 
traries are made equivalent by placing the particle 
not after the subject of the affirmative ; as, for in- 
stance. All men are just, all men are not just. I can 
put not after men in the first proposition, and reduce 
the sense to no man is just. 

Q. What is conversion ? 

A. The changing of the place of the predicate into 
that of the subject, and vice versa, keeping safe the 
truth of the proposition — as. Every man is a reason- 
able animal; I could say every reasonable animal is a 
man. 

Q-. What is the use of equivalence and conversion? 

A. They are of very great use in discovering soph- 
isms of adversaries, in understanding obscure and 
difficult propositions by reducing themi to a clearer 
form. 



CHAPTER VI. 

TRUTH OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

What is Logical Truth ? 

Q. Give an idea of truth in general. 

A. To answer this question, we must remark that 
whatever exists may have a twofold relation with the 
intellect. Things may be related to the intellect 
inasmuch as they draw their existence from it, or in- 
asmuch as they are known by it. Thus, a house is 
referred to the intellect of the architect in a different 
way from that in which it is referred to the intellect 
of the beholders. To the intellect of the architect it is 
related inasmuch as it originates from it ; to that of 
the beholders inasmuch as it is known by it. Now, it 
is evident that things could not exist except they were 
conceived by the intellect, which is their cause, in 
which case the relation they have with such intellect 
is an essential relation ; but things could exist very 
well without any other intellect knowing them, conse- 
quently the relation they have with the intellect 
which merely knows them is an accidental relation. 
The house spoken of in the example is related essen- 
tially to the intellect of the architect ; whereas it is 
related only accidentally to the beholders' mind. We 
must remark, in the second place, that between the 
object and the conception of the intellect either pro- 
ducing it or merely knowing it there may pass a re- 
lation of agreement and conformity, or disagreement, 



Elements of Intellectua I Ph ilosophy. 7 5 

because oftentimes the object does not correspond 
with the intellect of the artist, and frequently the in- 
tellect does not apprehend a thing just as it is. TJie 
agreement of the tiling zvith the intelleet from zu/u'eh tt is 
produced is called metaphysical trutli. The agreement 
of an object ivith the intellect knozving it is called logical 
truth. On the contrary, the discrepancy of the thing 
zi'ith the intellect which originates it is called metaphysi- 
cal falsehood ; and the discrepaticy of the object zvith the 
intellect knozving it is called logical falsehood. Both 
kinds of truths are defined by St. Thonaas the equatio7i 
of tJie object zvith the intellect. We shall speak in this 
article only of logical truth, which we have defined 
the agreement of the object with the intellect which 
knows it. 

O. How many kinds of logical truths are there ? 

A. Logical truth may be different, according as we 
consider the things which are known and the manner 
of knowing them. Considering the manner of know- 
ing things, logical truth may be mediate or immediate. 
It is called immediate when the intellect discovers the 
truth of a judgment the moment it is presented to it, 
— as, The zvJiole is greater than any of its parts ; of this 
judgment the intellect perceives the truth the moment 
it perceives the terms. On the contrary, when the 
intellect, in order to know the truth of a judgment, 
must make use of other truths better known to it, 
that truth is called mediate ; as, when hearing that the 
human soul is immortal, in order to perceive the truth 
of that proposition I must have recourse to other 
propositions better known to me. As to the terms, 
logical truth may be of fact and of reason. It is truth 
of fact when the objects are subject to experience ; it: 
is of reason when the terms are concerned about ab- 
stract principles. 



']6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 

Is Truth found in the Act of Apprehension or in that 
of JiLdgnient ? 

Q. In what act is truth found ?" 

A. The acts of our mind are three — apprehension, 
judgment, and reasoning. Reasoning is nothing else 
but a series of judgments and ideas formed by the 
mind. Hence, truly, the acts of knowing are ideas 
and judgments. Besides, strictly speaking, reasoning 
is nothing more than a third judgment deduced from 
two others, and is true or not according to the truth 
and order of the two first. Hence truth can only be 
sought in ideas and judgments. It is found perfectly 
in judgments. Locke, Rosmini, Galuppi, and others 
contend that it can be found in ideas. We follow the 
opinion of St. Thomas, whose doctrine on this point 
seems to us more simple, natural, and true. It is as 
follows : 

I. Truth, really and perfectly, is only in judg- 
ments. We prove it as follows : Truth consists in the 
agreement between the object and the intellect, and 
hence to know the truth is to know just this conform- 
ity. But to know that the apprehension of the intel- 
lect is conformable with the object is the work of 
judgment. Therefore truth perfectly can be found 
in judgment, because then only the intellect possesses 
truth perfectly when it not only has it, but when it 
knows that it has it. 

Truth is that thing after which the tendency of the 
intellect is drawn, and is, therefore, the perfection of 
the intellect. Therefore, truly and perfectly, it is 
found only in that act of the mind which is a com- 
plete and true knowledge, such as judgment. 

2. Truth is found imperfectly in apprehension. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. yj 

inasmuch as by means of the simple appreliension 
the intellect apprehends something as true, but does 
not know it to be such. In fact, simple apprehen- 
sions of the intellect represent the essence of things, 
as we shall see ; and therefore they must be comform- 
able to the things apprehended. Now, in this con- 
formity between apprehension and the object appre- 
hended lies truth. Therefore, even in apprehension 
we can find logical truth. But logical truth is said to 
be imperfectly in apprehension and in an incipient 
state, because the intellect, by means of the simple 
apprehension, does not know this conformity, as this 
belongs to judgment. 



PART SECOND. 



FORM OF REASONING. 

Having treated of the matter of reasoning, .which 
are terms and propositions, we must now speak of 
the form — that is, we must see how those terms and 
propositions must be placed together in order to form 
reasoning. All that can be said, however, with 
regard to the form of reasoning may be brought 
under four heads — first, the essential structure and 
order of reasoning; second, its different species; 
third, its external expression ; fourth, its defects. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF REASONING. 

ARTICLE FIRST, 

Of the Strtictiire of Reasoning in General. 

Q. What is reasoning? 

A. Propositions which may appear before the mind 
are of two kinds. Some are so evident that the mo- 
ment they are presented before the mind their truth 
can be at once perceived ; as, T/ie whole is greater than 

one of its parts ; a tiling cannot be a7id not he at the 

78 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 79 

same time. These are called truths evident of them- 
selves, or first truths. Others, and they the greatest 
number, are such as cannot be at once perceived by 
the mind. For instance, The soul is immortal ; a spiri- 
tual being cannot ocenpy space ; time is the measure of 
movement, and so forth. Now, in order to know these 
truths our mind must employ others better known to 
it, and which have some connection and relation with 
those it wants to know, and by placing and comparing 
them together comes to the knowledge of those it did 
not know. This operation is called reasoning or dis- 
course, and may be defined that act of the mind by which 
from tivo judgments a third is deduced, or that act which 
deduces the utiknoivn from the knoivn. For instance, 
the mind cannot see the connection between the sub- 
ject soul and the predicate immortal. What does it 
do? It compares both with a third idea, to see 
whether they agree or disagree with that third idea, 
and if it discover that they do agree it draws the con- 
clusion that they must agree together. This third idea 
may be spiritual, and the reasoning may be constructed 
as follows : 

That which is spiritual is immortal. 

But the soul is spiritual. 

Therefore it is immortal. 

Q. What is the order of reasoning ? 

A. It consists exactly in this: The mind wishes to 
know if a proposition be true or false ; in other words, 
if a predicate agrees with a subject. In order to find 
this out, the mind does nothing more nor less than 
what men do when they wish to find out if the length 
of two bodies is the same or not: they take a third 
one as a rule, and try it first with the one and then 
Avith the other ; and thus they can tell if their length 
agrees together or not. The mind does the same 



So Elements of Intellectttal Philosophy. 

when it wants to know if a predicate agrees with a 
subject. It takes a third idea, and makes it, as it 
were, the rule or measure, and compares it first with 
the subject and then with the predicate. Now, natu- 
rally three suppositions can result from this compari- 
son : I, That third idea may be found to agree both 
Mi\\\\ the predicate and the subject. 2. It may be 
found to agree with the one and not with the other. 
3. It may be found to agree with neither. In the' 
first case, when the third idea is found to agree both 
with the subject and the predicate, then the mind 
knows and concludes that the predicate and subject 
agree together, founded on that principle that two things 
zvliicJi agree zvith a tJiird agree together. For instance, 
the mind does not know if the soul is simple. It takes 
for a third idea that which has no parts, and compares 
subject and predicate with that third idea, thus: That 
which is simple has no parts. But the soul has no 
parts ; therefore it is simple. These reasonings are 
called affirmative. In the second case, when the 
third idea is seen to agree with the one and not with 
the other, the mind concludes that they do not agree 
together, on the principle that two things, one of ivhich 
agrees %vith a tJiird and the other not, do not agree to- 
gether. For instance, the mind knows the disagree- 
ment between these two ideas, a material substance 
and the human soul, by means of the third idea, a 
thinking substance, and reasons thus : A thinking 
substance is not material. But the soul is a thinking 
substance ; therefore it is not material. Here the 
third idea, a thinking substance, agrees with the sub- 
ject soul, but not with the predicate material. In the 
third supposition nothing can be concluded, as, the 
third idea not agreeing with any of the terms, no con- 
nection whatever is established between them. 



Elements of Iiitellectual Philosophy. 8i 

Q. What are, then, the elements and fundamental 
principles of reasoning"? 

A. It must result from three propositions, and 
these ordained in such a way that the mind may see 
the last proposition as included in' the two first. 

It must be formed of three terms: the subject, the 
predicate, and the third idea. 

We have said three propositions ; because in every 
reasoning three comparisons are made, one of the 
predicate with the third idea ; the other of the third 
idea with the subject ; the third of the subject witli 
the predicate. And from each of these comparisons 
arise a judgment and a proposition. They must be 
arranged in such a way that the last be contained in 
the two first ; otherwise there would be no reasoning, 
but three unconnected propositions. The three terms 
are called as follows : The predicate the major term, 
because ordinarily speaking it is more extensive ; the 
subject the minor term, because generally more re- 
stricted ; the third idea the middle term, from the office 
which it exercises. Likewise also the propositions : 
that in which the third idea is compared with the 
predicate is called the major proposition ; that in which 
the third idea is compared with the subject is called 
the minor ; that in which the subject and the predicate 
are compared is called consequent or consequence. 
And because ordinarily in the first proposition the 
predicate is compared with the third idea, and in the 
second the subject is compared with the third idea, 
the first is always called the major, the second the 
minor, and both together, in regard to the conse- 
quence, are Cd^leA premises. 

All reasonings are either affirmative or negative. 
The foundation of the afifirmiitive is that principle 
that tivo thins^s whicJi as!'ree zvith a third ao:rce too-etJur. 



82 Elcine7its of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Of the negative the principle is tivo iJiings of wJiicJi 
one agrees tvitJi a tJiird^ and the other does not, cannot 
agree together. 

Now, gathering together all- we have said, it is 
evident that in order to have reasoning the following 
things are necessary : 1st. That the mind be respect- 
ing the truth of a proposition in the state of doubt, 
desirous to remove it ; this is the end of reasoning. 
2d. It must have a third idea, which is the means 
whereby it reasons. 3d. It must compare this third 
idea with the terms of the proposition it wants to 
know, which constitutes the nse of that third idea. 
4th. It must deduce from that comparison the truth 
it wants to find out, which is the effect of reasoning. 
We shall speak of each of these separately. 

ARTICLE SECOND. , 
Of the End ivhich causes the Mind to Reason. 

Q. What are the different states the mind may find 
itself in with regard to truth ? 

A. The end which incites the mind to reason is 
that it may remove that state of doubt in Avhich jt 
finds itself with regard, to a certain truth, and take up 
another state. To explain this properly we must 
give an idea of the different states in which the mind 
may find itself with regard to truth. Our mind, 
when a truth is presented before it, may be affected 
in three different ways. It may adhere to it without 
any hesitation or fear of its contrary ; it may adhere 
to it with a certain hesitation and fear of its con- 
trary ; or it may not adhere to it at all and remain in a 
state of suspense, hanging, as it were, between yes and 
no. .Each of these things constitutes a state of the 
mind with regard to truth: the first is called certainty ; 



Elements of Iiitellectital Philosophy. 8 



o 



the second is called probability of opinion; the third 
is called doubt. 

Q. What is certainty? 

A. That state of the mind by zvkich it firmly adlieres to 
a known trutJi zuithout fear of the opposite. It may be 
metaphysical, physical, and moral. It is called metaphy- 
sical certainty when it is founded on the very essence 
of things ; for instance, it is metaphysically certain 
that a square has four sides. It is called physical 
when it is founded on the constancy of natural and 
physical laws, as it is physically certain that a body 
gravitates towards its centre. It is called moral when 
it is founded on the testimony of men and the laws 
governing human acts ; as, for instance, it is morally 
certain that Washington was the first President of 
the United States. Hence, as it is evident, meta- 
physical certainty is absolute, as founded on the 
essences of things which are immutable. Physical 
and moral certainties are hypothetical, as they 
are founded on the supposition of the constancy 
of the laws which govern the physical and the 
moral world. This last observation gives rise to an- 
other distinction of certainty, intrinsic and extrinsic. 
It is intrinsic when it arises from the knowledge of the 
thing itself. It is extrinsic when it is founded on the 
testimony of others. 

O. How many degrees of certainty are there? 

A. Certainty is made up of two elements the cling- 
ing of the mind to the truth ; and the exclusion of 
any tendency to the opposite. Now, as regards the 
second element, certainty has no degrees, because this 
excluding all fear of the opposite is incapable either 
of increase or diminution. As regards the first ele- 
ment, the clinging of the mind, this m^ay admit of 
degrees, as the mind may cling to a truth with more 



84 Elements of Intellechtal Philosophy. 

or less tenacity ; for instance, in metaphysical cer- 
tainty the clinging of the mind is stronger and more 
tenacious than in the other two. 

Q. What is probability ? 

A. That state of the mind in zvhich it adheres to a 
truth zvith a kind of fear of the opposite. It may be 
also intrinsic and extrinsic. It is intrinsic when 
founded on the essence of the thing itself, extrinsic 
when it is founded on arguments outside the thing, 
itself. 

It may have different degrees, according to the va- 
lue and number of arguments and motives which sup- 
port it. Because an opinion in respect to another 
opinion may be equally probable, more probable, 
most probable in proportion as the arguments sup- 
porting it grow in weight and number. But it must 
be remarked that all these degrees of probability can 
never, no matter what their weight or number may 
be, reach to certainty, because if they remain probable 
they must always imply some fear of the opposite, 
and no being by mere union with another of the 
same kind can change its nature, hence, even united 
together, all these degrees of probability must imply 
some fear of the opposite. But certainty essentially 
excludes all fear. Therefore a number of degrees of 
probability can never give certainty. 

O. What is doubt ? 

A. That state of the mind in which it does not 
adhere either to one side or the other of an object 
proposed, but hangs in suspense. It has been beauti- 
fully personified by Spenser in his " Faerie Oueene " •• 

" His name was Doubt, that had a double face ; 
Th' one forward looking, th' other backward bent." 

As it is clear, doubt differs from certainty and pro- 



Elemeiits of Intellectual Philosophy. 85 

bability. because both imply adhesion ; doubt impHes 
suspension. 

It may be positive or negative, because the mind 
may withdraw its adhesion either because it sees no 
reason in the one or other of the two things, or be- 
cause it perceives equal reasons on both sides. From 
which it appears that a negative doubt cannot have 
any degrees, whereas the positive can, in proportion as 
the reasons pro and con diminish or increase ; in the 
latter case the doubt approaches nearer to probability. 

Q. What is ignorance $ 

A. The absence of knowledge. We have not 
enumerated it among the states of the mind because 
it is rather the absence of a state. 

Q. In what state is the mind before reasoning? 

A. In the state of doubt. It could not be in igno- 
rance, because he who is ignorant about something 
cannot wish for nor seek it. Now, to reason is_ to 
seek for something. Therefore, when the mind pro- 
ceeds to reason it cannot be in ignorance. It cannot 
be in a state of adhesion or certainty, because if it 
knew a truth it would not seek for it. Therefore, in 
order to reason the mind must neither be in ignorance 
nor in the state of adhesion, but must be wavering 
between the two ; neither be ignorant altogether nor 
certain, but in the state of doubt. Doubt, therefore, 
must always go before reasoning and demonstration. 
Hence the truth v/hich the mind wants to find out by 
reasoning before the demonstration is called the ques- 
tion ; after, it is called thesis. This doubt is called 
methodical doubt. And it is distinguished from that 
of the sceptics and from that of Descartes. Sceptics 
doubted of everything, and wished to remain in doubt ; 
whereas the doubt called methodical is invented just 
to bring one out of doubt, and it is called methodical 



86 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

because it is taken and supposed by necessity of 
method, whereas the doubt of the sceptics is called 
systematic because assumed on system. It is dis- 
tinguished from that of Descartes, who held that 
science must proceed from doubt ; but his doubt was 
universal, extending to all first and self-evident truths, 
whereas our doubt is particular, extending only to 
those truths of mediate evidence which need to be 
demonstrated. 

O. What does the mind aim at in reasoning ? 

A. It seeks to remove the state of doubt and to as- 
sume another state. But doubt excluded, there are no 
other states but that of probability and certaint}-. 
Therefore the mind in reasoning aims at probability and 
certainty. From this arises the division of reasoning 
into probable and apodictic, though strictl^y speaking the 
mind in reasoning properly aims at certainty, and at 
probability only indirectly and incidentall}-. The rea- 
son is this : In probability, as we have said, two ele- 
ments are found, the adhesion of the mind to the object 
and the fear of the contrary. Now, the mind when it 
aims at probability in reasoning is not led to do so from 
the fear of'the opposite, for in this respect probability 
is akin to doubt, and the mind would shrink from it as 
it does from doubt. Therefore it aims at probability, 
to adhere to the truth and to avoid the fear of the 
opposite. Hence it strictly aims at certainty, which 
excluxies fear and implies firmness of adhesion. When 
it cannot possibly attain certainty, then it aims at 
probability ; but only indirectly and accidentally. We 
may, therefore, draw as a general conclusion of the 
whole article that the mind in reasoning aims at cer- 
tainty as the proper end of that operation. 



Ele7iients of Intellectual Philosophy. 87 

ARTICLE THIRD. 

Of the Means ivhich the Mind uses in Reasoning, or 
of the Middle Term. 

O. What is meant by middle term ? 

A. It is that third idea with which the mind com- 
pares the predicate and the subject. It finds it out as 
follows : When the mind doubts about a proposition 
it shows that it does not know its truth or its false- 
iiood. Now, to know the truth or falsehood of a pro- 
position does not mean anything else but to know the 
unity or non-unity of being between the predicate and. 
the subject ; or, in other words, to know if the predi- 
cate be or not the same as the subject ; since the 
whole form of a proposition consists in telling if the 
subject be the predicate or not. To reason, there- 
fore, is to endeavor to know the unity or non-unity of 
being between the subject and the predicate. Hence 
to find the middle term is nothing else than to find the 
similitude or agreement between the predicate and the 
subject. Now, Avhen we want to find out a similitude 
between two things which is not yet apparent, the 
way we follow is this : to consider both things from 
every side, to see if we can find out some common 
point of resemblance. In the same manner the mind 
acts when it proceeds to reason ; it considers from 
every point of view the subject and the predicate, to 
see if it can find some point which may present a 
similitude with or difference from the other. This 
point of similitude which it finds first in the one and 
then in the other, or of difference which it finds in one 
and not in the other, it assumes as the middle term. 
Kence to find the middle term we must consider both 
subject and predicate from every possible side. 

O. What and how many are these sides according 



88 EletJients of Intellectual Philosophy. 

to which we may consider the terms of a proposition, 
and from them draw the middle term ? 

A. They are ten ; and from the office they fulfil 
are called common points, or topics, of argumentation, 
because the predicate and the subject cannot be con- 
sidered except from these points of cause, effect, subject, 
adjuncts, coitraries, similes, name, dejinition., division, 
and authority. From all these we can take the mid- 
dle term. 

O. Give an example from each. 

A. We take the middle term from cause when we 
show the effects from these causes ; as, for instance, 
showing from its material cause that the human body 
is corruptible ; thus, that which is made of matter is 
corruptible. But the human body is made of matter, 
therefore it is corruptible. 

From the effects we take the middle term, showing 
the cause from its effects. The most wonderful dra- 
matic productions argue a most powerful imagina- 
tion. But Shakspere has produced the most won- 
derful plays, therefore he must have had the most 
powerful imagination. 

We take the middle term from the subject when we 
show of the accident something deduced from its sub- 
ject ; for instance, that quality Avhich leans on a more 
noble subject is in itself more noble. But the quali- 
ties of the soul lean on a subject more noble than the 
body, therefore they are more noble than those of 
the body. 

From the adjuncts or circumstances when we show 
something from all that surrounds the subject, such 
as time, place, persons, means, and the like. 

From contraries, making one contrary exclude an- 
other; as, for instance. Truth is a good of the intel- 
lect, therefore falsehood is its evil 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 89 

From similes, showing one to be like to the other ; as, 
Americans gained their independence by those virtues 
which make up pure patriotism, therefore they will 
continue to preserve.it by the same virtues. 

We take the middle term from the name in two 
ways : i. From its signification ; as. Angel means a 
messenger, therefore angels are messengers between 
God and men. From its etymology philosophy means 
love of wisdom, therefore philosophers love wisdom. 

From the definition is drawn the middle term when 
we argue from those elements which compose it ; 
as, science is to know a thing from the principles 
which constitute it. But I know the principles of a 
certain subject, therefore I have the science of that 
subject. 

From division we take the middle term when we 
argue from the parts to the whole, and from the whole 
to the parts. As, for instance, the head, the arms, the 
hands, the fingers, and all the other parts of the 
human body are animated, therefore the whole body 
is animated. 

Finally from authority, when we take the middle 
term from the authority of others. 

O. What criterion must guide us in assuming the 
middle term ? 

A. In assuming the middle term we must pay atten- 
tion to two rules : 1st, In affirmative propositions the 
middle term must never be more extensive or ample 
than the predicate. For instance, to show that man 
is an animal I could not take the middle term, sub- 
stance, and say: Man is substance; but the substance 
is animal, therefore man is an animal. This reason- 
ing proves nothing, because the middle term, sub- 
stance, is much more extensive than animal. Again, 
the following reasoning would be vain : Peter is a man ; 



90 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

but John is a man, therefore John is Peter. Here the 
middle term, man, is more ample than Peter. 

2d. On the contrary, in negative propositions the 
middle term must not be more restricted than the 
predicate. The following reasoning would, therefore, 
be bad : The finite is material ; but the soul is not 
material, therefore it is not finite. The reasoning is 
false because the middle term, material, is taken in a 
more restricted sense than the predicate, finite. The 
reason of both rules is found in what we have already 
said. The middle term is that side of similitude oi' 
difference by means of which the predicate agrees with 
the subject in force or not. But in affirmative propo- 
sitions the predicate must agree with the subject in all 
its comprehension ; therefore the middle term, which 
must represent that comprehension, must not be more 
extensive than the predicate, otherwise it would have 
less comprehension. On the contrary, in negative 
propositions the predicate must be denied of the sub- 
ject in all its extension. Therefore the middle term, 
which must represent that extension, must not be less 
extensive than the predicate. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 

Of the Use of the Middle Terjn, or of Figures and 

Modes. 

Q. How is the middle term to be used ? 

A. The use of an instrument or means consists in 
making it available for the end for which it has been 
invented. Now, the middle term is intended for the 
object of comparing it with the two terms of the pro- 
position by means of the artificial structure of the 
premises ; therefore the proper use of the middle term 
consists in this comparison and in the artificial struc- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 91 

ture of the premises. This comparison may be made 
in different ways. Because the middle term in that 
comparison may vary in two ways, either because of 
the place it occupies in the structure of the reasoning, 
and of the figure it makes in the premises, now ap- 
pearing as predicate and now as subject, or because 
of the manner according to which propositions are 
formed, negative or affirmative, universal or particular, 
by the help of the same middle term. The diversity 
which the structure of the reasoning takes from the 
figure the middle term makes in the premises is called 
the figure of syllogism ; that which arises from the 
second — that is, the different manner of propositions — 
is called the mode of syllogism. Hence, to understand 
what and how many are the uses of the middle term 
we must speak of the figures and modes of syllogism. 

Q. What is a figure ? 

A. That different disposition which the middle term 
takes in relation to the extreme terms in the premises. 

This disposition or placing may be made in three 
different ways. The first is, when the middle term is 
subject in the major and predicate in the minor, as in 
this reasoning : Every animal (middle term subject) 
has a sensitive appetite ; but man is an animal (middle 
term predicate), therefore man has a sensitive appetite. 

The second way is, when the middle term acts as 
predicate in both premises. Every man is endowed 
with reason ; but no horse is endowed with reason ; 
therefore no horse is man. 

The third is, when the middle term officiates as sub- 
ject in both premises ; as, for instance. Being is op- 
posed to nothingness. But being is identical with 
good ; therefore good is opposed to nothingness. 

There is a fourth figure which can be reduced to the 
first ; therefore we do not speak of it. 



92 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Q. What are modes ? 

A. They may be defined the disposition or locating of the 
premises according to their universality or particularity, 
their affirmation or negation. 

Q. How many modes can a syllogism have? 

A. Sixty-four ; because every figure can have six- 
teen modes, since in every figure the premises may be 
either both universal or both particular, or the major 
universal and the minor particular ; and each of these 
modes has four others under it, according to affirma- 
tion or negation, because the premises, either univer- 
sal or particular, may be both affirmative or both 
negative, or the major negative and the minor affirma- 
tive, or vice versa. Of all these modes only ten arrive 
at a conclusion. Each one may amuse himself by 
enumerating them for exercise. 

ARTICLE FIVE. 
Of the Deduction of the Consequent from the Premises. 

Q. In what manner is the consequence deduced 
from the premises known by the intellect ? 

A. We can gather from all we have said that in 
reasoning the mind in the major compares the middle 
term with the predicate, and sees that they agree to- 
gether ; hence, when in the minor it comes to compare 
the middle term with the subject, it may be really 
said to be comparing the predicate with the subject, 
because it knows and has seen in the major that the 
predicate is the same as the middle term. In a word, 
in the minor it sees the predicate in the subject by 
means of the middle term as through a lens. From 
this we can conclude how the mind comes to the 
knowledge of the consequence. Because that which 
it affirms without hesitation in the consequence it has 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 93 

already seen in the minor, and would contradict itself 
if it affirmed in the consequent something contrary to 
what it has said in the premises. Hence, it has been 
rightly said that the premises stand to the knowledge 
of the consequences as the cause to the effect, because 
the mind, having known the premises, cannot ignore 
the consequences, as, having supposed the action of 
the cause, the effect must follow. ■/ 

ARTICLE SIXTH. 
Rules of Reasoning. 

Q. How many rules of reasoning are there? 

A. The following: ist. There camiot be more than 
three terms in the reasoning. The reason of the rule 
may be gathered from all we have said. But here we 
must observe that oftentimes a fourth term is hidden, 
and this happens when a term is used equivocally, now 
in one sense and then in another — as, for instance, the 
rat is a syllable ; but a syllable cannot eat cheese, 
therefore the rat cannot eat cheese. 

2d rule. In the conclusion no term must be taken in a 
more extensive sense than it has in the premises ; be- 
cause that which is more extensive and universal can- 
not be found in that which is less so. Hence, if the 
term in the conclusion is taken in a more universal 
sense, it cannot be found in the premises and could 
not be deduced from it. Against this rule Is that 
sophism of Cellius : *'You are not what I am; but I 
am a man, therefore you are not a man." 

3d rule. The middle term should not enter into the con- 
clusion, because its use consists in comparinsf it with 
the other two terms, which is only done in the pre- 
mises — as, for instance, Napoleon was a general ; but 
Napoleon was poor, therefore Napoleon was a poor 



94 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

general. Shakspere was a poet ; but Shakspere was 
poor, therefore he was a poor poet. 

4th rule. The middle term uiust he taken in a tuii- 
vcrsal sense, at least in one of the premises ; because if 
it was taken in a particular sense in both premises we 
should have two terms and not one — as, for instance, 
a certain animal is endowed with reason ; but the 
nightingale is a certain animal, therefore the nightin- 
gale is endowed with reason. 

5 th rule. A^o conclusion can be drawn from tzvo nega- 
tive propositions, because when both are negative it is 
clear that the middle term agrees neither with the 
predicate nor with the subject, and therefore nothing 
can be concluded from them. Hence the following 
reasoning would be bad : Man is not eternal ; but the 
animal is not eternal, therefore man is not an animal. 

6th rule. No conclusion can be draivn from two par- 
ticular premises, because in this case the middle term 
would be taken in particular senses in both premises. 

7th rule. TJie conclusion must share in the for time of 
the zveaker party ; that is to say, if one of the premises 
is particular the conclusion must be particular, be- 
cause otherwise the terms would be more ample in the 
conclusion than in the premises ; if of the premises 
one is negative, the other affirmative, the conclusion 
must be negative, because in this second case the mid- 
dle term agrees with the one and not with the other, 
and therefore subject and predicate do not agree 
together. 

8th rule. We cannot draw a negative conclusicn from 
two affirmative premises. The reason is clear. 



CHAPTER II. 

DIFFERENT SPECIES OF REASONING. 
ARTICLE FIRST. 

Of the Variety of Reasonings ; and, first, of the Induc- 
tive Syllogism. 

O. Whence arises variety of syllogisms.? 

A. We must distinguish three things in the mid- 
dle term : I. What it is in itself. 2. The connec- 
tion which it has with the extreme terms. 3. The 
special form by which they are connected. Because, 
the middle term must be something m itself, and in 
order to become the middle term must have some con- 
nection with the extreme terms, and also have such 
connection under a certain form. Now, since the 
variety of syllogisms originates in the middle term, it 
is clear that such a variety arises from the three heads 
just mentioned — that is, from the intrinsic diversity of 
the middle term, from the different connection it has 
with the extremes, and from the difference of form. 

O. What is the division arising from the first head ? 

A. From the first head arises the division of syllo- 
gisms into inductive and deductive, or into induction 
and syllogism properly so called. Because the middle 
term, considered in itself, may represent either a uni- 
versal idea or particular ideas ; in other words, it may 
represent a whole from which a part is deduced, or 
the parts from which the wliole arises. In the first 
case the syllogism is called deductive or syllogism 

95 



g6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

simply, in the second it is called inductive or induc- 
tion simply. 

O. What is induction ? 

A. That kind of reasoning in which, from the 
enumeration of the particular parts of a subject, is 
gathered the whole and the universal. For instance, 
the lion, the horse, the ox, the leopard, man, and the 
like are sensitive. But all these constitute the genus 
animal ; therefore the genus animal is sensitive. 

Induction may be of two kinds, complete and in- 
complete, because the enumeration of the particulars 
may be complete or incomplete, and according as it 
is the one or the other induction is complete or incom- 
plete. 

Q. What is to be observed as to the incomplete 
induction ? 

A. We must carefully observe in what sense Ave 
can say that the enumeration of its parts is not com- 
plete. Because if by this it is meant to convey the idea 
that from an incom.plete enumeration of parts we 
can draw a general consequence without adding to or 
supposing anything more in that incomplete enu- 
meration, as some modern logicians have thought, it 
is false, and would be contrary to that rule of reason- 
ing which forbids the consequence to have a greater 
extension than the premises. The whole is certainly 
more ample and universal than some of its parts. 
But in the incomplete induction, according to these 
logicians, the consequence contains the whole because 
universal, and the premises contain only some parts 
because the induction is incomplete ; therefore the 
incomplete induction, as it is explained by some 
modern logicians, is repugnant to the fundamental 
rules of syllogisms, because in it the consequence is 
more ample than the premises. Therefore, in order 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 97 

to avoid such inconvenient, if the enumeration of 
parts is not complete it must be made so in some 
way. This is done by adding after the incomplete 
enumeration of parts the phrases and so forth, and the 
like,2iS the ancients observed, who held that induction 
could conclude nothing except to the enumeration of 
parts one could add and so on of the rest. 

O. For what reason and upon what foundation 
could you add and so on of the rest ? 

A. That phrase is added in force of the principles of 
analogy, that nature is limited to one thing ; that nature, 
zvlien not prevented, works always in the same manner. 
Upon this, having observed that a certain property is 
constantly found in many individuals, we become as- 
sured that it belongs to their nature ; and because 
nature works always in the same way in all individu- 
als, we attribute the same property to the rest of the 
individuals not mentioned in the enumerations. The 
true difference, therefore, between complete and in- 
complete induction is this : that in the first the enu- 
meration of parts is actually complete ; in the other 
it is not actually complete, but becomes so by means 
of the phrases, and so on zvith the rest, and the like. 

O. What is the principle on which both deductions 
rest? 

A. That zvhich agrees or disagrees zvith all the par- 
ticulars implied in the idea of the subject agrees or dis- 
agrees with the subject taken as a zvhole or universally. 

O. What has Bacon done with regard to induction? 

A. Modern philosophers sing loudly the praises of 
Bacon for the services he has rendered to philosophy 
in teaching the inductive process. But we have to 
observe that he has done nothing as to the logical 
form of induction which was not known and taught 
by the ancients. All that Bacon has done is to point 



98 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

out the way how to proceed in the observation of par- 
ticular facts by way of negation and affirmation, so 
that truly he has treated only of the most common 
part of induction. 

ARTICLE SECOND, 

Of Deductive Syllogism and its Species. 

Q. What is deductive syllogism ? 

A. If, in reasoning, instead of particulars we take 
the universal as the middle term, then we have the 
inductive syllogism, or syllogism properly so called, 
which may be defined that reasoning in which from 
the imiversal is deduced the particidar contained in it — 
for instance, Every animal is sensitive ; but man is an 
animal, therefore he is sensitive. 

O. How many kinds of syllogisms are there? 

A. Several, i. The syllogism a priori and a pos- 
teriori. The first is that in which the middle term is 
something which by its nature is understood before 
that which it is intended to demonstrate, and acts as 
the cause of that which is demonstrated. Hence it is 
called also from the cause — for instance, every being 
endowed with reason has a will ; but man is endowed 
with reason, therefore he has a will. Here the middle 
term, reason, is the true cause of the will, as reason is a 
rational tendency. The second is when we assume as 
middle term something which is conceived by the 
mind as posterior to the thing which we want to de- 
monstrate, as when we prove a thing from its effects 
or properties. 

2, Syllogisms from the proximate reason and from 
the remote reason. The first is that in which the mid- 
dle term contains the proximate and adequate reason 
of the thing. The second is that in which the middle 
term contains only the remote cause of the thing. 



Elements of In tellectna I Ph ilosophy. 9 9 

3. Direct and indirect syllogisms. The first is that in 
which the middle term contains a truth which has some 
connection with the proposition to be demonstrated. 
It is called indirect when, having supposed, as hypothe- 
sis, the contrary proposition, we take as middle term 
an absurdity, and show that the absurdity proceeds 
from that hypothesis. It is called also demonstration 
from absurd consequences. For instance, wishing to 
demonstrate the free will of man, we take as middle 
term the absurdities which would follow from the de- 
nial of it — for instance, the destruction of virtue, of 
reward and penalty, etc. 

4. Syllogisms from statements admitted by adversa- 
ries, called ex datis, and it is that in which the middle 
term is something admitted by the adversary. 

ARTICLE TI-IIRD. 
Of Demonstrative or Apodictic, and Probable Syllogisms. 

Q. What is the next thing to be considered in the 
middle term, and what division of the syllogisms arises 
therefrom ? 

A. The next thing to be considered in the middle 
term is the connection it has with the extremes, and 
from this arises another division of the syllogism — that 
of demonstrative and probable. This division of the 
syllogism is made from its efficacy in demonstrating a 
truth. But the efficacy of reasoning results from the 
connection which the middle term has with the ex- 
tremes ; therefore this division of the syllogism into de- 
monstrative and probable depends on the connection 
which the middle term has with the extremes. Thus, 
in order to have a demonstrative syllogism, it is neces- 
sary that the middle term should be so connected with 
the extremes as to contain \.\\e. proximate, necessary, and 



loo Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

proper cause of a tJiing. Caiisc^^wxz^ the syllogism is 
intended to produce science, that is, knowledge certain, 
necessary, and evident. But science is knowledge de- 
duced from its cause ; therefore the middle term of the 
demonstrative syllogism must contain the cause. This 
cause must be necessary, because, if it were acciden- 
tal, the conclusion would not be necessary, and hence 
unscientific. It must be the proper cause, because a 
common cause would belong not only to the thing we 
want to demonstrate, but also to others, and therefore 
could produce only probable knowledge. It must 
be the proximate cause, since the remote cause would 
give but an inadequate knowledge. 

Q. What is probable syllogism, and by what criterion 
may we distinguish it from the other ? 

A. The syllogism is called probable when its middle 
term has no necessary connection with the extremes — 
as, for instance, when the middle term is drawn from 
etymology, from authority, from a common cause, from 
effects not necessarily connected with that reason 
alone and such as can originate in some other cause, 
etc., or from some accident, etc. By keeping in view 
all these things one can have a criterion to distinguish 
the probable from the demonstrative syllogism. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
Of Categorieal and HypotJictical Syllogisvis. 

Q. Define these two kinds of syllogisms. 

A. The connection of the middle term with the ex- 
tremes must be put in a special form. Now, gene- 
rally speaking, the middle term may be connected Avith 
the extremes in two forms, either in an absolute way 
or conditionally; hence the division of syllogisms 
into categorical and conditional or hypothetical. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. i o i 

The categorical or absolute syllogism is that in 
which the middle term is connected with the extremes 
in an absolute way. The conditional is that in which 
the middle term is connected by way of a conditional 
proposition in the major. Moderns call the first sim- 
ple and the second composite. 

O. What are the species of conditional syllogisms ? 

A. A conditional syllogism is that in which the mid- 
dle term in the major is bound by a certain condition. 
Therefore this syllogism may be of as many kinds as 
there are ways in which a term may be bound to an- 
other by way of condition — that is to say, as there are 
species of conditional propositions. Now, these pro- 
positions are of three kinds — connex, conjunctive, and 
disju7ictive. Therefore there are three kinds of condi- 
tional syllogism — connex, conjunctive, and disjunctive. 

The first is that in which the major is a connex pro- 
position. For instance, If the soul is a spiritual princi- 
ple, it is immortal ; but the soul is a spiritual princi- 
ple, therefore it is immortal. 

The second is that in which the major is a conjunc- 
tive proposition ; as, One cannot sleep and be awake 
at the same time ; but John is asleep, therefore he is 
not awake. 

The third is that in which the major is a disjunctive 
proposition ; as, Peter is either alive or dead ; but he is 
alive, therefore he is not dead. 



CHAPTER III. 

OF THE EXPRESSION OF REASONING. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Different Ways of Expressing a Reasoning. 

Q. Define the different ways of giving expression 
to reasoning. 

A. Besides syllogism and induction, of which we 
have spoken, there are the enthymeme, the epichi- 
tema, the sorites, the prosyllogism, and the dilemma. 

Oftentimes in reasoning the premises are so easy 
and clear that we omit one of them — as, Virtue is the 
greatest good in the world ; therefore it should be 
practised. Here the major is left out ; that is, that 
which is the greatest good should be practised. When 
the reasoning is so expressed it is called enthymeme. 
On the contrary, we have the epichirema when to 
one or both premises we add proof — as, Idleness is 
hurtful because the parent of ail vices. But wliat is 
hurtful should be avoided, therefore idleness should be 
avoided. 

The sorites is a reasoning composed of several pro- 
positions, so arranged that the predicate of the first is 
the subject of the second, and so on until in the conse- 
quence the predicate of the first proposition is united 
with the subject of the last — as, Truth is the object of 
the intellect. That which is the object of the intel- 
lect perfects it. That which perfects the intellect is 
the proper good of man. That which is the proper 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 103 

good of man is to be followed. Therefore truth is to 
be followed. 

The prosyllogism is the union of two syllogisms so 
connected together that the consequence of the first 
officiates as the mkjor of the second. For instance, 
Sensible goods do not fully satisfy human aspirations ; 
but that which does not fully satisfy human aspira- 
tions is not the true happiness of a man, therefore 
reasonable goods are the true happiness of man. But 
that which is not man's true happiness must not be 
exclusively sought for ; therefore sensible goods must 
not be exclusively sought for. 

The dilemma is a syllogism which has for its m?jor 
a disjunctive proposition, and from each of the 
members of which we endeavor to draw a conclusion 
against the adversary. For instance : Christianity was 
either propagated by the force of miracles or without 
miracles. If it was propagated by miracles, it is 
divine ; if it was not propagated by miracles, this is 
the greatest of all miracles, that a religion opposed by 
the whole world and contradicting all human passions 
should subdue this world and should be propagated 
all over by twelve rude and ignorant fishermen. 

All these expressions of reasoning can be reduced to 
the s}41ogism, as one can easily see by himself; as, for 
instance, the dilemma given above may be reduced to 
the following syllogisms : If the Christian religion was 
propagated by means of miracles it is divine. But it 
was propagated by means of miracles, therefore it is 
divine. The minor is proved by this other s\'llogism : 
Ifwe deny that miracles propagated it, we must ac- 
count for that propagation effected without miracles. 
But this would be a greater miracle under the circum- 
stances ; therefore the Christian religion was propa- 
gated by means of miracles. 



CHAPTER IV. 

FAULTS OF REASONING. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 
Sophistries of TJwught. 

Q. What is a sophism ? 

A. Reasoning is intended to bring us to the know- 
ledge of the truth ; therefore it is faHacious when 
under the appearance of trutli it insinuates falsehood. 
This fault is called sophism. This insinuation of 
falsehood under the appearance of truth may arise 
from two sources: cither from the form when the 
rules laid down to construct reasoning are not kept, or 
from the matter when this is in reality false but ap- 
pears under the garb of truth. We shall say nothing 
of the fallacies originating from the form, as they can 
be easily detected by means of the rules laid down. 
We shall therefore speak of the faults proceeding from 
the matter. These may be divided into two, fallacies 
of thought and fallacies of words. 

O. Speak of each of them. 

A. Among the fallacies of thoughts the first is that 
called oi accident, which occurs when we attribute to 
a subject a predicate as substantial and necessary 
when it only agrees with it accidentally. For in- 
stance, Reason is oftentimes faulty, therefore it is an 
evil. 

The next is the fallacy of passing from the absolute 
to the relative, and vice versa. It is committed when 
we attribute something to the subject in an absolute and 

104 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 05 

unconditional manner when it may be attributed to it 
only under certain respects and conditions; as, Medi- 
cine gives health to the body, therefore it should al- 
ways be taken. 

3. The fallacy of false cause. This is perpetrated 
when we assign as the cause of something that which 
is not really so ; as, The soul united to the body thinks, 
therefore the soul separated from the body cannot 
think. ■ 

4. Begging the question or principle. This is com- 
mitted when we assume as the premises of reasoning 
that which must be proved, though we use different 
words — as. The human soul is imperishable, therefore 
it is immortal. 

5. The ignorantia elenchi. It is incurred when the 
adversary tries to evade the question and to find a 
contradiction against our statement which is really not 
to be found therein. 

6. Fallacy of many questions. This is committed 
when the adversary, to the many interrogations which 
he heaps one upon the other, wants a single answer, 
either affirmative or negative, whereas, in order to an- 
swer properly, it would be necessary to distinguish and 
give an answer to each question in particular. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Fallacies of Words. 

Q. What are the fallacies of words .? 

A. I. Figure oi expression. This proceeds from the 
fact that an expression may seem like to another 
when in reality it is not. 

2. EqnivocatioJt — when we make use of an am- 
biguous term in the same argument. 

3. FaHacy of pronunciation, when we use promis- 



io6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

cuously a word Avhich by a slight variety of pronun- 
ciation may be made to signify different things. 

4. Amphibology — when, in consequence of the 
structure and placing of words — there arises an am- 
biguous sense which may be applied to one or to the 
contrary part. For instance, that answer given by the 
oracle of Apollos to Pyrrhus, King of Epirus : Aio te 
yEacida Romanes vine ere posse (" Pyrrhus the Romans 
shall, I say, subdue ") — which closely resembles, as 
Shakspere remarks, the witch prophecy, " The duke 
yet lives that Henry shall depose." 

5. Fallacy of composition. This is committed when 
that which is only true in a divided sense is taken in a 
composite sense — as, Every man can live and die. 

6. Fallacy of division. This is the contrary of that 
of composition, and is committed when that which 
is true in a composite sense is used in a divided sense. 

Q. How are fallacies refuted? 

A. If the syllogism be false in the matter, then we 
must deny that proposition which contains falsehood. 
If it be faulty because the fallacy renders the sense 
ambiguous, then w^e must clear up the meaning of that 
proposition which presents the ambiguity. 



PART THIRD. 



END OF REASONING. 

O. Of what shall we treat in the third part of logic? 

A. The end of reasoning being certainty or science, 
since a knowledge Avhich is certain and acquired by 
reasoning is called science, it follows that we must 
speak of science in this third part. But in science we 
must distinguish two things — that which is properly 
so called and thq way by which we arrive at it, which 
is called vietJiod. Therefore, in treating of science we 
must speak of science and of method. And because 
in everything we find first the way to it and then the 
thing itself, therefore we shall speak of method first 
and then of science. We shall treat of method in 
three chapters: I, its nature and necessity; 2, its 
elements and means ; 3, its divisions. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF THE NATURE AND THE NECESSITY OF METHOD. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Definition and Necessity of MetJiod in general. 

Q. Define method and its nature. 
A. If science is to be acquired by means of reason- 
ing, it is evident that it is hidden and far from us, and 

107 



1 08 Elements of Intellectttal Ph ilosophy. 

that we arrive at it by a slow process of the mind. 
Now, that which is far away and is acquired slowly by 
a process of the mind supposes a way which leads to it ; 
therefore science supposes a way which leads to it. 
This way is called method, which may be defined 
that zvay or order tvJiicJi the mind follows in the ac- 
quisition of science. 

From this definition it appears what things are neces- 
sary to have method, and in what the nature of the lat- 
ter properly consists. The method is a way or road. 
Now, we find three things in a road — the starting-point, 
the term at which we arrive, and the means, which lies 
between the two. Three things, likewise, are neces- 
sary in method : the principle, from which it starts, 
the means, and the end. The principle or principles, 
which may be different and various, are those truths, 
of immediate evidence, and indemonstrable, which are 
always supposed in science, and which are taken as a 
starting-point, and may be of fact and of reascn : of 
fact — as. The ivorld exists ; of reason — as, Nothing can 
be and not be at the same time. The end, or term, is sci- 
ence, because it is that which method aims at. The 
means is that order or process of acts which the mind 
pursues to arrive, from the principles, at science. 

Now, the nature of method does not consist in the 
principles or the end but in the process, because, as to 
the principles, they must be already known ; as to the 
term — that is. Science, or the acquisition of truth — this 
follows, and is a consequence of, the method. There- 
fore, strictly speaking, the nature of method lies in 
the order and process of the mind. 

Q. What is the difference between method and 
reasoning ? 

A. A doubt might arise from what we have said 
whether method and reasoning be not the same thing ; 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 109 

because if method is a process, so is reasoning ; if 
metiiod arrives at science by that process so does rea- 
soning ; if method starts from indemonstrable princi- 
ples, so does reasoning. In what, then, are they distin- 
guished from each other? To answer this question we 
must distinguish with St. Thomas"'^ two kinds of pro- 
cesses in human science : " The first is a process of suc- 
cession (and time), as when, after having considered one 
thing, we turn around to consider another, and thus 
complete our first knowledge. The other process is 
byway of causality, when from the principles we draw 
conclusions which naturally originate from them," 
The first process is that of one who views a variety 
of objects one after the other ; the second is that 
of one who considers the light as springing from the 
sun, the flower as budding from the tree, etc. The 
first process is method ; the second is reasoning. 

O. Is method necessary? 

A. By the nature of our mind we are so constituted 
that we cannot understand everything at once and sim- 
vdtaneously, but must understand things successively, 
and part after part. Now, to do this well we must 
follow an order of some kind. Therefore it is neces- 
sary, in order to acquire science, to follow a certain 
order. But the essence of method lies just in this 
order ; therefore method is necessary. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Method must be One and Definite — Eclecticism. 

Q. What can you say of the eclecticism of Cousin ? 

A. This philosopher has broached a very strange 
theory about method. He maintains that pure error 
is not to be found in the human mind, and that error 

* I p. qu. 14, art. 7. 



no Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

is an incomplete truth. From this he concludes that 
all the erroneous systems of philosophers cannot be 
called so in the sense that they do not contain any 
truth at all, but only in the sense that they contain 
truth in an incomplete manner. This truth, in the 
long succession of centuries up to our times, has al- 
ready been exhausted by philosophers, some of them 
presenting one part and some another, but none ex- 
hibiting the whole truth. Hence we cannot find any 
new truth ; but our business is to gather the truths 
scattered here and there. From these statements he 
concludes that it is not proper to have any determi- 
nate and definite system in the nineteenth century, 
but that we should gather all that is good and true 
here and there in every system, and, rejecting the 
false, endeavor to reconcile all systems. This sort of 
method is called eclecticis^n. 

Now, without entering into the examination of the 
principles assumed — that pure error is impossible, that 
error is an incomplete truth ; for this shall be done in 
Metaphysics — we say that this theory is contradictory, 
because at the same time that it rejects all sorts of 
method it supposes already a definite method. Be- 
cause how could the mind gather the truth here and 
there in this system or in the other, separate it from 
falsehood, and keep the one and reject the other, with- 
out a rule to guide it in this selection and discrimina- 
tion ? Now, this rule guiding the mind in this process 
implies a method. Therefore eclecticism, which re- 
jects all method, supposes a method. We conclude, 
therefore, that a method is necessary to acquire science, 
and that this must be definite. In fact, a method 
must start from a definite point. Now, a definite point 
of starting renders the way also definite. Method, 
therefore, must be one and definite. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 1 1 

ARTICLE THIRD. 

Q. How can we determine the true method ? 

A. This is a very difficult question, and cannot be 
answered here in consequence of the many controver- 
sies which have arisen on the point, and to answer 
which more knowledge of philosophy is needed than 
we hitherto acquired. . We must, therefore, leave the 
answer to this question for another part of this work. 
Here we shall give those essential characteristics 
which must accompany a true method, whatever it 
may be. Now, the first essential character of true 
method is that it nnist be agreeable to the nature of our 
intellectual faculties. Because method is that process 
which our mind follows in the acquisition of truth. 
But our mind and our intellectual faculties in the 
acquisition of truth follow always that way which is 
natural to them ; therefore true method must be 
agreeable to the nature of our mind. Moreover, 
method is a guide and a help to lead our faculties to 
science. But a guide contrary to the nature and 
faculties of a being would be a hindrance rather than 
a help ; therefore true method should be agreeable to 
the nature of our faculties. 

From this it follows that a true method must pro- 
ceed after these laws : i. In the investigation of truth 
it must start from that which is better knozvn to come 
to that which is less known. This law is clear, and 
we shall only explain what is meant by it. That 
which is more knowable may be understood in two 
ways — in itself and according to its nature, or in rela- 
tion to oicr Diind. A thing is called better kfiown in 
itself and accorditig to its nature when it is naturally 
first and more perfect than another, as the cause with 
regard to its effects. Hene God, who is most per- 



112 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 



feet and necessary, is, according to his nature, the most 
knowable of all beings. But oftentimes that which is 
most knowable according to its nature is less known 
in regard to us — as, for instance, some cause which, 
according to its nature, is always more knowable than 
itt effects, may, with regard to us, be less known than 
its effects. Now, in the law laid down, when we say 
that we m.ust proceed from that which is better known 
to that which is less known, we mean with regard to 
what is better known to our mind, and not with re- 
gard to that which is better known in itself and by its 
own nature. The reason is easily understood. In 
every road the starting-point is that which is nearer 
to the one who is to go. But the method is the road 
of our mind ; therefore its starting-point should be 
that which is nearer to, and better known zvith regard 
to it. 

The second law is that the mind should proceed 
from the better known to the less known gradually, 
and not by leaps ; because the last conclusion results 
from the preceding conclusions, and hence the know- 
ledge of the last conclusion is the effect of the pre- 
ceding conclusions. Whenever one of them is missing 
the knowledge of our mind is no longer perfect. 

The third law prescribes that between the various 
gradations and conclusions there should be a con- 
nection. 



CHAPTER II. 

ELEMENTS AND MEANS OF METHOD. 
ARTICLE FIRST. 

Of the Elements of Method ; and, first, of Analysis arid 
Synthesis. 

Q. What are the elements of method ? 

A. The essence of method, as we have seen, consists 
not in the principles from which it starts, nor in the 
term where it ends, but in that process by which from 
the principles we arrive at the end. Now, this pro- 
cess implies an order of operations which must be gone 
through to obtain an end. The elements of method, 
therefore, are those operations by which the mind, by 
means of reasoning, arrives at science. 

Q. How many of these operations are there? 

A. Two, analysis and synthesis. The first is that 
act of the mind which resolves a certain subject into 
its elements ; and because we cannot resolve anything 
except it is composite, therefore analysis is that opera- 
tion of the mind which travels from the composite to 
the simple. And, again, because the whole is more 
complex than its parts, the effect more complex than 
the cause, the particular more complex than the uni- 
versal, the example more so than the rule, and the fact 
more so than the principle, hence analysis, after all, 
is that operation which travels from the whole to the 
parts, from the effects to the cause, from the particular 
to the universal, from the example to the rule, from 
the facts to the principle. Thus, when the natural 



114 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

philosopher, from the experience of natural pheno- 
mena, discovers a law, he proceeds by way of analysis ; 
when an artist, from the various examples, draws a 
rule, he also makes use of analysis. 

The following lines of Pope are a specimen of the 
finest analysis. He wants to prove the superiority of 
reason over the senses, as he states in the first two 
lines : 

" Far as creation's ample range extends. 
The scale of sensual, mental powers ascends." 

And he proves it by the following analysis: 

" Mark how it mounts to man's imperial race, 
From the green myriads in the peopled grass ; 
What modes of sight betwixt each wide extreme. 
The mole's dim curtain and the lynx's beam ; 
Of smell, the headlong lioness between, 
And hound, sagacious, on the tainted green ; 
Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood, 
To that which warbles through the vernal wood ; 
V The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine ! 

Feels at each thread, and lives along the line ; 
In the wise bee what sense so subtly true 
From poisonous herbs extracts the healing dew ! 
How instinct varies in the grovelling swine, 
Compared, half-reasoning elephant, with thine ! 
'Twixt that and reason, what nice barrier, 
For ever separate, yet for ever near ! 
Remembrance and reflection, how allied ; 
What thin partitions sense from thought divide ! 
And middle natures, how they long to join. 
Yet never pass the insuperable line ! 
Without this just gradation could they be 
Subjected, these to those, or all to thee? 
The powers of all subdued by thee alone. 
Is not thy reason all these powers in one ?" 

— Essay on Man. 

Synthesis is the opposite of analysis. It means 
composition. But only the simple is put together. 
Hence synthesis, after all, means that act of the mind 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 1 5 

which proceeds from the simple to the composite ; 
and as the parts are more simple than the whole, the 
cause more simple than the effect, the universal more 
so than the particular, the principle more so than the 
fact, the rule more so than the example, hence we 
have the operation called synthesis, when from the 
parts Ave go to the whole, from the cause to the effect, 
from the universal to the particular, from the principle 
to the fact, from the rule to the examples. 

ARTICLE SECOND, 
Use of Analysis and Synthesis. 

Q, When and how must these two operations be 
used? 

A. A great dispute has arisen among philosophers as 
to when and how to use these two operations; some 
wanting to use synthesis first, and then analysis, and 
others wanting to use analysis first, and synthesis after- 
wards. To resolve this question we must observe, in 
the first place, that when the mind* sets out to inves- 
tigate an object, it must know it somewhat, at least 
confusedly ; because if it knew it not it would not set 
out upon its investigation. 

2. In force of the nature of our intellect, this object 
to be investigated must be presented before it in a 
complex state. 

3. The mind truly knows it when it knows all its 
parts and the manner by which they are knit to- 
gether. If this last observation needed any proof it 
might be demonstrated thus : Then only have we a 
true knowledge when it corresponds to the reality of 
the object. Now, to get at the reality of an object 
which is complex two things are required ; the parts 
and their union, made according to the nature of the 



1 1 6 Eleme7its of IntellccHtal Philosophy. 

object. Therefore it is only when we know the parts 
of a complex object, and the manner after which they 
are knit together, that we can be said to have true 
knowledge of it. 

Having premised these things, we come to the solu- 
tion of the question. Which must we use first in the 
acquisition of science, synthesis or analysis? We 
say, in the first place, that it is impossible not to make 
use of analysis in science ; because, when we come to 
know and to distinguish the parts of a whole appre- 
hended in a confused manner at first, the process 
which we follow is analytic. Again, it is impossible 
not to use synthesis ; because, to have a perfect 
knowledge of a whole, it is not sufficient to know its 
parts, but it is necessary to know how they lie to each 
other and to the whole. This process, as it is evident, 
is synthetic; therefore in science we must use both. 

Besides, we are so made by nature that our know- 
ledge ordinarily begins from experience and from 
facts, and from them arises to principles. Now, this 
is analysis. On the other hand, experience is not suffi- 
cient to give us science, because it does nothing more 
than to affirm a fact ; hence we stand in need of syn- 
thesis also, which shows the connection of facts with 
principles; therefore science needs both these opera- 
tions. The second question is, How are they to be 
used, supposing that they are both necessary? 

We have said that the first thing we do after that 
confused knowledge of an object is to separate and 
distinguish the parts, and then we study the manner 
in which they are used. Therefore we begin first by 
analysis and then use synthesis. Again, we have said 
that our knowledge starts from experience. Now, ex- 
perience implies analysis; therefore in science we 
begin first from analysis. This, of course, is under- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 1 7 

stood in a subjective sense, inasmuch as science is an 
act of our mind, but not inasmuch as when, after hav- 
ing acquired science, we wish to impart it to others. 
In that case we use analysis first and synthesis 
afterwards, or vica versa, just as we see it more con- 
ducive to our object of imparting it. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
On Definition 

Q. What is definition ? 

A. Whatever may be the starting-point of our 
minds, either analysis or synthesis, it must have some 
fixed limits, in order not to be too much distracted and 
wandering about. These limits are appointed by defi- 
nition and division. 

Definition is a short discourse which declares what 
is that of which we are treating. It may declare a 
name or a thing, and hence is distinguished into no- 
minal and real. It is called nominal when it explains 
the signification of a name ; real when it manifests the 
nature of the thing signified by the name. Both may 
be formed in different ways, and, therefore, are of dif- 
ferent kinds. The nominal definition may be formed 
in three different ways: i. From the etymology, as 
when we say, The word philosophy means loveofzuisdom. 
2. From the common use in which a word is taken — 
as, A zuise man is understood by all to mean one %vho 
judges from the standpoint of the highest catises. 3. From 
our special signification — as, / mean by eloquence the 
prese7it impassioned state of my soul transfused into 
words. 

A real definition maybe also formed in three ways: 
I. By giving the essential constituents of a being; as, 
Man is a reasonable animal. 2. By explaining the man- 



1 1 8 Elements of Intelleciical Philosophy. 

ner in which it has been produced ; as, The circle is a 
figure described by the extremity of a straight line 
turning upon the other fixed extremity. This is called 
genetic definition. 3. By describing the thing by its 
most important accidents and exterior causes ; as, 
Man is an animal, provident, sagacious, full of reason 
and counsel. This is called descriptive and is used in 
oratory. The nominal definition must always precede 
the real, it being of the utmost importance in a dis- 
pute to be agreed upon the signification of the terms 
used. But to determine the nature of a thing the 
real definition is the most important and necessary to 
a methodic process. 

Q. Give the laws of definition. 

A. I. The definition must be clearer tJian that wJiich 
is defined, because the whole object of the definition 
is just this. 

2. The tiling defined must itot enter into the definition^ 
at least tender the same respect in which it is defined, 
otherwise we should declare the unknown by the un- 
known. 

3. // 7nust be convertible xvitJi the thing defined, 

4. It must be formed from the proximate genus and 
the specific difference of the tiling to be defined, because 
the definition must fix the proper limits of a being. 
Now, every being agrees in some things with other 
beings and disagrees in other things; therefore a defi- 
nition must express that in which the object defined 
agrees with others and that in which it differs from 
them. This is done by using the proximate genus 
and the specific difference. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 19 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
Of Division. 

Q. What is division, and how many kinds of divisions 
are there ? 

A. Division is the distribution of a whole into its 
parts ; it is of as many kinds as we may suppose a whole 
to be. Now, a whole can be so actually or potentially. 
It is actually so when it is really composed of parts, 
which may be pJiysical, as in a house the walls, the 
roof, etc.; metaphysical, as in man animality and ra- 
tionality ; accidental, as the modifications of a being ; 
logical, when they are supposed by the mind. 

It is potentially so when it actually has no parts, 
but can have them as the univdrsal relatively to the 
particular ; genus, for instance, respectively to species ; 
because, though genus actually does not contain the 
species, yet it may be divided according to the species, 
as animals may be divided into reasonable and unrea- 
sonable. Division, therefore, may distribute the ac- 
tual and the potential whole. 

O. What are the laws of division ? 

A. The following : i. It must be entire; that is, 
that no part of the subject must be left out, so that 
all the parts put together may be equal to the whole. 

2. The parts must be somewhat opposed to each 
Other, so that the one does not contain the other. 

3. The division should be effected in an orderly 
way; that is, a subject should be divided first in its 
more general parts, and these in their turn subdivided, 
and so on. 

4. It should not be too minute, which would engen- 
der confusion. 



CHAPTER III. 

DIVISION OF METHOD— THAT 76, OF METHOD OF INVEN- 
TION AND OF DISCIPLINE. 

Q. How many kinds of method" are there? 

A. Two, method of invention and method of dis- 
cipHne. We can attain science in two ways: either by 
discovering it ourselves or by learning it from one who 
has already found it. The first is called method of 
invention ; the other, of discipline. 

Q. What are the truths which the intellect may 
discover ? 

A. Four questions may always be raised upon a 
subject: i. Whether it exists? 2. What is it? 3. 
What are its qualities ? 4. What originates its ex- 
istence, and for what does it exist ? Hence there are 
four truths which may be discovered in a subject : 
existence, essence and nature, qualities, and the causes 
of existence. Of these four truths two properly be- 
long to science : What is it, and from whence comes 
it, and why ? That is the essence and the efficient 
and final cause of a thing. The others are subject to 
experience, and are a way to science, but not science 
itself. 

Q. What are the means to obtain truth ? . 

A. They can be of two kinds, direct and indirect, 
because we can either discover truth by ourselves or 
learn it from others ; the first is called direct, the 
other indirect. The direct may belong to sensitive 
and to intellectual knowledge. Now, using these two 
means to arrive at science, two things may happen ; 



Elements of Intellechial Philosophy. 121 

either we arrive at the. knowledge of the principles and 
of the nature of a thing or we do not. If the first, then 
our mind is satisfied and rests ; if the second, the mind, 
to be satisfied, seeks some other means, and supposes 
a principle which may explain all the accidents of the 
subject, and which may fulfil the office of its nature 
for the time being until it succeeds really to find it 
out. This supposed principle is called hypothesis. 

Such is the way which the mind follows in the pursuit 
of truth. Oi the senses and of the intellect, and of their 
value as means ot truth, and of the indirect means— 
that is, the testimony of others — we shall speak in 
another place. Here we shall say a few words with 
regard to experience and to hypothesis. 

Q. What is experience, and what are its laws ? 

A. Experience has often been confounded with 
observation. To observe is to look at the facts just 
as they happen, and nothing more, whereas experience 
means always a certain knowledge of some properties 
revealed by observation. Hence is it that, though 
observation is satisfied with one fact, experience 
requires several, and most rarely is satisfied with 
one, and when this happens the fact must be of 
the highest importance and equivalent to many facts. 
This is the reason also why the word experience has 
been extended not only to mean the gathering of a 
property of an object from the observation of many 
facts, but is used to mean the artificial reproduction 
of facts to force, as it were, the object more clearly 
to reveal its properties. Thus chemists, for instance, 
make experiments by reproducing facts and pheno- 
mena to force the object to reveal itself. In one 
word, experience and experiment are ordained to 
gather from the observation of facts the properties 
and qualities of beings. 



122 Elements of IntellectMal PhilosopJiy 

The laws which must guide us in the experience of 
facts are: i. We must pay attention to the least 
circumstances of place, of time, of manner, because 
the least influence of these things causes a variation 
in the experiment. 2. We must repeat and vary 
the experiment, try it with other instruments and 
under different circumstances, oftentimes using a con- 
trary process, in order that the phenomenon may be 
known under all its aspects. 3. We must protract 
the experiment for a certain time, and pay attention 
to those more constant and stable effects and con- 
ditions which may accompany the phenomenon. 
These laws require the utmost diligence in their ob- 
servation, and the greatest patience in continuing 
them. 

Q. What is hypothesis, and what are its laws ? 

A. We have said that oftentimes, in spite of all our 
constancy in experimenting, we cannot find the prin- 
ciple and reason of a phenomenon. Then we put 
forth a principle which may better explain it ; this is 
called hypothesis, which may be defined : A probable 
opinion put forth to explain the nature and reason of 
a phenomenon, zvJiicJi nature and reason are not knoivn 
by experience^ nor as yet demonstrated by reason. The 
laws are : i. We must only take as an hypothesis that 
principle which may explain most of the circum- 
stances, and these the most important. 

2. That it contain nothing repugnant to the laws 
of nature already known. 

3. That, among the hypotheses, should be chosen 
which proceeds in the most simple way. 

If in the prosecution of the experiments we find out 
that that hypothesis explains the true nature of the 
phenomenon, then the probability becomes certainty 
and the hypothesis becomes thesis. 



Ele7nents of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 123 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Of the Method of Discipline. 

Q. What is meant by teaching? 

A. When science is found the method employed to 
communicate it to others is called didactic, or of dis- 
cipline. In order to understand the nature of this 
method we must see v/hat it is to teach science. 

To teach is to manifest the science which we know, 
and to cause others to learn it. But to know, in a 
scientific way, means to deduce a conclusion from 
principles certain and evident ; therefore to teach 
science implies inducing the mind of the pupil to 
draw consequences from known principles. Hence it 
appears that the teacher is not the principal cause of 
the science in the disciple, but a guide who, by means 
of signs — that is, words — leads the disciple and induces 
him to draw conclusions from known principles in the 
same manner as he drew them himself. Hence the 
principle or cause of the science in this case is not 
the teacher but the reason of the disciple. 

From this appears the strangeness of the opinion of 
those who hold that the analytic method is good to 
discover science, the synthetic to impart it. We say 
that in general the best method of teaching science is 
the same one which discovered it. Because to teach 
is to incite the mind of the disciple to form those 
same demonstrations which are in our mind; there- 
fore the easiest method is the same followed by us in 
the formation of those demonstrations. 

Besides, between the method of invention and 
that of discipline exists the same difference which 
intervenes between nature and art, because the in- 
ventive method is natural, that of discipline is arti- 
ficial. But art must imitate nature ; therefore the 



1 24 Elements of Intellechial Philosophy. 

method of discipline must imitate the method of in- 
vention. 

This, however, must not be understood so strictly 
as to forbid the use of any other method. The best 
rule in this matter is, that method is the best which 
best facilitates the acquisition of science, and there- 
fore when the analytic answers the purpose let the 
analytic be followed ; when the synthetic, let the latter 
be followed, because the easiest and the clearest way 
is always the most natural. 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF SCIENCE, ACCORDING TO ITS STRICTEST ACCEPTATION, 
INASMUCH AS IT IS KNOWLEDGE. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Idea of Science. 

Q. In how many ways can the word science be 

used ? 

A. In two ways, though both are connected to- 
gether. In the first place, science impHes a particular 
knowledge of an object. But our mind can have also 
several distinct ideas of an object, and form several 
distinct conclusions about it, which it may put to- 
gether in order and form a whole body of knowledge. 
Hence, in the second place, science may be used also 
to express that orderly series of scientific knowledge 
we form about an object. In this chapter we shall 
treat of science in the first signification, leaving it to 
the next to treat of it in its second acceptation. 

O. Give an idea of science inasmuch as it is a spe- 
cial knowledge of an object. 

A. It is called a special knowledge of a set purpose, 
because science does not mean any knowledge what- 
ever, but only a perfect knowledge. This sense is 
attached to science even by common sense, because 
men generally attach a different sense to the word 
knowledge and to that of science, meaning by the 
latter a fuller, more evident, and more noble know- 
ledge. Science, therefore, implies a perfect knowledge. 
From this idea we can draw the elements necessary 
and essential to the conception of science, because 



126 Elements of Intellectua I Ph ilosoph^i 

three things are necessary to have a perfect knowledge : 

1. It must be certain, because, besides certainty, there 
is nothing but doubt and probabihty, or opinion. But 
doubt is the want of knowledge, and probability is an 
imperfect knowledge, always implying a certain fear 
of the contrary ; therefore we can call perfect only 
that knowledge which is accompanied by a certainty. 

2. It must be evident, either mediately or immedi- 
ately ; because, if knowledge is certain, it is necessary 
that the mind should have no fear of the contrary. 
To have no fear of the contrary the mind must feel 
perfectly secure about it. To feel perfectly secure 
it is necessary that it should see clearly into the 
principles on which it is founded, and discover the 
connection between those principles and the conclu- 
sions drawn from them ; therefore science must be 
evident knowledge. Moreover, if this knowledge were 
not evident but obscure, it would not be perfect but 
imperfect. 3. It must be a knowledge deduced from 
its causes, because otherwise it could be neither cer- 
tain, evident, nor perfect — not certain, because then 
only can we be said to have certainty when not only 
do we know that a thing is but also that it in2ist he so, 
which absolutely excludes all fear of the opposite. 
But the necessity that a thing must be so is only 
known when we discover the cause and the connection 
which it has with it. Therefore knowledge, to be cer- 
tain, must be deduced from its causes. It could not 
be evident, because when the mind can see no connec- 
tion between a thing and its cause it cannot have true 
evidence, as it can see a void, and never can rest until 
it discovers that connection. It could not be perfect, 
since that knowledge alone is perfect which leaves 
nothing to discover, and when we know not the cause 
of a thing we cannot say that there is nothing more 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 127 

to discover; therefore science must be a knowledge 
deduced from its principles. 

O. Give a full definition of science according to the 
above principles. 

A. A knowledge, certain and evident, deduced from 
its principles or causes. Here a difficulty might be 
raised. We cannot always investigate the cause of an 
object, and yet we can have a scientific knowledge of 
it. For instance, God has no cause, and yet we can 
have the science of Him, which is called Theology. 

In answer to this difficulty we say that when we 
cannot investigate the cause of an object, in that case 
the knowledge of its effects performs the office of the 
cause, as when we say God exists because He has 
created the world, God is most perfect because He 
is the cause of all the perfections of creatures ; here 
the knowledge of the effect performs the office of 
cause. 

O. How can we make the effect officiate as cause? 
Is not this contradictory? 

A. When a cause has produced a certain effect, it 
has imposed the necessity of its own existence for 
having produced that effect, and of its being such by 
nature as the effect produced requires ; because as, on 
one side, the effect must necessarily exist since the 
cause has acted, and must be such, and not otherwise, 
as the cause has made it, so likewise, on the other 
hand, the cause must necessarily exist because its 
effects exist ; it must necessarily have produced it, 
because the effect is already produced, and must 
necessarily be so-and-so, because the effect is so- 
and-so, and not otherwise. Therefore in this case 
the effect performs the office of cause in the con- 
struction of science, since we can argue from a certain 
effect the existence of the cause, its being produced 



128 Elements of Intelleciual' Philosophy. 

by the cause, and somewhat the nature of the cause. 
Hence St. Thomas has observed that when we de- 
monstrate the cause by its effects, then the effect 
officiates as the cause, and the definition of the effect 
is given instead of that of the cause. Here we must 
observe that we do not say that the effect is the cause 
of the existence of the cause, as Hegel objected 
with regard to the demonstration of the existence of 
God from His effects. We only say that the effect 
merely officiates as the cause in the demonstration, in- 
asmuch as we have said every effect necessarily sup- 
poses a cause, and such a cai;se as befits the effect ; 
and, therefore, supposing the existence of the effect, 
the cause also must exist, and be such as the effect 
requires. Besides, by the same cause we do not 
merely understand the efficient and the final causes, 
but also the principles essential to a being, which form 
it, which may be reduced to the formal cause. But 
the essential principles of a being may be easily read 
and discovered in their effects more or less, according 
as the effect approaches the cause and equals its 
power, as we must find the similitude of the cause in 
its effect. Therefore, even when we demonstrate from 
effects, science is knowledge from its causes. It may 
not be quite perfect, but it is science for all that, be- 
cause containing all the elements of science. 

Q. What must you observe as to the object of 
science ? 

A. I. Science must have for its object the essence 
and the immutable relations of the essence of things. 
It must have for its object the essence, because science 
is knowledge certain and universal. But such know- 
ledge must have an object, which cannot be otherwise 
than immutable ; therefore the object of science must 
be immutable. But only essences are immutable ; 



Elements of Intellectual PIi ilosophy, 129 

therefore the object of science must be the essences 
of things. 

Of these essences we must know the elements and 
their immutable relations, because science lies in the 
knowledge of the connection and relation between 
effects and their causes. But we could not know this 
connection between effects and their causes without 
knowing the elements and the immutable relations of 
the essences of things ; therefore, etc. 

The second observation is in relation to what is 
necessary in the intelligent subject in order to have 
scientific knowledge. Because it is not necessary, in 
order to have a scientific knowledge of an object, to 
have been able to produce it, as was asserted by Vico, 
who held that the intellect knows only what it does ; 
but it is sufficient that there exist a means which may 
represent to our mind effects and their causes, their 
relations and essences, in which means the mind may 
see all those things. This means we have in ideas, 
and the force of reading them lies in our intellect. 
The principle of Vico would only render possible one 
science — that is, mathematics, which is the creation of 
man ; and upon this principle the German panthe- 
ists have constructed their system, as we shall see in 
its proper place. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Of Science in Relation to Opinion and Faith. 

Q. How is science distinguished from opinion and 
faith ? 

A. As to opinion, science is distinguishable from it 
in four ways : i. \r\ knowledge, \v\\\c\\ in science most 
firmly clings to the object known without the least 



1 30 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

fear of the opposite, whereas opinion implies an adhe- 
sion of the mind with fear of the opposite. 

2. As to the matter ; this in science being always 
necessary and immutable, whereas in opinion it is 
oftentimes mutable and contingent. 

3. For the' means, which in science is the demon- 
strative syllogism, deducing certain and evident know- 
ledge from its causes, whilst in opinion the means 
is the probable syllogism. 

4. For the manner according to which they are pro- 
duced, science being produced by one efficacious de- 
monstration, whilst opinion is engendered by the 
aid of various syllogisms in consequence of their 
weakness. 

As to faith, science can be distinguished from it 
for two reasons: I. The certainty of science consists 
in two things — in the intrinsic evidence of the object 
and in the firmness of adhesion of the mind. On the 
contrar}^, faith consists only in the firmness of the ad- 
hesion of the mind, not caused by the internal evi- 
dence of the object as perceived by the mind, but by 
the external evidence only if we speak of human 
faith, and by other causes if we speak of divine faith, 
the clinging of the mind which the latter implies being 
caused also by an internal operation of God upon the 
soul. 

2. In science we adhere to the conclusion forced by 
the necessit}^ of the principles. In faith we cling to 
the object prompted by the will, which presents that 
belief as good. 



CHAPTER V. 

OF SCIENCE IN ITS MORE ENLARGED SIGNIFICATION INAS- 
MUCH AS IT IS A SYSTEM OF TRUTHS. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 
Idea of Science in this Second Sense. 

O. What do you mean by science in this second 
sense? 

A. Any system of truths belonging to a definite 
order of things and presented in one body. 

Q, Is not science, understood in this latter sense, 
confounded with art, in which truths and rules are 
also presented in one body? 

A. Art is only an order of rules upon some particu- 
lar thing, whereas science is always a deduction. In 
art we do not always find the evidence of principles ; 
in science always. In art the order of rules which it 
gives cannot, strictly speaking, be called a system ; in 
science the body of truths which it exhibits is always 
called a system. Three things, therefore, are the pro- 
perty of science in this second sense : principles, de- 
duction, and system. 

Q. What about principles? 

A. A principle is that from which a thing proceeds ; 
and because we here speak of knowledge, the principle 
is that by which a thing is known. But we do not 
know by means of another principle, except that 
which cannot be known by itself; therefore we must 
call principles those propositions known of them- 
selves, and which are the cause of tlie knowledge of 



132 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

many others — for instance, Every effect supposes a 
cause; Those things zvJiicJi are equal to a third are 
equal to one another. Nothing can be and not be at the 
same time ; from which it appears that there are three 
properties of a principle — evidence, necessity, and 
universaHty. Evidence is that property by which 
a thing, in being presented to our mind, makes itself 
known most clearly. It is of two kinds, mediate 
and immediate. It is called immediate when the 
thing can be known by itself without the need of any 
other, as the principles above mentioned. It is called 
mediate when the truth cannot be known by itself, 
but stands in need of other truths to be known. The 
evidence of principles must be immediate, because it 
must be the cause of the knowledge of other truths. 
From this property of evidence flows the other, of ne- 
cessity. Because if the thing is evident by itself the 
mind cannot refuse its adhesion to it, but must neces- 
sarily give it. This is called the necessity of a prin- 
ciple. Finally, universality, the third property of a 
principle, is a consequence flowing from the very na- 
ture of a principle. A principle is that which is the 
cause of the knowledge of many other truths. Now, 
this must be understood, inasmuch as these truths 
are contained in that principle. Now, this property 
of being able to extend to many truths, and in all 
cases, is called the universality of a principle ; there- 
fore a principle must be universal. 

Q. Can there be one principle for all sciences? 

A. This is impossible, because, i, the principles of 
sciences must correspond with the real and objective 
principles of things. But the species of things which 
are the object of our knowledge are many and various ; 
therefore many and various must be the principles 
of sciences. 2. A principle is a law — that is, ex- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 133 

presses a certain respect according to which things 
comprehended in it are regulated. But things are 
many and various, and various are the respects under 
which they may be regarded ; therefore various must 
be the principles of sciences. It is true that there 
exists one principle which is the foundation of cer- 
tainty, the principle of contradiction, but this can 
never be such as to enable us to derive from its first 
cause the science of an object. This principle does 
not regard any matter of science. 

Q. How are principles divided ? 

A. Into proper and common. Common principles 
are those which are used in all sciences ; as, Nothing is 
done zvithont a sufficient reason ; It is impossible that a 
thing be and not be at the same time, of the same kind. 
Proper and other principles are those which regard 
the special matter cf a particular science ; as, Do as 
you would be done by, which is a principle of the 
moral science. 

Into analytic and synthetic. The first are those in 
which the predicate is found in the idea of the sub- 
ject ; as, The tvhole is greater than any of its parts. 
The second are those in which the predicate is not 
included in that of the subject, but is attached to it in 
force of our experience ; as, Every body tends tozuards 
its centre. In other words, the one originates in the 
nature of the subject, the other does not. 

The opposite of the analytic principles is absolute, 
repugnant, and contradictory, and not even God him- 
self could effect it ; but the opposite of synthetic 
principles is contradictory only hypothetically, that is, 
supposing that the laws according to which bodies are 
governed be maintained constant. For instance, it is 
an absolute contradiction to say that a thing is and is 
not at the same time, and God himself could not effect 



134 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

such a thing; but it is not contradictory in itself to 
say that a body, instead of tending towards its centre, 
should tend upwards, because this may be done by 
suspending the law of gravitation, Avhich is -net essen- 
tial to the nature of the body. It is only contra- 
dictory in the hypothesis that the laws now governing 
bodies be constant ; hence, admitting the law of gravi- 
tation actually in force in a given body, it is a contra- 
diction to say that it could tend upwards. 

Q. What is the means of science? 

A. The other thing most necessary to science is 
reasoning. Some philosophers, as the school of Locke 
and Condillac, pretend that the only means of science 
is induction. But such a theory is absurd. Induction, 
of itself, does nothing more than generalize a fact, but 
says nothing of the reason why such a fact is so and 
not otherwise, and why it takes place, nor discovers 
the connection between cause and effect. Now, all this 
is necessary to science ; therefore induction alone can- 
not suffice for science. Therefore we must hold that 
the primary and essential means of science is the apo- 
dictic reasoning. And as science, inasmuch as it is a 
system, cannot prove everything apodictically, so all 
other kinds of argumentations are most useful, even 
those which produce nothing more than probable 
knowledge. 

O. What is the last thing necessary to science? 

A. The connection, or order. For science must 
equal its subject ; and as then only Ave have truth 
when the form of the intellect is equal with the 
thing, so science is true and perfect only when it is a 
true image of its object. But the object is in itself 
perfectly well arranged and set in order ; therefore 
science also must be well arranged in its cognitions. 
Here we may recall the observation of Vico, that in 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosopJiy. 135 

knowing an object we should divide it in its parts and 
construct it gradually in our minds, as if we were 
making it. Nay, this is just what gives to a treatise 
the character of science — the order and connection of 
the deductions. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
Distinction and Order of Sciences. 

Q. What is there to be observed about the unity 
and distinction of sciences? 

A. The true and principal criterion of the unity of 
sciences is their object. Science, in this second sense, 
is a system of knowledge belonging to a certain order 
of things ; therefore, if that order of things be one, 
the science will be one, and hence the unity of each 
science depends upon the unity of its object. But we 
must draw a distinction here. The object of the sci- 
ence may be considered materially and formally. We 
consider it materially when we look at everything and 
every element which constitutes its being ; we consider 
it formally when we look only at that respect accord- 
ing to which it is the object of a given science. Now, 
the unity of a science is constituted by its formal ob- 
ject, but not by its material ; hence it may happen 
that many things materially different from each other 
may form one object of a science, being regarded 
under one peculiar aspect. For instance, how many 
are the material objects of physics ? Numberless ; 
yet they form one object of that science, inasmuch as 
they are regarded under the one aspect as phenomena 
of bodies. On the contrary, it may happen that an 
object materially one may form the object of many 
sciences, in each of them being considered under a 
peculiar aspect. Man, for instance, one material ob- 



136 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

ject, may be the object of anatomy, physiology, pa- 
thology, psychology, and so forth. The formal object, 
therefore, is that which gives unity to a science. 

As to distinction, we say that unity is the foundation 
of distinction, because a thing is distinct from others 
because it is in itself one. But unity is given to science 
by its formal object ; therefore from the formal object 
arises the distinction of sciences. Hence a science is 
different from others, according as its formal object is 
more or less different ; as, for instance, theology is dis- 
tinct from cosmology, because their formal objects are 
different ; natural theology is distinct from revealed 
theplogy, because their formal object is different. 

Omitting all other distinctions of sciences, we shall 
say a word of that well-known distinction into specu- 
lative and practical. A speculative science is that 
which regards its object only as truth ; practical, that 
which regards its object as to be acted on ; or, in other 
words, speculative sciences are those which have for 
their object the contemplation of truth ; practical, 
those which have for their end action. 

Q. What is the order and dependence of sciences? 

A. Though sciences be different, yet they must be 
set in order and be dependent. When many things 
are destined to one end it is necessary that one of 
them should govern and regulate the others. But all 
sciences and arts are destined to one end — the perfec- 
tion of man ; therefore it is necessary that one of them 
should govern and regulate all others and take the 
name of Avisdom. But one may ask. What is that sci- 
ence which may rule and govern all others? That 
which has certainly the aptitude to govern and rule 
others. But, as Aristotle remarks, among men those 
are naturally able to govern who have more intellectual 
power ; and those who are more robust in body but 



Eleme7its of Intellectual Philosophy. 137 

wanting in talent are naturally liable to be governed. 
Hence that science must be the first and govern all 
others which is most intellectual. But that which is 
most intellectual is occupied about those objects which 
are most intelligible. The intelligible is the universal ; 
therefore that science is first which has a more uni- 
versal object. But philosophy has an object more 
universal than other science ; therefore philosophy is 
that first science on which all depend. And here we 
conclude this first part of philosophy with that from 
which we started, after having given a brief idea of 
the matter, the form, and the end of reasoning. 



ONTOLOGY 



139 



ONTOLOGY. 



INTRODUCTION— OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS— DEFINI- 
TION OF ONTOLOGY. 



Q. Give the object of metaphysics, 

A. In Logic we have spoken of being inasmuch as 
it is the product of the mind, and have explained the 
nature of reasoning. This was obhged to be done be- 
fore all things else, not because of the dignity of the 
object, but by necessity of method, as we have shown 
in the Introduction to Philosophy. We proceed now 
to speak of real being, which forms the object of meta- 
physics. This word, composed of two Greek words, 
means that which follows physics, and was given by 
the compilers of Aristotle's works to those thirteen 
books in which they found the philosopher treated 
of real being, the name happily chiming with the ob- 
ject of these books, since metaphysics treats of things 
separated from matter either by abstraction of the 
mind, as being in common, or by their nature, as the 
soul and God, and if it treat at all of material 
things it does so in a more noble way' than physics. 

Q. Give the division of metaphysics. 

A. It has been divided into four parts — Ontology, 
Anthropology, Cosmology, and Natural Theology. 

O. What is Ontology, and what are its parts ? 

A. Ontology is that part which treats of real being. 



142 Introduction. 

considered in common and in a general way. But 
about real being, considered in a general way, our 
mind may naturally enquire the following things : 
I. What is the nature of real being, considered in a 
general way ? 2. What are its properties ? 3, What 
are its principles and causes? 4. Hovv^ is it divided? 
Therefore, according to this natural order, we shall 
treat of these four things : of the nature of real being 
in general, of its properties, of its causes, and of its 
divisions. Beginning from the first, we shall treat of 
it in the following chapters: i. Of being considered 
in itself and in a most general way ; 2. Of the first de- 
terminations of being — that is, of essence and exis- 
tence ; and 3. Of the manner in which these two last 
concur in forming real being. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF BEING, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF AND IN A MOST 
GENERAL WAY. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Of the Idea of Being in Itself. 

O. Can you give a definition of being? 

A. We cannot, because a definition must be com- 
posed of the proximate genus and of the specific dif- 
ference of the thing defined. Now, being can have 
neither; therefore it is incapable of being defined. 
The minor is proved thus : Every genus must have 
specific differences, which are not comprehended in 
the essence and idea of the genus, but lie outside of 
it. For instance, the genus animal has two specific 
differences, reasonable and brute. These are outside 
the essence and idea of the genus. Now, there can 
be nothing which is not comprehended in the idea of 
being; therefore being cannot be defined. It may be 
declared by saying that being is everything which is 
in any way whatever, or that which can be positively 
conceived. 

Q. What consequences do you draw from this doc- 
trine? 

A. I . TJiat being is the most general and simple idea. 
The most general, because nothing can be more inti- 
mate and essential to all things than that of being 
something. Now, this is just what is meant by being. 
Therefore this idea is applicable to all things, and 
hence most general. Again, being agrees with, and is 



144 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

attributed not only to, all things but also to all con- 
ceptions and ideas ; therefore it is the most general 
of all ideas. 

It is the most simple — that is, it has a less number 
of elements and a more restricted comprehension than 
all other ideas, because, as we have said in Logic, the 
comprehension of an idea is in the inverse ratio of its 
extension. Consequently, this idea, being the most 
general, is the least comprehensive, and hence most 
simple. 

2. Being is the first idea, both in the chronological and 
logical order. This idea is first in the chronological 
order, inasmuch as it is acquired by our minds before 
any other idea. For our mind is so constructed that 
it must travel in its investigations from that which is 
less perfect to that which is more so, and hence from 
that which is more general and confused to that which 
is less general and more distinct. But no idea is more 
general than that of being ; therefore it is the first 
which is acquired by the mind. Kence the first thing 
we perceive in all things is that they are, that they 
are something, and, gradually proceeding forward in 
the knowledge of them, we come to know them more 
perfectly and more minutely. 

This idea is also fi^rst in the logical order, by which 
we understand that all other ideas are subject, and can 
be reduced to the idea of being. In fact, everything 
can be resolved into its primitive and more simple ele- 
ments. But the idea of being is common to all ideas, 
and is the most simple of them all ; therefore they all 
can be reduced to that idea. 

■■■ Again, all other ideas are determinations of the idea 
of being ; therefore they can be reduced to that idea. 
Take, for instance, the idea of Shakspere. This is 
an individual idea of the greatest of our English poets, 



Ekinents of Intellectual PJi ilosophy. 1 4 5 

the most individual expression of somebody. But let 
us resolve that into its more general elements, and 
ask, What is the greatest of English poets ? A man — 
something more general yet. But what is a man ? 
A twofold substance, spiritual and material, united 
together by one personality-^more general still. But 
what is a substance ? It is a being that stands by it- 
self. Here we have reduced the idea of Shakspere 
to the idea of being by stripping it of its determina- 
tions ; therefore the idea of being is the first in the 
logical order. 

Being is the best known of all ideas, because we be- 
come acquainted with things unknown by means of 
that which we know. But we have the idea of being 
by itself, and by its means we are introduced to the 
knowledge of all other things ; therefore being is the 
best known of all ideas. 

The idea of being, therefore, does not include in 
itself any determination of substance or accident, of 
essence or existence, of reality or possibility ; because 
with none of these conceptions can we reconcile the 
characters and properties which become the idea of 
being. 

Q. What is the idea of not being ? 

A. The negation of the idea of being — that is, noth- 
ing. But nothing has not an idea of its own, since every- 
thing is known inasmuch as it is, and nothing is the 
negation of being ; therefore nothing C2iX\not be known 
by itself or possess an idea of its own, but must be 
conceived through the idea of being. 



1 46 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 

ARTICLE SECOND. 

Of the Univocal Attribution of Being and of the Principle 
of Contradiction. 

O. In how many ways can a nature or property be 
predicated of various subjects? 

A. In two ways, nnivocalty and cqnivocally. The 
first is when that nature or property is attributed to, 
and found in, the subject in the same degree and un- 
der the same signification. The second is when that 
nature or property is attributed to many, not because 
found in them in the same degree, but in consequence 
of a certain resemblance and proportion between the 
subjects. For instance, Ave attribute the nature of 
reasonable to all the subjects called men, in the same 
degree and under the same signification ; therefore we 
attribute it univocally. But we attribute the quality of 
healthy to the animal body, to food, to air, to place, 
not in the same sense and degree, but on account of 
the resemblance between the objects called healthy ; 
wc attribute it, therefore, equivocally. 

Q. To Avhat can the idea of being be attributed 
univocally ? 

• ■ A. Only to itself, as when we Sd^y, Being is ; then 
being is attributed to itself in the same identical signifi- 
cation. From this manner of attribution proceed va- 
rious analytical judgments, as that which we call oi iden- 
tity, and which is expressed thus : TJiat zuJiich is, is; that 
tvhich is not, is not. The judgment called of excluded 
means — as, SometJiing either is or is not ; or as that 
spoken of — Being is. But on close consideration all 
these judgments may be reduced to one, which is the 
foundation of all judgments, and which is called the 
principle of contradiction, which is expressed thus: 
A thincr cannot be and not be at the same time. 



Elements of lute llcctua I Ph ilosophy. 1 4 7 

O. Is this principle important in science ? 

A. It is most important, as that which comprehends 
all the judgments which arise from the univocal attri- 
bution of being. 

Q. What are its properties? 

A. I. It is knozvn by itself. 

Principles called self-evident, or known by them- 
selves, are those in which the predicate is contained in 
the idea of the subject ; so much so that the momxcnt 
we know the terms, that very moment we perceive the 
truth of the judgment. Take the principle, for in- 
stance. The whole is greater than any of its parts. 
All we have to do to perceive the truth of this judg- 
ment is to understand the terms, in which we find 
that any part of a whole is contained in it as one of 
its elements, and that, therefore, the whole is greater 
than any of its parts, as a total is greater than the 
units composing it. Now, in no other principle is this 
quality of self-evidence found better than in that of 
contradiction, because in it the predicate enters as 
identical with the subject, since the terms of such 
principle are. Being is being, not being is not bein'g; 
therefore the principle of contradiction is self-evident. 

2. // is tJie most universal judgment and principle. 
The narrowing of a judgment arises from two causes : 
from the subjects to which they extend, and from the 
matter of Avhich they treat. For instance, the fol- 
lowing judgment, Man is a reasonable animal, is nar- 
rowed down by the subject, because it extends to man 
only, and even as to him it applies neither to his will, 
his liberty, his body, his soul in general, but only to 
his specific difference of being reasonable. And be- 
cause the matter of which a judgment treats is repre- 
sented by the predicate, as may be seen in the above 
judgm^ent, and in any other like it, we may say that a 



148 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

judgment is restricted and determined by the predi- 
cate and the subject. Hence the greater or lesser 
universality cf a judgment depends exchisively on the 
terms composing it. Now, among all judgments, 
there is none which has such universal terms as the 
principle of contradiction, because its terms are being 
and not being. Therefore it is the most universal prin- 
ciple, and there can be no judgment not contained 
therein. 

3 . // is the first and supreme principle. 

A principle, to be such, must have two qualities : 
I. It must be self-evident. 2. To it we must be able 
to reduce all other principles. But we have shown 
that the principle of contradiction is self-evident. We 
can show also that we can reduce all other principles 
to it, because principles and judgment are reducible 
to another when they can be resolved into another, 
more general, in which they are contained. For in- 
stance, the principle, Tlie liead is smaller tha?i the body, 
is true, because it can be reduced to that other more 
general principle. The part is siiiallcr than the whole. 
But the principle of contradiction is the most common 
and universal principle; therefore to it can be reduced 
all other principles ; therefore it holds the primacy 
over all other principles. This is so true that no other 
principle can be produced which may claim the prece- 
dence over the principle of contradiction. Attempts 
have been made by several philosophers to bring for- 
ward a principle which could pretend to this prece- 
dence, but they have all failed. Des Cartes produced his 
pet theory : I think, therefore I am ; but this principle 
is true, because founded on that of contradiction. A 
thing cannot be and not be at the same time, because 
if the latter were not true how could one say, I think, 
therefore I am ? since in that case it would not be con- 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 149 

tradictoiy that one should think and not exist at the 
same time. Leibnitz proclaimed his principle of suffi- 
cient reason, Nothing am exist without a sufficient 
reason, and pretended partial primacy for it ; but all 
in vain, since, if the principle of contradiction were 
not true, it would be possible for a thing to exist and 
have no sufficient reason to account for it. Conse- 
quently, Leibnitz was wrong in saying that the princi- 
ple of contradiction was first among necessary truths, 
and the principle of sufficient reason was first among 
contingent truths, since all truths depend upon the 
principle of contradiction, and it holds precedence of 
them all. 

ARTICLE THIRD, 
Of the Analogical Attribution of Being. 

Q. Of what is being predicated analogically? 

A. We have said that being is predicated univocally 
only of itself; therefore it is attributed analogically to 
all other subjects. These may be God and the crea- 
ture, and the latter may be a substance or an accident ; 
therefore being is predicated analogically of God, of 
creatures, of substances, and of accidents. This may 
be briefly demonstrated as follows : 

I. We can attribute something univocally to a 
number of subjects when they agree in the same spe- 
cies, or at least in the same genus. When they do not 
agree even as to genus, then we attribute the same 
thing to them only in consequence of a certain com- 
mon aspect or relation. Now, being cannot be genus, 
as we have shown in the first article ; therefore we 
cannot predicate being of God and creatures, of sub- 
stances and accidents, univocally, but equivocally in 
force of a certain common aspect we discover between 



1 50 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

them. Therefore God and the creature agree in the 
common attribution, being, but only by a certain ana- 
logy between them, and not because they belong to 
the same species or genus or have the same being. 

2. Univocals have this special property of their 
own : that they are found, according to their common 
aspect, in the same manner in all those subjects to 
which they are attributed, as man, which is predicated 
of many individuals, and is found in all of them in the 
sam.e manner. On the contrary, in analogous things 
tlie common feature is found in a different way in the 
subjects, as the attribute sound, which may be predi- 
cated of food, of the animal body, of the mind, etc., 
and which is not found in the same manner in these 
several subjects. But being is not found in the same 
manner in God and in the creature, in the substance 
and in the accident ; therefore it can only be attri- 
buted to them analogically. 

3. Univocals are restricted by the difference which 
lies outside the common nature, whereas analogicals 
are determined always by the different manner in which 
they enjoy that common aspect which makes them ana- 
logicals. For instance, animal is not determined and 
narrowed down by the different manner in which it is 
found in man and in the brute, because it is the same 
in both ; but by the difference of reasonable or un- 
reasonable, which lies outside the essence of the ani- 
mal. Now, being cannot be narrowed down by any 
difference lying outside the nature of being — because 
what is there which is not being? — but it is narrowed 
down by the different manner of being. Therefore 
being is predicated analogically of those different sub- 
jects. That being is found differently in God and in 
the creature, in the substance and the accident, as 
we have supposed in the minor of all the preceding 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 



i^i 



arguments, is evident ; because God is the essential, 
most pure, infinite, independent being, the fuhiess of 
ail perfections of being ; whereas creatures are rot 
essential or necessary beings, nor have they the ful- 
ness of being, but have a borrowed, finite, dependent 
being. 

Substances are independent of accidents as to their 
existence; accidents cannot exist without. the sub- 
stance. The latter possesses being directly and in 
itself; the accident only indirectly and by means of 
the substance. The being of the substance is strictly 
such, but the accident is only an adjunct, an appendage 
to the being of the substance. Therefore it is evi- 
dent that being is found in a different manner in God 
and in the creature, in the substance and the accident, 
and that, therefore, we can predicate being of all these 
subjects only analogically. 



CHAPTER II. 

OF THE DETERMINATIONS OF BEING IN GENERAL- 
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 
H'ow are Determinations of Being to be Understood ? 

O. How is the idea of beincr determined and nar- 
rowed down ? 

A. Being, as we have described it in the first chap- 
ter, indeterminate and common, does not exist in 
nature. To represent, therefore, a real being, that 
idea, in force of its vagueness and indetermination, is 
not sufficient, but must be made more definite and 
contracted. But how is this to be done ? How can 
being be made definite? All other ideas can be 
made more definite by adding something distinct 
and different from them ; as, for instance, the idea 
of animal is made more definite by adding to it 
the element of reasonable. But this cannot be done 
with the idea of being, because what can we add to it 
which is not being? To limit, therefore, the idea of 
being must be done by the same idea of being a little 
more explicit ; because ideas must correspond to ob- 
jects, but objects are so many special beings ; there- 
fore their ideas can be nothing more than so many ex- 
plicit conceptions of being. 

Q. What are the first limitations of being ? 

A. Two : essence and existence. But to under- 
stand these two limitations it is necessary to speak 
first o{ possibility. The idea of possibility has been 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 153 

variously misrepresented by philosophers. A possible 
is that which is capable of being. This aptitude may 
be of two kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic. A being is 
called intrinsically possible when the elements which 
must constitute it do not clash with each other; be- 
cause possibility has relation to being, hence all that 
which may be is possible. But to prevent a thing from 
being can be effected only by the principle of contra- 
diction ; therefore all that which does not involve 
an interior repugnance is possible. Now, the mere 
intrinsic possibility or agreement of the elements 
which have to constitute the being would not of 
itself be sufficient for a being really to exist. An- 
other condition is required, because everything which 
may be cannot come from the mere possibility to the 
jtctual act of being, except by means of a being 
already in act which may carry that aptitude into 
reality. To be able to exist by means of this exter- 
nal agent carrying that internal aptitude into the ac- 
tual fact of being is called extrinsic possibility . And 
because these extrinsic agents or causes may be either 
God or creatures, extrinsic possibility is divided, ac-. 
cording to St. Thomas, into possibility according to 
the supreme cause — God — and into possibility accord- 
ing to the proximate causes, meaning creatures. 

Everything which is contrary to possibility is called 
impossible, which may also be of two kinds, intrinsic 
and extrinsic impossibility. The first occurs when the 
terms or elements of a thing are contradictor}^, as a 
square circle, a four-angle triangle, a material spirit. 
The second is found Avhen there is no external cause to 
carry the intrinsically possible into reality. From 
these definitions we may gather that all that which is 
intrinsically impossible is also externally so, and can 
never be effected, even by God himself. 



1 5 4 Elements of Ijitellechta I Ph ilosophy. 

O. Give the different misrepresentations of this 
ide^i by philosophers. 

A. Hobbes, Spinoza, Robinet, doing away with all 
idea of the possible, have said that thing only is pos- 
sible which really exists. This is absurd. Possible is 
that which may be. Now, if we look at the idea of 
being in itself, we find that it can extend not only to 
things really existing, but also to many more. On 
the other hand, if we regard the causes which may 
reduce possibilities to act, we find that they could ef- 
fect a great deal more than they actually do. We 
know by the testimony of internal consciousness that 
we could do a great many more things than we do. 
God could certainly create many more things than he 
has created, else his power were limited ; therefore the 
idea of such philosophers is false. 

Others have said that the omnipotence of God is 
the index and the test of the intrinsic possible, that 
alone being possible which can be effected by that 
perfection. Now, in the first place, these philosophers 
turn around in a circle, for if we ask them what is that 
which God's omnipotence can do, they will answer, 
That which is intrinsically possible ; and if we beg of 
them to tell us what is intrinsically possible, they will 
subjoin. That which God's power can do. 

Finally, others, like Descartes, have said that the 
intrinsic possibility of things depends upon the will 
of God. If God wills a thing, well and good ; it is in- 
trinsically possible. If he do not will it, it is impos- 
sible. Now, according to this opinion, it would follow 
that if God pleased to make the circle square he could 
do so, or that a triangle should have four angles, which 
is absurd, because that which involves a contradiction 
is nonentity, a mere nothing. Consequently, in the 
supposition of God's effecting that which is intrinsically 



Elements of Intellecttial Philosophy. 155 

impossible, we would have the infinite power of God 
exercising itself about, and resulting in, a nullity worse 
than Parturic7it monies, nascetur ridiciilus vms. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Definition of Essence. 

Q. What is essence ? 

A. The idea of essence, in consequence of its sim- 
plicity, is developed in various ways, and, according to 
these different ways, it takes different names. Gather- 
ing these different ways under certain heads, we may 
say that essence may be considered under a threefold 
aspect: i, in itself; 2, relatively to its effects ; 3, re- 
spectively to its conception in our minds. Considered 
in itself, it may be defined : That zvhich causes a thing 
to be ivhat it is and distinguishes it from all others. 
Under this aspect it is strictly and properly called 
essence. 

Considered in its effects, it is defined : That first 
radical and intimate principle of all actions and proper- 
ties zvhich may belong to a being. In this regard it is 
called nature. 

Finally, considering it relatively to our Avay of ap- 
prehending it, it may be defined : That zvhich is first 
conceived as the first thing in a beings or that zvhich is 
expressed by the definition. Under this relation it is 
called conception., or reason. 

From these definitions we draw the following corol- 
laries : 

I. Essence in the first sense— that Is, In Itself— 
can only be attributed to substances, because the es- 
sence is that which causes a being to be Avhat It Is 
and to be distinguished from all others ; therefore 
it can be attributed to that only which strictly and 



156 Elements of Iiitellechcal Philosophy. 

perfectly exists. But this can be said only of sub- 
stances, because accidents are imperfect beings or 
the mere complement of a being. Therefore essences, 
strictly and properly speaking, can be attributed only 
to substances. We say this not as meaning that acci- 
dents have no essence, but as implying that it can be 
attributed to accidents only imperfectly in the same 
sense as being is predicated of them. 

2. Essences dwell intimately in things, because 
they are the principle and origin of the properties and 
actions of things. Hence Plato was wrong in admit- 
ting essences separated from things and existing in 
themselves, and which were the cause of the being and 
knowledge of things, because things are what they are 
in force of their essence, and become known by means 
of the essence. Therefore, if essences were separated 
from objects, they would no longer be what they are, 
and would not become known. 

3. It follows that the essence is that by means of 
which things are truly and properly known, and the first 
thing we conceive about an object when we come to 
think about it. Hence the opinion of Locke and Gio- 
berti is false which asserts that the essences of things 
are unknowable, and that our mind knows only certain 
essences which it forms itself. Such an opinion is ab- 
surd, first, because our knowledge can only be called 
true knowledge when it corresponds to the reality of 
things. But that by which things are what they are 
is the essence ; therefore we have a knowledge of 
things only when we know their essences. Conse- 
quently, if essence were unknowable, we could never 
have a true knowledge of things, and would fall into 
scepticism. 

2. Sciences would become impossible, inasmuch as 
they are founded upon the essence of things. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 157 

3. It is a fact that we know the real essences of 
many things, inasmuch as we perceive in them certain 
differences wliich cause them to be wliat they are and 
enable us to distinguish them from others, and which 
differences we perceive as the source of all the pro- 
perties of such things. For instance, we can distin- 
guish plants from brutes, brutes from men, men from 
pure spirits ; and we see something in all these as the 
principle and source of their properties. Now, if 
this is not knowing the real essence of these things, 
what is? 

4. Finally, we cannot see why the essences of 
things should be unknowable and unthinkable. Every- 
thing is knowable inasmuch as it is and in the way it 
is. But the essence is that by which a thing is what 
it is ; therefore everything is knowable by its essence, 
and it cannot be impossible that essences should be 
known and be the object of our thought. 

O. How are essences distinguished ? 

A. Essences cause beings to be what they are ; 
therefore they must be different, according to the dif- 
ference of beings. Now, beings are first classified 
as substances and accidents ; therefore there must be 
essences of substances and essences of accidents. The 
first are found perfectly in the beings of which they 
are the essence ; the second only imperfectly. The 
essences of substances, then, are divided into essences 
of material substances and essences of simple and im- 
material substances. The first are composed of matter 
and form, and cannot be without matter. The others 
are forms only, without matter, and consequently are 
more perfect than the first.* 

* St. Thomas, De Enia ei Essentia, 



1 5 8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
Remarks on Essences. 

Q. What remarks have you to make on essences ? 

A, The first is about the indivisibility of essences. 
From our having distinguished essences of simple sub- 
stances, one must not infer that such essences are simple, 
having one single property ; nor from our having dis- 
tinguished essences of compound substances has any 
one a right to conclude that such essences may be di- 
vided into parts like their substances. With the exclu- 
sion of the divine essence, all other essences are formed 
of more than one property, but they are all indivisi- 
ble in spite of that. Essences locate objects in their 
proper species and genus, cause them to be what they 
are and to be distinguished from all others. Hence 
it happens that definitions Avhich express essences 
must be composed of the proximate genus and the 
specific difference, because the essences of creatures 
must have something which agrees with other crea- 
tures, and something which may distinguish them 
from others. Consequently, they must have at least a 
twofold property, that of the proximate genus and that 
of the specific difference. But, nevertheless, they are 
indivisible, as Aristotle says, like the species of num- 
bers, to which if we add or subtract a unit their spe- 
cies is changed. Likewise with essences: if we add 
to them one property or take away one property, they 
are no longer the same essences. For instance, if we add 
to the genus animal the species reasonable we have 
man ; or if we take reasonable we have the brute. 
Essences, therefore, are composed of more than one 
property, but are indivisible in the sense that we can 
neither add to nor subtract from them any property 
necessary to make such essences. 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 159 

The second remark is that to all essences may be 
attributed the three following qualities : wiviutability, 
necessity, and eternity. But as this may be misunder- 
stood, it is necessary to explain in what sense an es- 
sence is immutable, necessary, and eternal. Essences 
cannot be said to be immutable, necessary, and eternal 
in the sense that they have a position and actual exist- 
ence in themselves. Before they actually existed in 
themselves they did not exist at all ; they were created 
in time, and might, absolutely speaking, be destroyed. 
Hence in this sense they are mutable, contingent, 
and temporary. But they are said to be immutable, 
necessary, and eternal in two ways: i. As to the 
elements of which they are composed. These, as 
we have said, are indivisible, inasmuch as we can 
neither add to nor subtract from them, otherwise they 
would not form the same essence. In this sense they 
cannot change. Now, what is unchangeable is neces- 
sary and eternal ; therefore essences, Avith regard to 
the elements of which they are composed, are im- 
mutable, necessary, and eternal. For instance, a tri- 
angle is composed of three angles and three sides; 
and hence at no time will it ever be possible that it 
could have four angles and four sides and remaui a 
triangle. 

2. Essences are immutable, necessary, eternal in- 
asmuch as they are found positively in God's essence 
and intellect, because we know that in God are to be 
found the archetypes of all things. Essences, there- 
fore, inasmuch as they exist in the divine intellect, in 
which are the archetypes of all things, are immutable, 
necessar)', and eternal. 

But from the fact that essences, as to the elements 
from which they result, and inasmuch as they are seen 
by the divine intellect in God's essence, are immu- 
table, necessary, and eternal, wc cannot infer that they 



1 60 Elements of Intellechtal Philosophy. 

do or must actually exist in themselves outside the 
essence of God. But the only inference we can draw 
is that if they ever exist in themselves — a thing de- 
pending on the free-will of God — they must necessarily 
be composed of such elements. 

The last remark regards essences in relation to 
their properties and action. 

And, first, as to properties. These being so bound 
up with the essence, it follows that by adding or sub- 
tracting one of them the essence vanishes ; and, vice 
versa, excluding the essence, the properties also van- 
ish. This, of course, must be understood of essential 
properties. 

With regard to the action, we remark that, the es- 
sence being the most intimate and first principle of 
action in a thing, these actions must be agreeable in 
nature to the essence, because every being acts as it is. 
If it were otherwise, the being would and would not 
be such a being, which is a contradiction, 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
On Existence. 

Q. What is existence? 

A. The idea of existence is so simple that it can 
hardly be defined. We shall treat of it as follows : We 
have said that in God exist the archetypes of all es* 
sences — that is to say, the idea of the elements of 
which the essences of things must be composed ; and 
we have remarked also that as such they have no real 
existence in themselves. But suppose God determines 
to realize those ideas, and does so in fact ; in that case 
the essences are actualized. This gives the idea of 
existence, which may be defined that by which an 
essence is brought out of nothing, or the realization 
or actuality of an essence in itself. 



CHAPTER III. 

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE 
CO-OPERATE TO FORM A REAL BEING. 

Q. How do essence and existence co-operate to 
form a real being? 

A. To have real being essence and existence are 
necessary. This is proved as follows : First the es- 
sence is necessary. The essence is that by which a 
thing is what it is and is distinguished from all others ; 
the radical, internal principle of all the properties and 
actions of the thing — that which is manifested by the 
idea of the thing. But all real being is something 
in itself, by which something it is distinct from all 
others ; it has properties and actions, and, conse- 
quently, an internal principle from which its actions 
proceed, and is necessarily possessed of a conception 
peculiar to itself. Therefore in all real being the es- 
sence is necessary. 

Existence is also necessary. Existence is the act 
of the essence, or that by which the essence is put 
beyond the sphere of' possibility by having undergone 
the action of the cause. But all essences of real being 
must be actual and not potential ; they must have 
passed from under the action of the cause, because 
when a thing is under the action of the cause it is on 
the way to existence, but does not as yet exist, and, 
when it is in nothingness, is not real. Therefore 
existence is necessary to real being. 

We must remark here that essence and existence are 
distinct in created beings, but not so in God. In fact, if 

i6i 



1 62 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

in creatures essence were the same thing as existence, 
creatures would always exist by the necessity of their 
nature. Because that is indispensable to them which 
is required by their essence ; if, therefore, in the sup- 
position their essence were the same as existence, 
the latter would be indispensable to them, and hence 
their existence would be necessary by the necessity 
of their nature. But such a thing cannot be said of 
creatures, which do not exist by the necessity of their 
nature ; therefore in creatures essence is distinct from 
existence. 

2. If there were a creature in which essence were 
not distinct from existence, to it we should naturally 
attribute all that which belongs to being, as such. But 
it does not become being, as such, to be an effect, be- 
cause in that case every being would be an effect, and 
God also. Therefore, if in creatures existence were 
not distinct from essence, their being would not be 
an effect ; in other words, they would no longer be 
creatures. 

But if essence and existence were distinct in all 
beings, all beings would have an existence by acci- 
dent ; all would be potential beings first before being 
actual ; all beings would be produced without our 
ever being able to find a necessary cause always in 
act. But this would be a contradiction ; therefore we 
must, on the other hand, admit the necessity of a 
being in which essence and existence are not distinct, 
and which may be the cause of all the others. This 
is the uncreated Being. This will be better explained 
in Theology. 

Q. How are essence and existence distinguished? 

A. They cannot be distinguished as true parts of 
a whole, because a part is not the whole. But the es- 
sence is not a part of the substance but of the whole — 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 163 

that is, of the whole substance. Therefore essence and 
existence cannot be distinct fronn each as true integral 
parts, nor concur to form the real being as parts form 
the whole. Again, the part does not exhibit the idea 
of the whole. But the essence exhibits the idea of 
the whole being ; therefore essence cannot consti- 
tute the real being as an integral part constitutes the 
whole. They concur, therefore, as act and potenti- 
ality, because the act of the essence is existence. We 
might also say that they concur as two acts, because 
the essence is the act of being, inasmuch as it makes 
it be such and no other ; existence is the act of being, 
inasmuch as it draws it out of nothing and determines 
it to the act.* 

* St. Thomas. Contra, G. , lib. ii. ch. 34, 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF THE PROPERTIES OF BEING. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

On Unity. 

Q. How can being have properties, and what can 
they be? 

A. In the first place, the properties of being cannot 
be something merely ideal or purely negative. Not 
ideal, because that which is fashioned by the intellect 
and has only a logical existence cannot be the property 
of being. Not purely negative, because the idea of pro- 
perty implies always something positive and real. On 
the other hand, the idea of being is the most common 
and universal, and comprehends everything in itself. 
What, consequently, is there positive and real in 
being, distinct from itself, which may answer as its 
properties? 

Nothing. Therefore if a property must be some- 
thing positive, and if there can be nothing positive 
which is not included in being, we must conclude that 
the properties of being cannot be anything else than 
being itself, inasmuch as it is affected either by some 
negation or some other extrinsic relation which may 
really be attributed to it. As to negation, this can- 
not affect being, except in the sense that we deny of it 
its being divided, because being, taken universally, does 
not present this or that distinction ; hence we cannot 

deny of it this or that particular thing, but only that 

164 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 65 

which is opposed to being, which is next to absolute 
negation— that is, division, as we shall see. 

Division alone, therefore, can be denied of being ; 
and this negation of division constitutes the first 
property of being, which is unity. 

With regard to extrinsic relations, there cannot be 
any others than those referring to the intellect and 
to the will, because only the relation to the intellect 
and to the will is common to all beings. But the 
relation of being to the intellect is called truth, and 
the relation of being to the will goodness ; therefore 
the properties of being are no more than three — 
unity, truth, and goodness. And they arise from being 
in this order : first unity, next truth, and, finally, 
goodness.'^ 

Q. Explain the idea of metaphysical unity. 

A. The first property of being, then, is unity. This 
may be defined : Tliat property of being by ■which it is un- 
divided in itself and divided from others. 

This is called metaphysical unity, but to under- 
stand it well it is necessary to carefully determine 
it. First, it must not be confounded with numeri- 
cal unity — to wit, that unity which is the measure 
and principle of number. From this arise two, 
three, four — that is, number ; but from metaphysical 
unity no number can arise, at least directly, but only 
being. Neither must we confound the property of 
unity with that quality which makes a thing unique, 
because the latter property implies that a thing is 
sole, or that which excludes the existence of an equal 
thing, whereas the former excludes a division of it- 

* This natural mystery of three distinct things in being, and which, though dis- 
tinct from each other, cannot be anything else than one being, can only be explained by 
a higher and more sublime mystery, the principal dogma of our faith — the Trinity. 
V/e shall develop this view in the internal evidences of Christianity in the second 
volume of this work. 



1 66 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

self. In a word, metaphysical unity adds nothing to 
being, except the negation of its being divided. But 
from this, however, we cannot deduce that the idea 
of unity is a negative one. Also immense, immortal, 
ijumutahle seem to express a negative, yet their idea 
is positive ; likewise unity, which, after all, does not 
imply anything else, except the same entit}^ * of being, 
inasmuch as it is not divided. We have added to the 
definition that which divides it from others, so that 
this unity implies two elements, that of being undi- 
vided in itself and divided from others. The first is 
necessary and essential to metaphysical unity ; the 
second is a consequence of the first, because a being 
is distinct from others, for the very reason that it is 
in itself undivided. 

Q. Prove that every being is one. 

A. Everything is and is called being inasmuch as 
it has an entity of its own. But that which has an en- 
tity of its own does not contain more than one being, 
and is, therefore, in itself undivided ; and that which 
has an entity of its own does not share it with others, 
and is, therefore, distinct and divided from others, all 
of which things are necessary conditions to establish 
metaphysical unity ; therefore every being is one. 2. 
Every being has an essence, by which it is restricted 
to be this and not another. Now, to be restricted to a 
particular existence means, first, to be confined and 
restricted under special form, and not to be divided 
into several entities ; besides, if it is restricted to a 
special existence it is necessarily distinct and divided 
from all others ; therefore every being is one. 

3. Finally, a being is either simple or composite — 
that is, either immaterial or material. If it be simple, 

* Word used by Bentley. 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 167 

it is undivided in itself, both actually and potentially, 
and not only undivided but indivisible, and this by 
necessity of nature. If it be composite, then it may 
be divisible potentially ; but actually it is always un- 
divided, because it does not possess its entity when its 
parts are divided, but only when they are united ; 
therefore every being is itself undivided. Every being, 
therefore, is one, and unity is convertible with being. 

Q. What remarks must be made on the nature of 
unity ? 

A. We have said that the idea of metaphysical 
unity implies two elements, indivision in itself and di- 
vision from other beings — the first necessary and essen- 
tial, the second a consequence of the first. Now, we 
must make some remarks on both. As to the first, it 
is clearly seen that unity, or indivision in itself, is a 
perfection of being, and that a being is perfect in pro- 
portion to its indivision, and for that reason we say 
that the idea of unity is positive. 

We have said, moreover, that unity is convertible 
with being ; therefore it is different in proportion to 
the difference of being. Now, beings may be simple 
or composite ; therefore unity may be twofold : the 
unity of simplicity, which consists in a thing not only 
being undivided actually, but in being altogether 
indivisible ; the unity of composition, Avhich agrees 
with composite beings, and which implies actual 
indivision and potential division — that is, though 
actually undivided it may be divided. Again, this 
composition may be essential or accidental — as, for 
instance, the union of the body and soul is essential, 
the union of many soldiers to form an army is acci- 
dental ; hence two kinds of unity of composition, 
natural and accidental. 

This indivision, whether it belongs to composite or 



1 68 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

simple beings, whether it agrees with them naturally 
or accidentally, inasmuch as it is considered as really 
corresponding to itself, is called identity. Wherefore 
identity is, strictly speaking, the absolute conformity 
of a being with itself; and only in a loose sense can 
we call identity the conformity of one being with 
another. 

As to the other element of unity — that is, distinction 
from other beings — this may be of different kinds and 
has several degrees. 

Distinction, like indivision, follows the condition of 
being. Now, one being may be divided from another 
either really or logically ; therefore the distinction of 
one being from another may be of two kinds, logical 
and real. It is logical when things are not really dis- 
tinct from each other, but are so conceived and dis- 
tinguished by the intellect ; for instance, in God his 
essence and his attributes are not really distinct, but 
our intellect, the better to know them, considers them 
separately by a logical distinction. Real is when a 
thing is not really another; as, between cause and 
effect there passes a real distinction. Both are of dif- 
ferent kinds: the real is subdivided into substantial, 
accidental, and modal ; the substantial is that which 
exists between separate substances — for instance, be- 
tween man and the brute, or between the principles 
really distinct of a composite substance, as between 
the soul and body, which are the principles forming 
man. 

Accidental and modal distinction is that which 
exists between the substance and its modifications, or 
between one accident and another and its modes. 

Logical distinction is subdivided, in a twofold man- 
ner, into purely mental or logical and into virtually 
lofjical. The former occurs when the mind makes the 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 69 

distinction without having any foundation in reality, 
as ii" one were to distinguish man from reasonable 
animal. The second is when it is made with some 
foundation in reality, as when we distinguish in the 
human soul the rational, the sensitive, and the vege- 
tative principle, because, though the soul is but one 
principle, it has yet these three faculties and affords 
some foundation for that distinction. 

Distinction may have different degrees, because 
that wdiich is different from another may be so more 
.or less, according as it is more or less conformable 
with the other. Now, the limits of conformity or 
non-conformity determine the degrees of distinction. 
This gives rise to various notions, i. Things may be 
distinct from each other as to the essence, inasmuch 
as the essence of one is not the essence of the other, 
and in this case they are called diverse, and the dis- 
tinction diversity. 2. Things may agree in the es- 
sence or some other common feature, but vary as to 
the manner in which the essence or the feature common 
to both is found in each ; and in this case those things 
are called different, and the distinction difference. 3. 
Or they may agree in the essence and in the determi- 
nations of the essence, but vary as to their qualities ; 
and in this case they are called dissimilar, and the 
distinction dissimilarity ; and if they agree, similar, 
and the agreement similarity. 4. If things agree in 
essence, determination of the essence, and qualities, 
but vary in quantity, they are called unequal, and the 
distinction inequality ; and if they are even in this, 
equal, and the agreement equality. 5. Finally, if 
things are considered as divided only in respect to 
number, they are called distinct, and the division dis- 
tinction. 



170 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 

On the Trjith of Being. 

Q. Give the idea of metaphysical truth. 

A. In Logic we defined truth to be the conformity 
or the agreement of things with the intellect. Now, 
things may be regarded as related to the intellect in 
two ways: either because they are produced by it, or 
because they are merely the object of its apprehen- 
sion. For instance, all natural things can be referred 
to the divine intellect in the first manner, not only 
inasmuch as they are known by it but also inasmuch 
as they are created by it. They can be referred to the 
human intellect only in the second manner, inasmuch 
as they are known by it. From this arises the distinc- 
tion of truth into metaphysical and logical. Meta- 
physical truth consists in the agreement of all natural 
things with the divine intellect, on which they depend 
for their existence. Logical truth consists in the 
agreement of the conceptions of our intellect with the 
things which those conceptions represent. Here we 
treat merely of metaphysical truth, to establish which 
two things are required : the entity of the thing which 
is the foundation of truth, and its agreement with the 
type existing in the divine intellect. 

Q. What errors were maintained by Wolfius and 
Locke with regard to the essence of metaphysical 
truth? 

A. Wolfius and his followers held that the formal 
reason or essence of truth consists only in the entity 
of a thing. Locke maintained that it lies in the 
agreement of the real existence of things Avith the 
ideas of our intellect. Both these opinions are false. 
The first is false because, if the entity of a thing alone 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 171 

established its truth, truth would not imply any rela- 
tion, but would be altogether the same thing with 
being, and hence entity and truth would be only two 
words meaning the identical thing. But this conse- 
-quence is false by the admission of the Wolfians them- 
selves, who teach that truth is not the thing itself, 
but a transcendental property of being. Therefore 
the essence of truth cannot consist in the entity of a 
thing. 

The second opinion is false. The essence of truth 
cannot be placed in the agreement of things with an 
intellect to which they are related only accidentally, 
but with an intellect to which they are necessarily and 
essentially related. Now, things are related neces- 
sarily and essentially only to the divine intellect, and 
only accidentally to our intellect ; therefore the truth 
of things must be found in their conformity with the 
divine intellect. 

Q. Prove that every being is true. 

A. I. Every being is just what it is. But every 
being is just what it is because God has thought to 
make it so ; therefore every being is what God has 
thought it to be, and, therefore, conformable with 
the divine type. 

2. If things did not correspond with the divine 
archetypes after which God made them, we should 
conclude that either he knew not or could not create 
them just as he thought them out. But the first sup- 
position is repugnant to infinite Wisdom ; the second, 
to divine Omnipotence. Therefore all beings must be 
conformable with the divine archetypes. Hence with 
reason was it said by the schoolmen that being and 
truth are convertible terms — that is, that every truth is 
being because the truth of things is founded upon 
the entity of a thing, and every being is true be- 



172 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

cause every being necessarily implies a relation with 
the divine intellect. 

Q. What remarks must be made on the nature of 
truth? 

A. From what we have said it is clear that the 
nature of metaphysical truth is such that it absolutely 
excludes the contrary; hence it would be absurd to 
say that there can be metaphysical falsehood, and if 
we call anything false we do so only in a logical sense 
— that is, it is true in itself, but we may misapprehend 
it. 

It is clear, in the second place, that truth is neces- 
sary and universal, because all beings must necessa- 
rily be related to their types which are in the divine 
intellect ; whereas logical truth is accidental, because 
things are not necessarily and by their nature related 
to our intellect, but, on the contrary, the latter is re- 
lated to them. Finally, it is clear also that in meta- 
physical truth the intellect is the measure of things, 
because things have in themselves just what the intel- 
lect has idealized and proposed to create ; on the con- 
trary, in logical truth things are the measure of the 
intellect, because the latter can know just what things 
represent. Hence in metaphysical truth first comes 
the operation of the intellect and next the thing ; in 
logical truth first the thing and then the operation of 
the intellect. 

Q. Is truth one or manifold ? 

A. We must answer by making a distinction. If we 
speak of logical truth, then it is not one but many ; 
because logical truth is the agreementof the conception 
of the intellect with the things which those concep- 
tions represent ; therefore there can be as many logical 
truths as there are things of which faithful conceptions 
may be formed by the intellect. 



Elei7ients of Intellectual Philosophy. 



/ o 



If we speak of metaphysical truth, then we must dis- 
tinguish again. If we look at truth in its formal rea- 
son or essence, that which really makes it truth, then 
it is only one ; because that which makes all beings 
true is their conformity with the divine intellect. Now, 
this relation with the divine intellect is only one and 
the same in all things ; therefore in this sense meta- 
physical truth is one. If we look at truth in its 
fundamental aspect — that is, at the entity of things 
— as there are various entities, so we may say that 
there are various truths.' But it must be under- 
stood that truth in the latter sense is only taken 
improperly and analogically, and not in its true and 
proper sense. 

Q. Is truth necessary, immutable, and eternal ? 

A. We must again distinguish. If we speak of 
metaphysical truth, it is so, because this truth is, pro- 
perly speaking, in the divine intellect. But everything 
which is found in the divine intellect is necessary, im- 
mutable, and eternal; therefore truth is necessary, 
immutable, and eternal. But if we speak of logical 
truth, then we must again distinguish. If it is ques- 
tion of the truth of first principles and their most 
immediate consequences, this is certainly necessary, 
immutable, and eternal, because no one can be de- 
ceived or change his opinion about them. But their 
necessity, immutability, and eternity is like that of es- 
sences, of which we have spoken. If we speak of those 
truths which are discovered by reasoning, and are 
deduced immediately from first principles, then the 
conformity of our intellect with them may change, not 
because what has been once conformable with things 
may change in itself, but because our intellect may dis- 
miss it and turn to error. Hence in the sense ex- 
plained we may say with Shakspere : 



174 Elements of Iiitellcchial Philosophy. 

"Truth is truth to the end of reckoning";* 

or with Bryant : 

" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again: 
The eternal years of God are hers." f 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
Of the Goodness of Being. 

Q. Give an idea of the goodness of being. 

A. Some have said that, formally speaking, good- 
ness is the same as being. But if such were the case, 
goodness would add nothing to being, and the idea of 
both would be the same. Now, this is false, because 
either in speaking or thinking we distinguish these 
two ideas from each other. Others have held that 
the formal conception of goodness is the same as that 
of perfection. This is also false, because we think a 
being perfect by considering it alone by itself, and in- 
asmuch as it does not fail to have all those things 
requisite for its essence, virtue, and operation, the 
very things in which perfection consists. On the con- 
trary, goodness always implies a relation to a ten- 
dency of which it forms the proper object, because 
that which a tendency yearns after is goodness. We 
are obliged, therefore, to conclude that goodness, for- 
mally and essentially considered, lies in. its being 
sought after by a tendency or appetitive faculty, and 
it may therefore be defined : That property for zvJiich a 
thing is songJit after. 

Q, How many kinds of goodness are there ? 

A. Three kinds, metaphysical, physical, and moral. 
The first consists in this, that a being is sought as 
being in general; the second, inasmuch as it is such a 

* " Measure tor Measure." t Bryant's poems. 



Elemen ts of In tellectua I Ph ilosophy. 175 

being in particular; the third, Inasmuch as it is agree- 
able with moral laws. We shall speak here only of 
metaphysical goodness. 

O. Prove that every being is good. 

A. That this metaphysical goodness is the common 
and necessary property of every being is proved thus : 
The formal reason of the goodness of a being lies in 
the fact that it may be sought after by an appetitive 
tendency. But every being may be sought after by an 
appetitive tendency ; therefore every being is good. 
The major is apparent from the definition of goodness 
Ave have already given. The minor is proved as follows : 
A thing is appetible inasmuch as it is perfect, because 
every being seeks and desires only its own perfection. 
But every being, as being, is perfect, because every 
being, as such, is in act, and a thing is called perfect 
inasmuch as it is in act. Therefore every being is 
appetible. 

O. What remarks have you to make on the nature 
of goodness? 

A. I. It is clear from the reason just given that, 
though goodness in its formal idea is distinct from 
perfection and entity, it has yet a strict alliance 
with both ; because every being is good inasmuch as 
it is perfect, and is perfect inasmuch as it is being, so 
that being is the foundation of the perfect, and the 
perfect the ground-work of the good ; hence in order 
being comes first, next the perfect, and last the good. 
For this reason it Is said that goodness is convertible 
with being. 

" One truth is clear : whatever is, is right." 

— Pope. 

2. As being may be either essential or accidental, 
so metaphysical goodness may be either essential or 



I ']6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

accidental. Essential goodness is that which is be- 
coming to essences ; and as essences are incapable of 
oTovvth or decrease, so neither is essential goodness 
capable of such change. Accidental goodness is capa- 
ble of growth or decrease, because accident does not 
constitute the essence, but is added to the essence 
already constituted, as to be learned is accidental to 
goodness, and therefore may be capable of increase 
or diminution. 3. From this theory of the goodness 
of being other most important corollaries follow in 
relation to evil. 

Evil is the opposite of good, and is defined : TJie 
absence of a perfection required in a being. For in- 
stance-, sigJit is required in man's body, and hence its 
absence is a real evil. But if a perfection is not re- 
quired by the nature of a being, its absence cannot be 
called evil; hence if a stone is not endowed with a 
rational principle, this can never be called an evil. 

In this sense Pope has said : 

"Then say not man's imperfect, Heaven in fault ; 
Say rather man's as perfect as he ought : 
His knowledge measured to his state and place, 
His time a moment, and a point his space." 

— Essay on Man. 

From this.it follows : i. That evil is not in itself an 
entity. Every entity is good, because, as we have 
said, good is convertible with being. Now, evil is the 
opposite of good ; therefore evil is the opposite of 
entity, or the privation of being. 2. Evil is founded 
and exists in good. If evil has no entity of its own, it 
follows that it cannot exist in itself; therefore it 
must exist in some being. But every being is good ; 
therefore evil must exist in good. 3. Evil supposes a 
cause, and this cannot be but a good. Evil is the pri- 
vation and the absence of a certain perfection which 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 7 7 

the nature of being requires and must have. But that 
a certain being should be deprived of its natural per- 
fection, this must originate in a cause which may draw 
that being outside its disposition and order ; there- 
fore evil supposes a cause. This cause must be good. 
Because a nonentity cannot be cause, as it cannot act ; 
if evil, therefore, must have cause, this must be an 
entity. But good and entity are convertible ; there- 
fore good is the cause of evil. 4. Good is the cause of 
evil only accide]itally. Every effect must have a pro- 
portion and likeness with its cause ; therefore the 
proper effect of good cannot be but good. If, there- 
fore, sometimes it produces evil, this cannot be but by 
accident. 5. MetapJiysical evil, propounded by Leibjiitz, 
is an absurdity. Metaphysical evil, according to 
Leibnitz, consists in the limitation of the creature, in- 
asmuch as it cannot have other perfections than those 
required by its essence and nature. Now, this is not 
evil, because evil is the absence of a perfection re- 
quired by the nature of a being. But perfections 
which are not required by the nature of a being 
are not due to it ; therefore their absence cannot be 
an evil. Hence metaphysical evil, Invented by Leib- 
nitz and his followers, does not exist. 

O. What is the order of the transcendental proper- 
ties of being? 

A. They proceed from being in this manner: first is 
unity, next truth, and, last, goodness. That unity 
is the first transcendental property of being is evident 
because it is absolute, and becomes being by itself 
and not by any denomination to any exterior thing, as 
truth, which implies a relation to an intellect; and 
goodness, which implies a relation to an appetitive 
faculty. Now, the absolute is before the relative ; 
therefore unity is before truth and goodness. Next 



178 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

comes truth, because, i. Truth implies a relation to 
an intellect, goodness to an appetitive faculty or a 
will. But the intellect precedes the will ; therefore 
truth is before goodness. 2. Because goodness is, in 
a certain manner, founded on truth; health, for in- 
stance, to be good, must be real, true health, because 
if it were false it could not be good health. Now, the 
foundation of a thing precedes the thing itself; there- 
fore truth is before goodness. From this, of course, 
we must not conclude that the aforesaid properties are 
really distinguishable from being; their distinction 
from it being only logical, without a foundation in re- 
ality. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
The Beautiful. 

Q. Why do you speak here of the beautiful, and 
what is its definition ? 

We speak here of the beautiful because it has such 
close connection with unity, truth, and goodness. 
Nov/, before giving the definition of the beautiful we 
must distinguish three things about it: the formal 
essence of the beautiful, its foundation, and its effect. 

And, first, as to its foundation. The beautiful is 
founded on goodness, because our soul cannot take 
pleasure in anything except what it desires and craves 
for. But our soul cannot crave except what it appre- 
hends as good ; therefore our soul cannot take plea- 
sure except in what it apprehends as good. Now, our 
soul does take pleasure in the beautiful ; therefore it 
must apprehend something good in the beautiful as its 
foundation. 

As to its effect, it is admitted by all philosophers, 
and confirmed by the common sense of mankind, that 



Elements of IntellecttLal Philosophy. 179 

the effect of the beautiful consists in giving pleasure. 
The simplest child, for instance, in looking at the sky 
in its most magnificent apparel, in looking at a land- 
scape, cries out, with pleasure beaming from its eyes, 
Oh ! how beautiful, how charming. And what the 
child does, so do the most consummate artists, as was 
the case with Michael Angelo in the presence of the 
Apollo of Belvedere, when he stood, day after day, 
rapt in pleasure, contemplating that wonderful repre- 
sentation of the human form divine, chiselled with 
such admirable art and truth, which has not as yet 
been surpassed ; the effect of the beautiful, therefore, 
is to give pleasure. 

As to its essence, the beautiful consists in variety 
reduced to unity by order and proportion of the parts 
with each other and with the whole. 

Q. Explain the definition. 

A. The beautiful consists, i, in variety, because if 
we were to contemplate unity bare and naked, and no- 
thing but unity, we should soon get tired and wearied 
and turn away from it in disgust. 

2. In unity ; because if we saw a number of objects 
without any connection or relation with each other, 
the same effect would result : Ave should take no plea- 
sure in contemplating them. 

3. Order is required, because a number of objects 
put together without any idea or principle regulating 
their arrangement would present nothing but con- 
fusion, and be not only unable to cause pleasure but 
render impossible the unity required for the beautiful. 

4. Proportion is required between the parts and the 
whole. This proportion means that there should be 
a kind of softening in the variety of each part, so as to 
gently make way for the unity of the whole ; because 
if the parts were kept in their decided, crude variety 



1 80 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

unity could never be effected. But if, in the extremes 
of each part, a softening of their variety is produced, 
so that one part may, by its extreme being softened 
down, almost touch the extreme of the other part, also 
softened down, the unity is gently procured without 
disturbing the variety of the parts. If the extremes 
of these parts could not be softened down, their 
nature not permitting it, then between one part and 
another a third must be placed, of such nature as to 
answer for the keeping of the proportions required to 
result in unity. To illustrate this theory about pro- 
portion we may make use of the parts of creation, the 
best representation of the beautiful. God has created 
spiritual beings and sensitive beings, living and inani- 
mate beings. Had he kept the variety of each of 
these species in their crude state, so to speak, the har- 
mony and the beauty of creation would have been 
marred in consequence of the too great contrast be- 
tween them. But God put an intermediate species 
between each to soften down the contrast and make 
way for the unity of the Avhole. Hence between the 
purely spiritual species and the sensitive God has 
placed man, partaking of the spiritual and the sensible 
softened down in him ; between the sensitive beings, 
such as animals, and the living beings, such as plants, 
God has placed a kind of animal endowed with one 
sense, and that very dull, so as to approach the two 
species together, such as the polypus and all corallines ; 
between the living beings or plants and the inanimate 
God has placed something which seems to be border- 
ing between the plant and the animal, such as the fungi, 
under which name botanists comprehend also a large 
number of microscopic plants forming the appearances 
called mouldiness, mildew, smut, rust, brand, etc, 
O. How is the beautiful divided ? 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 8 1 

A. The beautiful is divided into natural, artificial, 
and moral ; and the natural is subdivided into spiritual 
and corporal. 

The beautiful natural is that which is found in every 
being and in the whole assemblage of created beings 
forming the universe. That in every being we find a 
variety reduced to unity by order and proportion is 
evident ; because, first, every nature is composed of 
different principles, which are so connected together 
by order and proportion as to make a beautiful whole. 
Take, for instance, man. He is composed of body 
and soul : the body consists of motive, vegetative, sen- 
sitive faculties; the soul of intellectual and volitive 
faculties. The motive faculties are subject to the 
vegetative, then to the sensitive. The variety of the 
senses is brought into unity by what is called a com- 
mon sensorium. These are brought into communica- 
tion with the intellectual faculties by means of the 
imagination, which is, as it were, a faculty akin to the 
senses and to the intellect. The will governs all these 
faculties. 

"The elements 
So mixed in him that Nature might stand up 
And say to all the world, ' This is a man.'' " 

• — Shakspere. 



That the same variety reduced to unity by order 
and proportion is admired in the universe is too evi- 
dent to need any demonstration ; therefore we may 
conclude that every being is beautiful. 

The spiritual beautiful is that which is admired in 
spiritual beings ; the corporal that which is admired in 
corporal beings. 

The artificial beautiful is that which is produced by 
human genius and art, and must consist of the same 



1 8 2 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

elements— that is, variety reduced to unity by order 
and proportion. 

The moral beautiful consists in the conformity of 
the human actions with the eternal principle of right. 

We must remark in general, in support of the theory 
of the beautiful given above, that in works, either of 
nature or art, where the variety is made of objects 
forming each one a whole by itself, and, as it were, 
independent, the unity cannot be found as actually 
existing in them in a material sense, but results from 
the order and proportions of the parts, which all are 
made to conspire in representing and expressing an 
idea intended by the artist. Thus in the universe we 
cannot find a material unity, as it is made up of a 
numberless variety of objects, each forming an indi- 
viduality by itself. But all conspire, by their order 
and proportion in being and in action, to show forth 
the grandeur and the infinite excellence of the Creator, 
the idea which God intended to express. 

The same must be said of artificial beauty. When in 
the productions of art the variety is made up of indi- 
vidual objects, each forming a whole by itself, the 
unity which must be sought in such productions can 
only be ideal ; that is, the artist must so choose its 
objects, and arrange and dispose them in such a man- 
ner, and put such proportion between them that they 
naturally suggest the idea he wanted to incorporate. 
Take, for instance, the " Last Judgment " of Michael 
Angelo in the Sistine Chapel. The great artist could 
not put in such a picture a material unity, as it is formed 
of a great number of objects having an individuality of 
their own. But he so chose and arranged each ob- 
ject that they all conspire in representing the dread- 
ful horror of that day — the idea Avhich he wanted to 
express. This he has attained by representing the 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. i8 



o 



Judge with such dread majesty on his countenance, 
b\^ surrounding that majesty vvitii such an array of 
angels and saints, themselves in awe and almost 
trembling, and by a multitude of horror-stricken 
wretches awaiting that judgment, that the beholder is 
at once impressed with the idea of the artist and 
almost feels the horror of that day subduing his soul. 

The second remark is that, as we have shown every 
being, as such, to be beautiful, it follows that being 
is convertible with the beautiful, and that an object is 
beautiful in the same proportion as it is a being, and 
that consequently the Supreme Being is the supreme 
beauty, which beauty in him consists in the infinite 
variety of his attributes, reduced to infinite simplicity 
of his essence, or rather, as the Christian revelation 
teaches us, in the mystery of the Trinity, which is vari- 
ety of persons and unity of essence, the supreme type 
of all beauty. But enough of the beautiful. 

Q. Say a word on the sublime. 

A. Being may oftentimes by its fulness seem to 
transcend our capacity of apprehension and the 
ordinary limits of other beings. Then we are accus- 
tomed to call it sublime. Kence the true foundation 
of the sublime is the infinite, which alone has natu- 
rally no limit ; and in proportion as beings approach 
more or less the infinite they assume more or less the 
characters of the sublime. Hence it follows that in 
the works of art the sublime is obtained by the ideal 
and the indeterminate, which, by leaving the object 
expressed not deprived of its entity, but in a kind of 
ideal and indeterminate condition, enhance its grandeur 
before our imagination. 

Such is the definition which God gave of himself to 
Moses, " i am who am," which has been called sublime 
by all the geniuses of mankind. Such is the descrip- 



184 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 

tion of Satan by Milton, etc. The sublime is of 
three kinds, because being may transcend the limits 
of our capacity of apprehension by its entity, by its 
force, by its extension as to duration and grace. If 
the being transcend the limits by its nature, then it is 
called the sublime ontological ; if by its force, the sub- 
lime dynamic ; if by its duration or space, the mathe- 
matical sublime. 



CHAPTER V. 

ON THE CA USES OF BEINGS. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

On the Nature and Idea of Cause. 

Q. Why do we treat of the causes of being, and 
what order shall we follow in speaking of them ? 

A. The idea of cause has such connection with that 
of being that the mind, in reasoning upon one, cannot 
pass over the other ; because every being is either 
cause or caused, hence the idea of cause always follows 
being. Hence, having spoken of the properties of 
being, we must now speak of its causes. And to give 
an orderly and adequate idea of them we shall first 
give an idea of cause and of its nature ; 2, of its diffe- 
rent species; 3, of the relations they have with their 
effects and with themselves. 

Cause is understood to be the principle of a thing ; 
hence it takes ordinarily the name of principle. But, 
strictly speaking, the idea of cause is different from 
that of principle. Principle, in its strictest accepta- 
tion, means merely something from which another 
thing proceeds in any manner whatever. Cause means 
something upon which another thing depends as to its 
being. Hence the idea of cause implies a certain de- 
pendence and inferiority of being in the thing which 
is caused, whereas the idea of principle does not imply 
a dependence or inferiority of being as regards the 
thing proceeding from it."'" 

* Hence the Church calls the Father in God the principle of His Son, but not the 
cause^ because the Son is perfectly equal to the Father in nature and attributes, and 
in no way inferior to Hici. 

185 



1 8 6 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

Hence it is apparent that the idea of cause, i, is 
narrower than that of principle, because every cause 
is principle, but not every principle is cause. 2. Cause 
implies always a real and positive influx upon the 
being which depends upon it, and which is called 
effect. 3. Cause, at least in nature if not in tinae, is 
conceived always before the effect. After all these 
remarks we may define cause to be that zvhicJi posi- 
tively concurs in tJie being of a tiling. Hence the idea 
of cause is always relative, implying a necessary rela- 
tion to that thing to the being of which the cause has 
concurred. 

The term of this relation, as we have said, is called 
effect. From this relation arise those principles of 
immediate evidence : Every effect supposes a cause ; 
No being ca7t be the cause of itself ; All that tvhicJi 
is contained in the effect innst be found in the cause, 
etc. 

Q. What was Hume's error as to the idea of cause ? 

A. Hume asserted that the idea of cause has no 
objective value ; that is to say, that it does not repre- 
sent a real thing. He proved his assertion thus: Ob- 
servation is the only source of our knowledge ; but 
observation cannot give us the idea of cause ; there- 
fore the idea of cause is not objective. He proved 
his minor thus : Cause implies a connection with the 
effect ; now, observation merely manifests a succes- 
sion of facts in nature, but not their connection ; 
therefore observation cannot give the idea of cause. 
He concludes from this that the principle of causality 
— that is, that every effect must have a cause — is a 
prejudice of our mind. 

Now, how absurd this opinion is every one can see 
by himself, and we could easily pass it unnoticed, as 
it is founded on that principle that all our knowledge 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 187 

is derived from observation, which principle we shall 
prove to be utterly false. Yet we shall make a few 
remarks upon it the better to illustrate the idea of 
cause. We say, in the first place, that the idea of 
cause is objective. Hume admits that the idea of 
cause would be objective if observation not only mani- 
fested to us a succession but also a connection in 
natural facts. Now, such is the case ; therefore the 
idea of cause is objective. The minor is proven by 
the following reasons : Succession implies the idea of 
one thing following another, connection the idea of one 
thing springing or proceeding from another. Such is 
the difference between succession and connection. 
Now, observation manifests not only many things 
following one another, but also many things springing 
and proceeding from others. In fact, we have our 
senses, sight, hearing, taste, and we know that they 
were given us for an object — the sight to see, the ears 
to hear, and the palate to taste — and we use them 
whenever we wish to feel their action or effect. 
Again, everybody feels that when he wants to talk 
he talks, and when he wants to move he moves, and if 
he wants to be at rest he can do so at once. We feel, 
therefore, that these facts are not only things wdiich 
follow one after the other, but which spring and ori- 
ginate one from the other. 

Besides, to feel that a certain thing is wholesome 
and another hurtful does not exceed the power of ob- 
servation, as it is manifest to all mankind. But this 
implies that we can feel that one thing proceeds 
from another; therefore observation manifests to us 
not only the succession but the connection of facts. 
When we eat, for instance, something unwholesome, 
and we feel a certain effect from it injurious to our 
health, we certainly observe the connection between 



1 8 8 Elements of IntellectMal Ph ilosophy. 

the eating of that thing and the injurious effect result- 
ing thereby, and not merely the succession of one 
thing after the other, because we feel that that injuri- 
ous effect only follows the eating of that particular 
thing; hence we feel their connection. 

Now, nothing more, even according to Hume, is nec- 
essary to render the idea of cause objective ; therefore 
that idea is objective. This we have said, confining 
ourselves within the limits of observation, and we add 
that our mind, by observing from all these facts and 
depriving them of their particular circumstances, forms 
the general idea of cause and of effect. 

If, then, the idea of cause is objective, it is evident 
that what Hume asserts about the principle of causali- 
ty — that it is a prejudice of our mind — is false ; because 
if a certain reality corresponds to the idea of cause — 
that is, a thing which really concurs to the existence 
of another — it is clear that we can argue rightly from 
the existence of the effect to the existence of the 
cause. 



ARTICLE SECOND. 

Of the various Causes ; and, first, of Material and 
Format Causes. 

Q. How many kinds of causes are there? 

A. We have defined cause to be that which concurs 
positively to the existence of a thing. Now, four are 
the principles which can concur in the existence of 
anything; therefore there are four kinds of causes. 
Of these four principles two are intrinsic and two ex- 
trinsic. The two intrinsic principles, speaking of ma- 
terial things, are the matter and the form, both of 
which are necessary to constitute composite beings. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 89 

But matter could not have its form if this were not 
o-iven to it by an exterior agent, and this exterior agent 
would not act except prompted by an end in view. 
Therefore, besides the matter apd the form, two exte- 
rior agents concur in the existence of a thing, the e^T- 
terior agent and the end which moves it. These, 
then, are the four causes : the material (matter), the 
formal (form), the efficient cause (the agent), and the 
final cause (the end). And as in any given effect of 
the kind we are speaking of Ave first observe the 
material cause, then the formal, and afterwards the 
agent and the end, so we shall speak first of the 
material and formal causes, and then of the other 
two. 

Q. What is the causality of matter and form ? 

A. Matter, or the material cause, is nothing but that 
thing out of which something is shaped ; for instance, 
the log or block out of which a sculptor makes a 
statue is called the material cause. The figure or 
shape which the sculptor gives it is called the for- 
mal cause. But it is to be remarked that the cau- 
sality of matter and form does not consist in any action 
which they may perform, because whosoever performs 
an action is called agent ; hence action cannot be predi- 
cated of the material or formal cause, but of the effi- 
cient cause. The causality, therefore, of matter and 
form cannot consist in an action. If it does not con- 
sist in an action, then their causality lies in \\\€\x entity, 
being used by the agent to form composite beings. To 
this causality corresponds a double effect depending 
one upon another. The first is proper to each, and it 
is for matter to hold the form and for the form to ter- 
minate and shape the matter. The second is common 
to both, and is the whole composite resulting from the 
union of both. 



iQO Elements of hitellectual Philosophy. 

Q. What is meant by intrinsic and extrinsic form ? 

The form, before it is applied to matter, has another 
mode of existence in the efficient cause, and this other 
mode is so necessary to the form, and has such strict 
connection with it, that it could never be applied to 
matter if it did not previously exist in the agent. For 
it is the agent that must produce such a form on the 
matter. But the agent could never intend to intro- 
duce such form in the matter if the similitude of that 
form were not already existing in him, because none 
can give what he has not ; therefore there must be 
the similitude of the form in the agent. This, inas- 
much as it is considered as having to be introduced in 
matter, is called extrinsic form to distinguish it from 
that which is really introduced in matter^ and which is 
called intrinsic. 

This extrinsic form may be of two kinds, because it 
is of such a nature as are the agents in which it is 
found. Now, agents may be of two kinds, because they 
are distinguished by the manner of their acting, which 
may be either byway of nature or byway of intellect. 
Hence natural agents and intellectual agents. Like- 
wise the extrinsic form is distinguished in two ways 
according to agents, by nature, or by intellect ; in those 
agents which act by nature the form is found accord- 
ing to natural being, as in man when he generates man, 
in fire which engenders fire ; in those agents that act 
by intellect it is found according to the intelligible 
being, as the similitude of a building is in the mind of 
the architect. But as agents by nature do not of 
themselves intend to introduce the form, but are led 
and guided by those who act by intellect, as the arrow 
reaches the mark because it is thrown by the archer, 
so agents by nature may be considered rather as in- 
struments of the agents by intellect ; hence the name 



Elements of Intcllcctital Philosophy. 191 

of extrinsic form has been applied more properly to 
the form of the effect which exists in the intellect 
of the ao-ent. Taken in this sense, it has been defined 
\.\\^.\.for]ii by looking at zchich the artist works. This 
has received the name of exemplary cause, because, as 
it is apparent, it concurs in the production of the effect, 
serving as model and example. It was also called 
idea, and received for the first time that name by 
Plato, and from it the name of idea Avas applied to 
that which serves as means of knowledge. 

But one must carefully remark the difference which 
exists between them. Both agree in this : that they 
are a similitude of something existing in the intellect, 
but are distinguished by these several heads: i. The 
idea which makes us understand objects is not the 
object of our knowledge, but a means by which 
the intellect perceives things. On the contrary, the 
exemplary cause is not the means but the object at 
which the mind of the agent looks. 2. The first does 
not always belong to the practical intellect, whereas the 
second always does, being intended to be outwardly 
expressed. 3. The first has no connection either with 
the efficient or the final cause ; but the -exemplary 
cause has, because it has connection with the efficient 
cause, inasmuch as it determines and guides the agent 
in its operation. It has connection with the final 
cause, in the sense that the end of the agent is nothing 
more than the reproduction of that form. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 

On Efficient Cause. 

O. Define an efficient cause. 

A. The form, as we have said, would not be given 
to matter but for the action of the efficient cause. 



192 Elements of hitellectual Ph ilosophy. 

This may be defined : That extrinsical principle fror/i 
which primarily and properly the movement of the ac- 
tion begins. It is called extrinsical principle to distin- 
guish the efficient cause from the material and formal 
causes, which are intrinsic principles. We have added 
from which the movement of the action primarily begins, 
to distinguish the efficient from the final cause ; be- 
cause, though we may say in a certain sense that from 
the end everything that regards the causing of some- 
thing takes its rise, yet, strictly speaking, the move- 
ment of the action begins primarily in the agent, and 
the end does nothing more than to excite the agent 
to begin the movement. Finally, we have added /r(?- 
perly to distinguish the efficient cause from the sim- 
ple occasional cause, from, which oftentimes the action 
begins, but does not properly proceed from it. 

Q. What subjects can be really efficient causes? 

A. Malebranche, and many Cartesians with him, are 
of opinion that to be really efficient cause can be said 
of God only, who alone can really act. Creatures, on 
their part, do nothing more than present to God the 
occasion for acting, but in themselves are really devoid 
of activity. This opinion was called occasionalism, be- 
cause it denies to the creature all real activity, and 
makes them exhibit only the occasion for God to act 
in them. 

I. Now, this opinion Is false and contains several ab- 
surd things. In fact, that It is not Impossible that the 
creature should have the power of acting can be demon- 
strated as follows : If such a thing involved any repug- 
nance, It ought to involve It either on the part of God 
or on that of the creature. But it does not involve 
repugnance on the part of either ; therefore it is not 
impossible that creatures should really act. 

To act follows to he, and is proportionate to the 



Ekfnents of hitellectual Philosophy. 193 

amount of being. This can be seen in God Himself, to 
whom occasionalists allow the power of acting, because 
God acts as He is, and the power of acting is in pro- 
portion to His being, and that kind oi power becomes 
Him because that being becomes Him. Hence to act 
becomes Him, because to be becomes Him. But crea- 
tures have a being ; therefore it is net repugnant on 
their part that they should have the power of acting. 
It is not repugnant on the part of God, because if 
God could communicate to creatures their being, why 
could not He also communicate them the power of 
acting? 

2. The principal reasons which occasionalists al- 
lege to show that impossibility are derived from two 
heads: i. God being a most perfect cause, it in- 
volves a contradiction that there should be other 
efficient causes besides Him; 2, because God can by 
Himself produce all the effects which take place in the 
world. If acts, therefore, all other causes are useless. 

As to the first reason, if that principle were true we 
might conclude from it that not only is it impossible 
that any creature should act but that any creature should 
exist. God is a most perfect being; therefore it is 
impossible that there should be other true beings be- 
sides Him. But as it is not impossible that besides the 
most perfect infinite being there should be other true 
finite beings created by the former, likewise it is not 
impossible that besides that first and most perfect 
Cause there should be other causes created by the 
former. On the contrary, the opposite opinion would 
involve a contradiction ; because as God's perfection 
would not be infinite if He could not give existence to 
other things outside Himself, so His action would not 
be infinite if He could not communicate it to others. 
And this, far from implying necessity or insufficiency on 



194 Elements of hitellechml Philosophy. 

His part, would be a sign and an effect of His immense 
perfection and goodness, by which He can communi- 
cate His similitude not only as to being but also as to 
action. 

With regard to the second reason, if this were of any 
value we could turn it against the occasionalists, be- 
cause God is fully sufficient to act all alone by Himself, 
and, in that case, not only the action of creatures would 
become useless, but also the occasions, since He could 
produce all sorts of effects without waiting for us to 
present Him with occasions. Why should God wait, 
for instance, that I should put water in my mouth, in 
order to take occasion to quench, by His own ac- 
tion alone, my thirst? Could he not do that Himself 
without waiting for that occasion ? Besides, even 
granting that God could do all by Himiself, yet for 
all that secondary causes would not be useless ; be- 
cause, as St. Thomas teaches, it is against the idea of 
wisdom that there should be anything useless in the 
works of the wise. Now, if created things did not 
act in the production of effects, but all was done by 
God Himself, he would employ other things to pro- 
duce effects uselessly and without reason. By admit- 
ting secondary causes, of course, we do not mean to 
attribute to them an infinite virtue ; nor is this nec- 
essary to the idea of cause, as Malebranche contends. 
W^e say that everything has the power of acting pro- 
portionate to its being. But to the creature we 
attribute a being, therefore a power acting propor- 
tionate to that being. 

3. Finally, if the opinion of the occasionalists were 
true, God would be the real author of all the crimes 
which are committed in the world, as He would be the 
only real agent, which is absurd. 

Gathering all we have said together, we say that 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 195 

the nature of cause can be attributed to all those 
things which have being, and can be attributed to 
them in the same degree and proportion as being ; 
and because being properly becomes the substance, of 
substance alone, therefore, may we predicate the name 
of cause. Hence the truth of that saying of St. 
Thomas, that every substance has the power of acting. 

Q. How many species of efficient causes are there? 

A. The nature of cause lies in this: that it is a prin- 
ciple from which the movement of the action proceeds ; 
therefore there are different causes in consequence of the 
difference of the movement and the action. But every 
movement may be different from two heads, either 
from its nature or from its term ; consequently, 
causes may differ either in consequence of the nature 
of their action, or in consequence of the effect or term 
which they produce. As to the manner of acting, the 
cause may h^ principal or instrumental The principal 
cause is that which acts by itself — not moved by an- 
other nor used as a means by another cause ; as. The 
artist is the principal cause of his work. Instrumental 
cause Is that which is used as a means by the principal ; 
as, The brush and the colors in the hand of the 
painter, which do something, and hence they are called 
cause ; but as they cannot do that something without 
being handled by the painter, they are, therefore, called 
instrumental causes. 

2. Free and Jieccssary cause. A free cause is 
that which acts with deliberation and choice, as mas- 
ter of its action, as the will of man in respect to par- 
ticular goods, A necessary cause is that which is im- 
pelled to act by the force of its nature, and which does 
not regulate its act by deliberation, as all the action 
of natural agents inferior to man. 

3. First and secondary cause. The first is that 



196 Elements of Intellecttial Philosophy. 

which admits of no other cause preceding it, such as 
God in respect to all created causes. Secondary is 
that which is moved by the primary cause, such as all 
creatures relatively to God. 

4. Cause by itself and by accident. The cause by 
itself is that which does that to which it is destined 
by its own nature, as for fire to burn, for man to rea- 
son. Cause by accident is when to the natural effect 
of a cause another effect is added accidentally con- 
nected with it ; as, for instance, a man digging the 
foundation' of a house finds a treasure. The actual 
effect of the man's action is the digging, but accident- 
ally the other effect is connected with it. 

On the part of the effect, efficient causes may be 
univocal, equivocal, analogous. The cause is called 
univocal when it produces an effect like to itself in 
species, as in the case of the generation of animals 
which engender an animal of the same species as them- 
selves. It is called equivocal when it produces an ef- 
fect similar to the cause as to genus, as the sun in re- 
spect to its effects. It is called analogous when the 
cause does not agree with the effect either as to spe- 
cies or genus, but yet has a certain likeness with ic, as 
God in respect to His creatures. 

Proximate and remote. Proximate is that which 
produces the effect immediately, remote when it pro- 
duces it by means of other causes. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
On Final Cause. 

Q. What is the nature and definition of final cause ? 

A. The efficient cause would not be moved to act 
but for the final cause. The end can be defined : That 
for the sake of which something is done, or that at 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosopJiy. 197 

which one aims in acting. This shows the difference 
of the final from all other causes. The matter is that 
out of which something is made, the form is that 
which gives it figure and shape, the agent is that 
which makes it, and the end is that for which it is 
made, and is called the end because, having obtained 
it, the action terminates and the agent rests. 

That the end is a true cause is clear from consider- 
ing that it concurs positively in the production of 
something by determining the agent and moving it to 
act. 

The nature of its causality, besides, consists in 
moving the tendency of the agent and in arousing the 
Avish of the agent to attain it, because, as the influx 
of the efficient cause consists in acting, that of the 
final cause is in being wished for. 

The way by Avhich the final cause acts is by exhi- 
biting its goodness, true or seeming. This is ex- 
pressed by Pope so elegantly : 

" Modes of self-love the passions we may call : 
'Tis real good, or seeming, moi'es them all." 

— Essay on JMan. 

Because every being wishes its own perfection. But 
the perfection of a being is its good ; therefore the 
end, in order to excite a desire for itself, must show 
itself as the good and the perfection of the agent. 

O. On what being can the end exercise its influ- 
ence, and for what being is it becoming to have an 
end ? 

A. To act for an end becomes all beings, of what- 
ever nature they may be; be they endowed with 
knowledge or not, be they spiritual or material, all 
beings must aim at an end. 

O. Prove this. 



198 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

A. First proof: From what we have said of causes 
we see that by necessity of nature they are subject to 
this order : the matter does not receive its form ex- 
cept it is given it by the agent, and the agent is not 
moved to give that form except when determined 
by an end, because if it were not determined by an 
end to a certain special effect, there would be no 
reason why it should produce one effect in preference 
to another ; therefore once we take away the end, 
neither efficient cause nor formal is possible, and con- 
sequently no effect can be obtained. 

2. Agents are either free or necessary causes ; but 
it is clear that free agents are induced to act by an 
end, because, being free, they are indifferent to act or 
not to act, to act in this or in another way, to act this 
or the contrary way, and the end alone can determine 
them to a choice. Necessary agents are called so be- 
cause they are by nature determined and necessitated 
to act. Now, this determination comes to them from 
the end ; therefore every agent aims at an end. 

But it is to be observed that not all agents aim at 
an end in the same manner. This depends upon their 
nature. Every being acts according to its nature. 
But agents are different by nature ; therefore they 
aim at an end in a different manner. In fact, all the 
agents in nature may be divided into three classes. 
Some are gifted with reason and intellect, by which 
they cannot only apprehend the end but also see how 
it befits their nature, and can discover the aptitude of 
the means which exist in order to obtain it. Others 
are without intellect, but are endowed with senses, by 
which they may apprehend the end at which they may 
aim, but cannot see the relation which exists between 
it and their nature, nor the aptitude of the means to 
obtain it. Finally, others have neither intellect nor sense, 



Elemen ts of Litellectua I Ph ilosophy. 1 9 9 

and cannot apprehend the end at all, as the arrow 
which goes to the mark. The first have a perfect 
knowledge of the end, and can reason upon the means 
to be chosen, and have no need that any one should 
direct them to it, but being, in force of their reason 
and will, masters of their acts, go to their end by them- 
selves ; and of such, strictly speaking, it is said that they 
aim at an end. The second, knowing by the way of 
the senses the end, and apprehending it somewhat, 
aim at it in a certain way, but according to the man- 
ner of their knowledge, that is, instinctively, urged by 
nature, and not perfectly by themselves, as they have 
not the mastery of their acts. Finally, those that 
have neither sense nor intellect are not moved by 
themselves to seek the end by an intellect external 
to them. 

Q. How many different ends may there be ? 

A. The nature of the end lies in this : that it must be 
intended by the agent as the term of its tendency and 
operation. Therefore it may be different, according 
to the different way of intending it as a term. Hence 
it may be proximate, intermediate, and ultimate : 
proximate if it is the first and immediate term of 
the tendency : ultimate if it is the very thing which 
the agent intends to cease operation and rest after ; 
intermediate if it is a term of the tendency, but 
neither proximate nor last. 

2. Principal and accessory. The first is that which 
is principally aimed at by the agent, and hence this 
is the principal term of the tendency. The second is 
that which is sought by the agent along with the 
principal, but not so that, if it could not be attained, 
the agent would cease to seek the principal. 

End of the action and end of the agent. The 
first is the natural term of the action, as the end of 



200 Elcme7its of IiitellecttLal Philosophy. 

the act of singing is to sing. The second is that 
which the agent proposes to himself, as a singer might 
propose to himself riches or delight. 

Objective and subjective. Objective is the ob- 
ject which is sought for. Subjective is the use to 
which the agent intends to put the object. 

ARTICLE FIFTH. 

Of the Relation of Causes with their Effeets and among 
Themselves. 

Q. How many are the relations which causes may 
have ? 

A. Relation arises from the respect which one thing 
has to another. Now, a cause may be considered in 
respect to its own effects or to another cause with 
which it is connected. Therefore causes may have 
relations either with their own effects or with other 
causes ; and we must speak first of the one and then 
of the other. 

Q. What are the relations which a cause may have 
with its own effects ? 

A. That a cause has relation with its own effects is 
clear from all we have said with regard to the idea of 
cause and effect ; for we have seen that between cause 
and effect there is not merely succession but a neces- 
sary connection, and that the effect cannot possibly 
exist Avithout receiving its being from the cause. A 
necessary consequence flows from this, namely, that 
between the effect and its cause there is a necessary 
and true relation, which consists in the effect depending 
as to its being upon its cause. Also from this neces- 
sary dependence of the effect upon its cause three 
other relations arise which will better illustrate its 
idea. Wh.erever several beine^s are connected to- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 201 

gather it is necessary that we should find these three 
other things : a relation of order, because connection 
implies order, a certain location of the parts connect- 
ed in view of an end ; a relation of nature, because 
things, in order to be connected, should have a certain 
natural affinity ; a relation of dignity, because where 
there is dependence and connection among a number 
of beings it is necessary that one should be more 
noble than the other. The relation, therefore, of de- 
pendence of the effect upon its cause gives rise to 
three other relations, that of order, of nature, and of 
dignity. We shall speak of each separately. 

With regard to the relation of order, this must con- 
sist in the priority of the cause with regard to its 
effect; because if the effect depends as to its being 
upon the cause, a relation of order in this case can- 
not consist in anything else except that the cause 
must be before the effect. But it must be remarked 
that this priority may be of two kinds, priority of 
time and priority of nature. The first consists in the 
one being temporarily before the other ; the second 
consists in this: that though cause and effect may be 
supposed to exist simultaneously, yet the cause must 
be conceived always first, inasmuch as the effect could 
not exist without it. With regard to the priority of 
nature, there is no doubt that the cause is always be- 
fore the effect. But with regard to priority of time 
v/e must remark that Ave may consider the cause only 
as a certain being in itself, irrespectively of any rela- 
tion to any effect, or we may consider it as merely a 
cause. If we consider it in the first sense, it is clear 
that it can exist before the effect ; and this is not 
impossible, especially in what are called successive 
causes, in which case it is necessary that the cause 
which produces by way of movement and possession 



202 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

should exist previously to the effect. In the second 
case the cause cannot exist before the effect ; because a 
thing is called a cause inasmuch as it produces an effect ; 
therefore it cannot possibly be called a cause before 
actually producing the effect. 

With regard to the relation of affinity or proportion, 
this consists in a certain similitude which the effect 
must have with its cause ; because the effect, so to 
speak, is an emanation of the cause — something 
drawn, as it were, from the cause, since no being 
gives what it has not. Now, all this necessarily im- 
plies a similitude between the effect and its cause ; 
therefore there must be a similitude between the ef- 
fect and the cause. This similitude, however, varies 
in proportion as the effect is more or less adequate 
to the activity of the cause. From this arises the 
distinction of effects into univocal, equivocal, and 
analogous, which we have already defined above. 

With regard to the relation of dignity, we must 
observe that it is different in- proportion to the manner 
according to which the cause concurs in the effect. 
Now, to determine this the following remarks are to be 
kept in view : If the question is about material and 
intrinsic formal causes, they are less noble than their 
effect, because the part is less noble than the whole ; 
but material and formal causes act as the part towards 
the formation of the whole, therefore they are less 
noble than their effect. We have said the intrinsic 
formal causes, because the extrinsic formal cause — 
that is to say, the exemplar and type which is in the 
mind of the artist — may be more noble than the ef- 
fect, as are all the types of things existing in the di- 
vine mind. If it is a question of the principal final 
cause in agents who act according to order, it is al- 
ways more noble than the effect, because no man who 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 203 

acts according to order will spend more in order to 
get what is less, nor employ what is more noble to 
attain what is less so. Now, the effect with regard to 
the end is like a means to an end ; therefore in one 
who acts according to order the end is always nobler 
than the effect. If it is a question of the efficient 
cause, it is either more noble than the effect or equal 
to it, because the cause is either univocal or equivocal. 
If it is univocal, it is equally as noble as the effect, 
which belongs to the same species; if it is equivocal, 
it is nobler than the effect, because the effect in this 
case belongs to a species inferior to the cause. 

Q. What is the relation of causes among them- 
selves ? 

A. A relation always means connection ; therefore 
we can have relation between causes only when we 
can find them connected together to obtain an effect. 
Besides, a connection between two things may be 
either proper or accidental. We intend to speak here 
of the proper connection. This relation between 
causes may be of order, of nature, and of dignity, 
as we have said of the relations of causes with their 
effects. 

Of the relation of nature among causes we think 
we have said enough already when we spoke of the 
proportion which the nature of the final cause must 
have with the efficient cause, and the proportion 
which the agent must have with the formal cause, and 
this with the material. We shall speak of the relation 
of order and dignity. 

As to the relation of order, we may distinguish be- 
tween causes of the same nature from those of a dif- 
ferent nature. The first are those which belong to the 
same kind, but are all ordained and bound together to 
produce the same effect; for instance, a number of 



204 ±Llements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

efficient causes bound together so that one depends 
upon the other, and all produce something. The 
second are those belonging to different kinds, as the 
final, the efficient, the formal, etc., which are different, 
but still one depending upon the other. 

Now, if the causes be of the same nature, and are, in 
themselves, in proper order, whatever other accidental 
order may be found among them, it is always neces- 
sary that there should be a first and a last one in that 
order, and that we should not have a progression ad 
infinitum; because, in such a case, in order to obtain 
the effect it is necessary that the action of one cause 
should pass to another, and from this to a third, and 
so on, till we have the effect. Hence if the series of 
such causes were infinite, the action and the move- 
ment should have to go through an infinite series to 
reach the effect. But the infinite, as such, cannot be 
outstepped ; therefore we cannot admit an infinite 
series of causes. 

Besides, in a series of causes naturally in order the 
first is the cause of the second, this of the third, and so 
on. Take away, therefore, the first cause and you take 
away also the last, for the same reason. But in an 
infinite series we cannot find a first cause, because 
otherwise it would be finite ; and, on the other hand, 
without the first there would be no middle, and con- 
sequently no last, cause, therefore no effect at all. 
Hence, in causes of themselves well arranged there 
cannot be an infinite series, but there must be a first 
and a last. Therefore in this series of efficient causes 
there must be always a first from which all others de- 
pend, and in the series of final causes there must be a 
primary end to which all other ends are directed. 
With regard to different causes, besides the theory 
that in them we cannot have an infinite progression. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 205 

for the same reason we may determine also which of 
them must be first and which last. In causing, the 
first is the end, because it moves the agent ; next 
comes the agent, who must act ; and finally comes the 
form which the agent intends to give to the matter. 

As to the relation of dignity between causes, it is 
clear that the formal cause is more noble than the 
material, because the form gives being to matter. 
Now, that which gives is more noble than that which 
receives; therefore the form is more noble than the 
matter. Next, the efficient cause is more noble than 
the form, because the form is given by it and is its 
own likeness. Finally, the final cause is the noblest 
of them all, because all causes act in order to obtain 
the end. But the end is sought as good and perfec- 
tion ; therefore all other causes stand in relation to 
the final cause as the imperfect to the perfect. 



CHAPTER VI. 

DIVISION OF BEING. 
ARTICLE FIRST. 

Of Substance and Accident. 

Q. What is the subject of this chapter ? 
A. Being, as we have said in Logic, is divided into 
ten categories, or supreme genera, because it is first 
divided into substance and accident, and this latter 
is divided into nine other genera. We shall speak, 
then, of these ten categories, and first of substance 
and accident- 
Substance is defined that which exists in itself 
and not in another on which it may lean as subject. 
We must pay attention to several remarks in order to 
understand this definition. What is meant by those 
words: that thing which exists in itself? i. They ex- 
clude all inherence of the thing called substance in any 
other being in order to exist, and cause it to be distin- 
guished from the accident, the essence of which is to 
lean on, or inhere in, another thing as subject. 2. 
Those words, which exists in itself, must not be taken in 
such a sense as to exclude from the idea of substance the 
idea of an efficient cause, because these words merely 
point out to an existence in one's self and not in 
another, but may or may not admit of an efficient 
cause. If that which exists in itself is infinite, then 
the substance does not require a cause in order to ex- 



Elements of InteUectital Philosophy. 207 

ist, but exists of its own nature. If the substance is 
finite, then, though existing in itself, it requires a 
cause to make it so. In other words, to exist in 
itself does not mean to exist by itself. The first 
means that a thing does not require to lean on any 
subject in order to exist ; the second means that the 
thing does not require any cause to give it existence, 
but enjoys existence in force of its own essence. 

2. That which exists in itself and not in another 
is called substance, principally from its being the 
subject of the accident. For the word substance is 
derived from those two Latin words, sub, under, and 
stare, to be placed or located. Now, that the substance 
is the subject of accidents is demonstrated as follows: 
If the subject of accidents were not the substance, it 
should be another accident. But the accident cannot 
exist in itself, but must lean on another in order to ex- 
ist ; therefore this same accident, supporting other acci- 
dents, must either lean on a substance or on another 
accident, and this on another, and so on ad mfinititm. 
But a progress ad infinitinn cannot be admitted ; there- 
fore the substance must be the subject of accidents. 

But we must remark here again that it is not neces- 
sary for the essence of a substance to be the subject of 
accidents. The essence of a substance is to be in itself. 
Besides this, it may or may not be subject of accidents. 
Finite substances which are perfectible are all subject 
to modifications or accident. The infinite substance, 
which is God, being absolutely perfect, is not subject 
to modifications. 

Q. What are the errors of philosophers as to the 
idea of £--bstance ? 

A. First, Locke contended that substance is a numhier 
or an accumulation of accidents, which we perceive by 
means of the senses, gathered and co-existing together 



2o8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

in a way unknown to us. We say, in the first place, 
that such an idea of substance is false, even accord- 
ing to experience, both of the senses and of conscious- 
ness ; of the senses, because through them we perceive 
bodies under every variety and succession of modifica- 
tions, and yet in perceiving them we perceive that 
we experience something standing permanent un- 
der a variety and succession of modifications, and 
even under the conflict of contrary modifications ; of 
internal consciousness, for Ave are conscious that our 
soul is subject to great variety of thoughts, of desires, 
of volitions succeeding each other, and oftentimes 
clashing with each other, and yet we perceive at the 
same time something standing permanent and the 
same under all that variety and conflict of modifica- 
tions. In the second place, the opinion of Locke 
refutes itself. Because, we may ask, those qualities or 
accidents which form the accumulation are either able 
to exist in themselves or they are not. If they are, 
then they are so many substances; if they are not, 
then they must lean on something existing in itself in 
order to exist. It will not do to say that those modi- 
fications can acquire the force of existing in them- 
selves by aggregation or accumulation, because if 
the qualities have not singly of their nature the force 
of existing in themselves, but demand a subject to 
lean on, this want of leaning on a subject must be felt 
with stronger reason by the whole assemblage, for the 
mere gathering cannot change its nature ; therefore the 
opinion of Locke is false. Spinoza also held an er- 
roneous opinion as to substance. He defined a sub- 
stance to be that which exists in itself, and can be con- 
ceived by itself — that is, that the idea of which does 
not require the idea of another in order to be con- 
ceived. 



Eletnents of Intellectual PJiilosophy. 209 

This definition of substance can apply only to God, 
for a thing which exists in itself, and which can be 
conceived by itself, is that only which does not re- 
quire a cause in order to exist, because if it required a 
cause to exist we could not conceive it by itself, but 
would be obliged to have the idea of the cause in order 
to conceive it. God alone, therefore, exists in Him- 
self in such a way that he does not require any cause 
or principle in order to exist or be known. The de- 
finition of Spinoza, therefore, would render impossible 
all created substances. 



ARTICLE SECOND. 
Principle of Individualization. 

Q. What can be called true substance ? 

A. Substance may be divided into first and second, 
or into real and logical. The substance first and real 
is the individual. The substance second and logical 
are the species and genera, because these have not an 
existence in themselves, except inasmuch as they are 
confined to the individual. The real and proper sub- 
stance, therefore, is the individual. This is defined by 
St. Thomas, " that which is in itself undivided and dis- 
tinguishable from others." The words " that which is 
in itself undivided " mean that it cannot be divided and 
be applicable to many things, in contradistinction of 
the universal, which means something which is com- 
mon to many ; the words " and distinguishable from 
others" mean that it is such a thing, and not this or 
that. 

Q. What is meant by the principle of individuali- 
zation.'' 



2 1 o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

A, We shall answer by an example. Let us take, 
for instance, the human species. This consists of the 
elements aniinality and reason. All the individuals 
belonging to this species have these elements, ani- 
mality and reason, for every man is a reasonable 
animal. Now, we may ask, so long as every indi- 
vidual of the human species has all the elements of the 
species, animality and reason, what is that thing which 
contracts, as it were, the species and constitutes the indi- 
viduals in each species ; or, in other words, what is that 
which makes the number of individuals in each spe- 
cies, and makes them undivided in themselves and dis- 
tinguishable from others ? Now, to answer this ques- 
tion accurately we must distinguish between beings. 
In material beings the principle of individualization is 
matter, because the principle of individualization must 
be intrinsic and substantial to the being. But in 
material beings there are two things which are intrin- 
sic and substantial — matter and form. Form cannot 
discharge this office of individualizing, because the 
form of its own nature is common to many, and 
therefore cannot be the principle of exclusiveness and 
incommunicability. This office, therefore, must be 
fulfilled by matter. But it must be remarked that 
matter may be considered in two ways — as abstracted 
from quantity and extension and common to all the 
beings comprised within a species, or as it is found in 
the real world marked by c]uantity. It is in the latter 
sense that matter is the principle of individualization. 

As to immaterial substances, if these have their ex- 
istence in matter as its form, as in the case of the 
human soul, their individualization arises from the re- 
lation and order which they have to their bodies, 
because the same reason given above applies to them 
also. 



Elements of InteUectual Philosophy. 211 

" 'Tis true that the souls 
Of all men are alike ; of the same substance, 
B}'- the same Maker into all infus'd ; 
But yet the several matters which tliey woik on, 
How different the}' are I need not tell you." 

— RUTTER, Shepherd's Holyday. 

But if they be purely spiritual, as we know by 
revelation angels to be, they are individualized by 
their own reality. God is individualized by His very 
nature and absolute simplicity. 

Q. How many khids of substances are there? 

A. Various kinds : Complete and incomplete. 
Complete substances are those which are not destined 
to exist united with another substance, so as to form 
together a perfect whole, as man, a tree. Incomplete 
are those which are destined to be united, such as the 
human soul. 

A complete substance may be endowed with intelli- 
gence, as man ; or not have intelligence, as plant. If 
it is endowed with intelligence, it is called person ; if 
it is not endowed with intelligence, it is called an 
individual or S7tppositiiin. Hence the supposituni may 
be defined : An individual and complete substance in- 
communicably existing. A person may said to be an 
individual and complete substance of the rational nature. 

Q. What do you call that act by vvdiich the sub- 
stance really exists and acts ? 

A siLbsistcnce, which may be defined : That actuality 
by zi'hich a complete siibstancc exists and acts zuithout 
communicating with aiiother substance. Here two 
questions arise of the greatest importance. The first is : 
Can a complete substance really exist and act without 
a subsistence of any kind ? In answer to this first 
question we say no substance can really exist and act 
without a subsistence, because, althougli we can con- 
ceive the essence and nature of a thing as possible 



2 1 2 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

without a subsistence, yet we cannot conceive the 
natui'e as actually existing and acting without it, be- 
cause it is just that act or last complement of being 
which makes it really actual ; hence the saying of 
schoolmen, that actiones sunt suppositoriini — actions 
belong to the suppositum — meaning that actions im- 
ply a subsistence in order to be possible. 

The second question is this : Admitting that no 
complete substance can really exist and act without a 
subsistence, it is asked : Is it necessary that this com- 
plete substance should have its own subsistence, or 
can it have the subsistence of another and made ac- 
tually to exist and to act by the subsistence of another 
nature ; or, in other words, does each nature absolutely 
require its own subsistence in order to exist and act ; 
or is it possible and sufficient for it to subsist by the 
actuality of another nature ? 

This question must be answered in the affirmative, 
because we can conceive that although a complete 
substance cannot exist or act without a subsistence, 
yet it is not necessary that this subsistence should be 
its own, because this complete substance might be 
united in a most intimate manner Avith a higher sub- 
sistence, in which case the subsistence of the inferior na- 
ture should give way to the superior. This is the case 
of our body. It would have a subsistence of its own 
were it not united to the soul, and that in such a way 
as to form one individuality. But because of this union 
its own subsistence must give way before that of 
the soul, a much superior substance. When separated 
from the soul our body resumes its own subsistence. 
Therefore in created substances nature and subsistence 
are distinct and may be separated.* 

* Upon this theory and truth is founded the fundamental mystery of Chris- 
tianity — that mystery which has ransomed and deified the world — the Incarnation. 
Of it more in the internal evidences of Christianity. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 2 1 3 

O. What about the action of substances? 

A. With regard to action there is this difference be- 
tween complete and incomplete substance : that the 
former bears exclusively the attribution of every ac- 
tion it performs, whereas, in the case of the latter, 
every action it may do is not attributed to it, but to the 
suppositum or complete substance resulting from the 
union. For instance, man is a complete substance, 
and therefore he bears the responsibility of every one 
of his actions ; but his soul and body are each an in- 
complete substance, and, therefore, whatever action 
may be performed by either is attributed not to it 
but to the complete substance — that is, man. The 
reason of this is because the operation must be of a 
piece with being. 

''The tuork the totuhstone of nahire is. 
And by their cperaiions things are known."* 

But the being of an incomplete substance, though 
existing in itself, yet does not exist for itself, but for 
the whole ; therefore it does not act for itself, but for 
the whole. On the contrary, a complete substance 
exists in itself and for itself; therefore it acts also for 
itself and must be responsible for its action. 

There is also this difference between substances as . 
to their actions : that rational substances, or persons, 
have a perfect mastery over their own actions, direct 
themselves to apprehend the end, and endeavor to 
discover the agreement or disagreement between their 
actions and the end which they propose to themselves. 
Unintelligent substances must be directed to their end 
by others. 

" What things soever are to an end referr'd. 
And in their motion still that end regard, 

* Davies' Poems. 



214 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Always the fitness of the means respect. 
Those as conducive choose, and those reject. 
Must by a judgment foreign and unknown 
Be guided to their end, or by their own ; 
For to design an end, and to pursue 
That end by means, and have it still in view, 
Demands a conscious, wise, reflecting cause. 
Which freely moves, and acts by reason's laws ; 
That can deliberate, means elect, and find 
Their due connection with the end designed." 

— Blackmore, The Creation. 

ARTICLE THIRD. 

O. What is an accident ? 

A, The accident is opposed to substance, and 
therefore is that thing which does not exist in itself, 
but is obliged to lean on the substance in order to exist. 

There are two kinds of accidents — absolute and 
modal. The first are those which lean on the sub- 
stance, such as movement, heat, cold. The modal acci- 
dents are called the different modes, or manners, ac- 
cording to which accidents lean on the substance — for 
instance, velocity or tardiness in movement, more or 
less intensity of heat, cold, and so forth. 

O. What questions can be raised with regard to ac- 
cidents ? 

A. Two questions. The first is: Is the being oi 
the accident different from, or identical with, the being 
of the substance? We answer that accidents are 
added to a substance— they come, they go. Now, if 
the being of the accident were identical with that of 
the substance, it would follow that the same thing 
would be added to itself, that it would come upon it- 
self and go from itself, which is absurd. Therefore 
the being of the accident is different from that of the 
substance. 

The second question is as follows : Can accidents 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 215 

ever exist without their own substance ? with regard to 
which question we answer that it is not necessary that 
an accident should lean on its own natural substance, 
so to speak, but it may be upheld by a foreign force 
or substance. For instance, extension, color, taste, 
etc., are all accidents of bodies, and, therefore, bodies 
may be called the natural and native substance of 
such accidents. But it is not absolutely necessary 
that these accidents should be upheld by the sub- 
stance of bodies. They may be supported by a for- 
eign force — a spiritual substance, for example ; be- 
cause it is intrinsically necessary for the nature of 
the accident to be supported, but it is quite indifferent 
to the same nature %vJiat it is supported by — its own 
native substance, or any other force sufficient to up- 
hold it. God, therefore, could, by His infinite power, 
effect that accidents should exist without the sub- 
stance. In this case they would not exist in them- 
selves, but be supported by Omnipotence.* 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
Of Quantity, Relation, and Quality. 

Q. How many accidents are there ? 

A. Nine — quantity, relation, quality, action, pas- 
sion, time, site, habit. In this article we shall speak 
of the first three. 

O. What kind of substance does quantity belong to, 
and what is its definition ? 

A. Quantity is a proper accident of corporal sub- 
stances, because these alone can have it. But, in order 
to give an adequate definition of it it, is necessary to 

* This occurs in the mystery of the Eucharist, where the accidents of bread and 
wine— that is, the color, the taste, the smell, etc. — are upheld, not by the substances 
of bread and wine, because those two substances have been changed into the sub- 
stance of the flesh and blood of our Lord, but are supported by Omnipotence. 



2 1 6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

determine in what its essence consists. Now, in conse- 
quence of this accident quantity, corporal substances 
are endowed with the following qualities: i. ex- 
tension — that is, the possession of distinct parts, one 
of which is not the other ; 2, occupation of a certain 
locality; 3, impenetrability — that is, that all these 
distinct parts cannot be in each other's places at 
the same time ; 4, capacity of being divided, or di- 
visibility ; 5, capacity of being measured, or 7;z^;^i-z^- 
rability. That these qualities belong to corporal sub- 
stances in force of their quantity is beyond doubt. 
We ask, therefore, in which of these qualities are we 
to place the essence of quantity? Some have placed 
it in one, some in another. We hold as follows : The 
proper office of the essence is to be that first internal 
and radical principle in a being which gives rise to all 
its properties. Hence that must be called the essence 
of quantity which is the root and principle of all its 
properties. Now, among the five properties of quan- 
tity just mentioned, that which is the first internal 
and radical principle of all others seems to be exten- 
sion. In this, therefore, must we place the essence of 
quantity. This we prove as follows : It cannot be oc- 
cupation of space, because this property belongs to 
the corporal substance, inasmuch as it is made up of 
parts, and we must conceive the body first as having 
parts and then as occupying space. It cannot be im- 
penetrability, which also supposes the body first hav- 
ing parts and extension, and afterwards the quality 
of one part not being able to occupy the space of 
another at the same time, both being obliged to hold 
their respective places. Neither can it be divisibility 
or measurability, for the same reason. Therefore the 
essence of quantity lies in extension; and, as each 
thing is to be defined by its specific difference, we 



Elements of Intellecttml Philosophy. 2 1 7 

may define quantity tJiat accident by zvhicJi corporal 
S2(hstaiices have extension. 

Quantity may be of two kinds — continual and sepa- 
rate. The first is that the parts of which exist to- 
gether, but united so as to form one mass or a whole, 
as a line. The separate is that the parts of which are 
disjointed and divided, as number. The continual 
quantity has three dimensions — length, breadth, and 
depth. If a continual quantity is considered only in 
regard to its length, it is called line; if it is looked at 
in reference to its breadth and depth, it is called sur- 
face ; if it is regarded as having all these qualities, it 
is called body. 

Finally, quantity may ht finite and infinite. The 
first is that which has limits ; the second is that which 
is conceived as having no limits. 

Q. Can there be a quantity really infinite ? 

A. We answer negatively as to both quantities, 
continual and separate. The first cannot be really in- 
finite, because a continual quantity may be either a 
body, a surface, or aline ; but none of these can be really 
infinite. Therefore continual quantity cannot be infi- 
nite. The minor is proved as follows : 

1. All bodies have a surface; but, surface is the 
limit of a body, therefore all bodies are limited, and 
cannot be actually infinite. 

2. The surface is terminated by the line ; therefore 
all surface is limited. 

3. All lines are terminated by points ; therefore all 
lines are limited, and consequently all continual quan- 
tity is limited. 

Separate quantity cannot be infinite, because all 
that which can become greater or less cannot be infi- 
nite. But, supposing a given number, you can always 
add to or subtract from it a unity, and thus make it 



2 1 8 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

greater or less. Therefore no separate quantity can 
be infinite. 

Q. Can any quantity be potentially infinite? 

A. If we speak of separate quantity we must 
answer, Yes ; because to every number we may 
always add other units. But if we talk of continual 
quantity, we must make a distinction. When that 
continual quantity is abstracted from every sensil^le 
form that is a mathematical quantity, it may be po- 
tentially infinite, because it is not impossible to 
think of an abstract quantity to which we are con- 
tinually adding. But if by continual quantity we mean 
that which actually belongs to bodies in nature, then 
it is impossible that it should be infinite, because what- 
ever exists in nature has definite, determinate being, 
and hence the quantity which accompanies it has a de- 
finite form also. Therefore in this sense there cannot 
be a continual quantity even potentially infinite. 

Q. Give the definition and elements of relation? 

A. Relation is defined : \.\\q order wJiicJi a tJiing Jias 
with another; or, the how two things lie to each other. 
From this definition it is clear that to obtain relation 
three things are required: i, the subject, or that 
which is related ; 2, the term, or that to which the 
subject is related ; 3, the principle, or reason why 
the subject is related to the term. Thus in the rela- 
tion of paternity the father, who generates, is the sub- 
ject; the son, who is generated, is the term; the 
foundation or reason for the relation is generation. 

The subject and the term, because the relation runs 
between them, are called the extremes, and oftentimes 
the terms, of the relation. Now, extremes in every 
relation must have this proper qualification : that, 
considered as such — that is, as relatives — they must 
exist together, both as to their being and as to their 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 219 

being known ; as to their being, because the father 
could not exist without the son, and vice versa ; as 
to their being known — that is to say, that the know- 
ledge of the one must necessarily carry along with it 
the knowledge of the other — because, when we consider 
relative terms as such, the knowledge of one must 
necessarily imply the knowledge of the other. 

Q. Speak of the distinction of relation. 

A. In logic we divided relation into real and logic. 
Here we must add that real relation may be mutual 
and not mutual. It is called mutual, or strictly real, 
when the relation is real in both extremes, as in the 
example above given of paternity and sonship. It is 
called not mutual when the foundation of the relation 
is real in one extreme and not in the other, but placed 
there by our mind. Such is the relation of creation. 
On the creature's side it is real, because it has placed 
in it something real ; on God's side it is logical, be- 
cause His creating the universe effected nothing new 
in His nature. 

Q. Do real relations truly exist? 

A. Certainly, i. Because none can doubt that a 
father is a true father of his son, and ■jyzV^ versa ; that 
two plus two are equal to four ; that two red roses are 
similar in color. But paternity and sonship, equality 
and similarity are mere relations ; therefore there 
exist true relations. 

2. It is certain that there exists in the universe an 
admirable order of different beings, and none could 
assert that it is merely a fiction of our fancy, or a 
pure extrinsic denomination, because in that order 
and harmony lies the whole good of the universe. 
But such order is nothing more than a real chain of 
relations ; therefore there exist true relations. 

3. We judge of the rights and duties in civil society 



2 20 Ele7ne7iis of Intellectual Philosophy. 

by merely considering the relations among indivi- 
duals ; but if the relations between individuals were 
not real, the rights and duties emanating from them 
would not be real. Therefore we. must admit real 
relations. 

Q. Under how many heads may we bring all these 
relations? 

A. Under three heads. Relation is the order which 
a thing has with another; therefore there are as many 
relations as there are ways by which a thing may have 
order with another. Now, a thing may have order 
with another (i) inasmuch as it forms one of its essen- 
tial elements, and both together constitute a genus 
or a species, as the relation which exists between the 
human soul and the body. 2. A thing may have 
order with another as the cause to the effect — as the 
relation of a father to his child, of an architect to the 
building, etc. 3. A thing may have order with an- 
other in consequence of the agreement or disagree- 
ment of both in some accidental quality — as two 
red roses, two white lilies, etc. 

Q. Give the essence and definition of quality. 

A. Quality is a name which is given to different 
things, and also to all the categories of accidents; 
but, taken as a special category, it is defined : tJiat 
accident which nwdifies and affects the substance i7i 
itself. Upon which definition Ave observe that it is 
called accident to distinguish it from the specific 
difference which also qualifies the substance ; but 
spirituality, for instance, qualifies the substance of 
the soul, yet it belongs to its essence, and is not 
an accident. We have added zvhich modifies and 
affects the substance, to distinguish it from other acci- 
dents. Because, though all accidents are affections 
of the substance, and are added to it to supply some 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 221 

defect or imperfection, yet the quality properly and 
intrinsically is that which modifies the substance. 
Quantity, for instance, is given to the substance to 
give it extension and impenetrability of parts ; re- 
lations are effects, as it were, of substances. Other 
accidents might more properly be called adjacent, 
rather than intrinsic, perfections of the substance ; 
but quality alone is intrinsic to it, as healthy food, 
fresh air, strong man, charming sky — all qualities 
inherent to these various substances. 

O. How many kinds of qualities are there? 

A. Four: those which modify the substance in it- 
self — as to be well, to be healthy; those which affect 
it in its operation by adding or diminishing efficacy — 
as the power of vision in a young person, the weak- 
ness of the same in an aged man ; those which affect 
it according to physical movement, inducing some 
sensible transformation — as Jiot air, cold air, moist 
air, etc. ; those which affect the form or figure of the 
substance — as a square table, an oval face, a hooked 
nose. The first qualities are called disposition or 
habits ; the second, power or impotence ; the third, 
alterations ; the {o\xx\\\, form zx\A figure. 

The following lines may be taken as an example of 
the different kinds of qualities : 

" Queen of fragrance,'^ lovely \ Rose, 
The beauties of thy leaves disclose ! 
The winter 's past, the tempests fly, 
SoftX gales breathe gently through the sky ; 
The lark, sweet warbling on the wing. 
Salutes the gay return of spring ; 
The silver dews, the vernal showers, 
Call forth a bloojny waste of flowers ; 
'Y'\xQ joyous fields, the shady woods, 
Are clothed with green or swell with buds ; 

* Quality of power. t Of disposition. | Of power, etc. 



2 22 Elemeiits of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Then haste thy beauties to disclose, 
Queen of fragrance, lovely Rose ! " 

— Broome, TJie Rosebud. 



ARTICLE THIRD. 
Action and Passion. 

Q. What is action, and how many kinds of action 

are there ? 

A. In another chapter we have spoken of causes, and 
especially of the efficient cause, or of the agent, and of 
the effects which emanate from it. This emanation 
from the cause producing the effect is called action. 
From this we can understand how, in order to have 
action, three things are required : r, a principle which 
acts — that is, the substance ; 2, a principle accord- 
ing to which the action is performed to deternjine its 
kind — that is, the essence, which is the interior prin- 
ciple of every action ; 3, a principle through which 
the substances may act — that is, the faculties, w'hich, 
as we shall show, in creatures are the proximate 
principle of operations distinct from the essence. 
Action is of two kinds — immanent and transient. The 
first is that which terminates in the subject, acting 
in such a manner that it is itself both the principle 
and the term of the action. The second is that Avhich 
terminates outside the subject — that is, the action 
begins in the subject and terminates outside of it. 

O. What are the opinions of philosophers as to both 
kinds of action ? 

A. As to immanent actions, some have said that 
they are not true actions, inasmuch as they have no 
real term. Against transient actions, Leibnitz has 
said that they are impossible, on the plea that in order 
to have a transient action something must pass from 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 223 

the agent to the subject acted upon, but this is im- 
possible ; therefore, etc. Now, both these opinions 
are false. i. As to immanent actions. When I 
study, for instance, I perform an immanent action, 
because the term of the action remains in me. But is 
the result of my action less real because it takes place 
in myself? Certainly not, since the perfection of 
my intellect, the consequence of my study, is surely 
something real — as real as the distinction Avhich exists 
between a learned and an ignorant man, between a 
cultivated man and a boor. 

" Base-minded they that want intelligence ; 
For God himself for wisdom most is praised, 
And men to God thereby are nighest raised." 

— Spenser. 

With regard to the possibility of transient actions, 
we deny that it is necessary that an accident should 
travel from the agent to the subject acted upon to 
render possible such actions ; because all that is ne- 
cessary in this case is that the agent should apply its 
efficacy and force upon the subject to produce in it a 
new state. Secondly, if this possibility were denied, 
many absurd consequences vv-ould follow ; for if all 
those actions which do not terminate in the agent did 
not exist, man would no longer be responsible for all 
those actions which pass from him, such as theft, 
murder, etc. ; he would no longer be liable either to 
reward or punishment ; all the order and harmony of 
the universe, which is kept by one series of beings 
acting upon another, would be a mere optical delu- 
sion. 

Q. What is the term of both actions? 

A. The direct term must always be something posi- 
tive, but as to the indirect term it may be negative. 
In fact, every agent acts always for an end ; but the 



2 26 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 

to be destined to, or to be designated by, that place. 
Now, this determination which a created spirit re- 
ceives from place is called to be in a definitive place, 
because place merely defines or designates where the 
spirit is, but neither contains nor surrounds it."^ 

Q. What is space ? 

A. It is very difficult to define space, and philoso- 
phers have broached all sorts of opinions about it. 
On the one hand, space cannot be what our fancy 
imagines — something really existing as containing 
an immense number of bodies — because extension can- 
not exist as something separate from bodies. What 
could it be but a body? And where could the body 
be contained? In another? And where would, this 
third one be ? In a fourth, and so on ad infinitttm ? 

On the other hand, it seems contradictory to sup- 
pose that that which contains all bodies is the same 
thing with that which it contains. If, therefore, space 
must not be something separate, and at the same time 
it must be something distinct, from bodies, what else 
can it be to satisfy both requirements except what 
St. Thomas defines it to be, tlie extension of bodies, in- 
asiiiitcJi as it is considered to ■ contain either the same 
body to which it belongs or other bodies ? 

Having thus explained the idea of space, it is hardly 
necessary to prove it, because if the capacity to con- 
tain must be found in a body, what else can it be but 
its extension and dimension ? Therefore it is clear that 
the nature of space lies in extension. Hence it is that 
whenever we want to measure space we only measure 
extension. From this it appears that that space which 
we imagine to exist outside the limits of the universe, 

"■■■ The schoolmen called the manner in which a material object is in a place esse 
in loco circtcmscriptive. The manner in which a spirit is in a place esse in loco defi- 
nitive. We have rendered in the text the idea of the schoolmen as accurately as we 
could. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 227 

and in which we fancy the world to have been created, 
is not a reahty but a fiction, which St. Augustine jest- 
ingly calls spacious nothing. 

But it. may be asked : Where is the world ? What 
vast body contains it ? The world is nowhere but in 
itself. It is not cdtitained in any other space or 
body, but God's infinite power upholds it. 
Q. Give the idea of the category When. 
A. Things may be bounded not only by place, 
but also by time. Now, as the boundary of bodies 
proceeding from place gives the category where, so 
also the determination of things arising from time 
gives the category zvheii. 

To understand this we must give the idea of time. 
Time is a kind of duration by which we mean the 
permanence of a thing in its existence. Hence dura- 
tion may be of as many kinds as there are modes of 
existence. The first is that of the Being absolutely 
immutable, which is God. The second is that of 
beings immutable as to their being, but changeable as 
to their operations. The last is that of being change- 
able as to both being and operations. According to 
these three modes of being we may distinguish three 
kinds of duration. The first is called eternity, the 
perfect possession of interminable life all In one — that 
is, having neither beginning nor end nor succession. 
The second is called cbvuvi, which is an interminable 
life of a being created but naturally imperishable, and 
belongs to Immortal spirits. The third is that of 
beings mutable as to being and operations. Time, 
therefore, is nothing more than the duration of beings 
mutable as to being and operations. And because by 
time we measure the changes and movements of 
such mutable beings, determining the beginning and 
the end of such movements, Aristotle has defined 



2 28 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

time to be the measure of movement by marking its 
before and its after. 

" Time past and time to come are not, 
Time present is our only lot." 

— Montgomery. 

Q. What is the idea of site ? 

A. The disposition or location of the parts of a 
body with regard to a place is called site. From 
this it might appear that the category site is con- 
founded with that of where ; but if we consider both 
accurately we shall find a great difference between 
them ; because where implies merely that a body is 
found in such a place, whereas site implies the manner 
and the how it is found — perpendicularly, horizontally, 
leaning, or lying, etc. Site, therefore, is the Jioiv a body 
is found in a place. Here we may remark that we are 
accustomed to apply the idea of site to spiritual 
things ; but this we do metaphorically. Hence God, 
says St. Thomas, is said to be sitting in consequence 
of His immutability, to be standing in consequence 
of His power to repel His enemies. 

Q. What is habit ? 

A. That determination or distinctioi. which ac- 
crues to bodies from that which clothes them. From 
this definition we can see that, in order to have this 
category, two or more substances are required — one 
which is clothed, the other which clothes ; that this 
accident consists in neither of these two substances, 
but in the contact of both or in the clothing. 

Q. Give a resume of the whole of ontology. 

A. We can see now as in a picture the whole series 
of truths explained in ontology, and how they descend 
one from another in beautiful order from the idea of 
being. Setting out from the idea of being, we have 



Elements of Intellectua I Ph ilosophy. 229 

investigated its «(^/«r^ universally considered, then we 
have studied its elements and Jioiv they constitute 
being, then we have studied its properties of unity, 
truth, goodness, and beauty. We have enquired after- 
wards into the causes of being, and have acquired a clear 
and distinct conception of them. Finally, we have 
proceeded to study the divisions of being, and have 
seen that it is divided into ten classes — first, substa?ice 
in its complete and incomplete state, and then the 
accidents of quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, 
space, time, site, and habit, and thus we acquired the 
most general idea applicable to all things. We con- 
clude with the words of the poet, which recapitulate 
the whole ontology, and especially the two supreme 
categories — substance and accident. 

The poet introduces a sibyl foretelling the fate of 
the eldest son of Being, which is Substance: 

" Your son, said she, nor can you prevent it, 
Shall subject be to many an accident. 
O'er all his brethren he shall reign as king, 
Yet every one shall make him underling ; 
And those that cannot live from him asunder 
Ungratefully shall strive to keep him under. 
In worth and excellence he shall outgo thern ; 
Yet, being above them, he shall be belov/ them. 
From others he shall stand in need of nothing. 
Yet on his brothers shall depend for clothing. 
To find a foe it shall not.be his hap. 
And Peace shall lull him in her flowery lap ; 
Yet shall he live in strife, and at his door 
De. ourijig War shall never cease to roar ; 
Yet it shall be his natural property 
To harbor those that are at enmity. 
What power, what force, what mighty spell, if not 
Your learned hands, can loose this Gordian knot ? " 

— Milton. 



CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE USB OF ONTOLOGY. 

O. What do young people think of ontology? 

A. That it is a hard, dry study, of no practical use 
whatever. 

Q. Is that so? 

A. It is certainly a little dry and hard to under- 
stand ; but as to its use, it is of the greatest importance 
to understand anything scientifically, and every science 
and art is founded upon ontology. 

Q. Can you give any example in art and science 
showing how they are founded on ontology? 

A. In art we will take as an example grammar, 
which is the art of speaking and writing correctly. 
In the first place, the foundation of the whole gram- 
mar is the substantive verb to be, which implies real 
existence. Without it language would not express a 
reality, but would be merely a construction and ar- 
rangement of words having no real meaning what- 
ever. The substantive verb to be, therefore, makes 
our grammar and our speech real and objective. But 
this substantive verb corresponds to the universal 
idea of being as described in ontology. 

Next come the nouns, which are divided into sub- 
stantive and adjective. These correspond to the 
great division of being into substance and accident. 
The pronouns, personal orindicative, are founded upon 
the idea of the person or the individual ; / express- 
ing always a personality, this or tliat expressing an 
individuality. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 231. 

Next follow the numbers, which are singular, plural — 
collective and universal. These are founded upon 
the property of being unity, which gives rise to dis- 
tinction and plurality. 

As to the verbs, they are active, passive, and neuter. 
The active verb, which means to do or to act, is 
founded upon the idea of cause and action. When 
the verb expresses an immanent action it is called 
active intransitive, as I sleep, I think ; when it ex- 
presses a transient action it is called active transitive, 
as I strike ; the two grand divisions of action. 

The passive verb, which means to be acted upon, to 
suffer, is founded on the idea of passion, the neuter 
on both. 

As to the moods of verbs, they are the infinitive, 
the indicative, the subjunctive, the potential, and the 
imperative. For this division there is no real ground, 
at least so far as the potential and subjunctive are 
concerned. The subjunctive is merely an elliptical 
mode of expression^ and the potential is made up of 
two or more verbs, and therefore it cannot, with any 
propriety, be called an inflection of any of them. 
This leaves us the indicative, by which simple assertions 
are made ; the imperative, by which commands are 
given; and the infinitive, which expresses the meaning 
of the verb in the abstract, as to love, to do, to think. 
The indicative is founded on the idea of being as as- 
serting something, the imperative on the idea of 
cause, the infinitive on the idea of action or passion. 
The tenses, present, past, and future, are founded upon 
the idea of time. 

The adverb is a qualification added to a verb, such 
as to do well, to do quickly ; and is founded on the 
ideas of quality — as to do ill, justly, wisely ; on the 
idea of quantity — as to work so much, considerably; 



2%2 



Elements of Intellechial Philosophy. 



of time — as to do it now, then, soon, when ; of place 
— as to write here, hence, there, where. 

The preposition is a word connecting two words 
together so as to indicate the relation which the things 
or ideas signified by them bear to each other, and, as 
it is evident, is founded on the idea of relation — as the 
heavens above us, the enemies of our salvation about 
us, the regret after sin, friendships among equals, 
love between brothers, etc. 

Finally, the conjunction, which joins words together, 
is founded also on the idea of relation. 

The syntax, which is that part of grammar which 
teaches how words are to be arranged and connected 
together, is also founded pre-eminently on ontology, 
because its fundamental rule is to arrange and con- 
nect words in such a manner as to maintain the proper 
relations of being. For instance, if I should in speak- 
ing break that first rule of syntax that a verb agrees 
with its nominative in number and person, and in- 
stead of saying, " /r^^a'^, /V/^r /£'(^r;/j'," I should say, 
''^ I reads, Peter learn,'' I would break the proper rela- 
tions of being; for if it is I who read I cannot 
express that relation of being in the nominative and 
then deny it in the verb ; if it is Peter who learns, one 
person, I cannot -contradict that and express in the 
verb that they are many who learn. 

Grammar, therefore, which takes its objective reality 
from the idea of real being ; which finds its ideas of the 
substantive and adjective nouns in the conception of 
substance and accidents ; which forms its verbs, active, 
passive, and neuter, on the ideas of cause, action, and 
passion; its tenses from the idea of time; which 
takes its ideas of adverbs, prepositions, and conjunc- 
tions from the various kinds of accident ; which gives 
rules of syntax from the natural and essential relations 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 233 

of being — is altogether founded on ontology, and can- 
not be known scientifically without it. 

O. Show by the example of the natural sciences 
how they are founded on the ideas we acquire in on- 
tology. 

A. The first natural science is physics, the object 
of which is to study the causes of the phenomena 
which happen in matter and which do not cause any 
change in the composition of bodies. A physical 
phenomenon is any fact which is accomplished or 
takes place in matter without altering its composition. 
A body which falls, a sound which is produced, a cer- 
tain quantity of water which is frozen, are so many 
phenomena. Now, to enquire into such facts which 
do not alter the composition of bodies is the object 
of ph3'sics. We say of phenomena which do not alter 
the composition of bodies, because to enquire into 
those facts Avhich modify more or less the nature of 
bodies is the object of chemistry. 

It is evident that physics is an application of on- 
tology to a particular object, for the first question 
which this science puts is, What is matter, or a body? 
— that is, it studies the nature of the object it works 
upon, and finds out that any limited quantity of mat- 
ter is a body ; that a body is not formed by a con- 
tinual quantity of matter, but of elements infinitely 
small, which cannot be physically divided, and are 
placed in juxtaposition with each other without 
touching each other, being designedly maintained at 
a distance by mutual attraction and repulsion, which 
elements are called atoms, and a group of them mole- 
cules. It finds out also that a body may be in dif- 
ferent states: the solid state, as stone, metal; the 
liquid state, as water, oil ; the gaseous state, as 
steam ; that the difference of these three states con- 



234 Elements of I Jitellectual Philosophy, 

sists in the cohesion of the parts or molecules ; in 
solids the cohesion being so strong as to require a 
great effort to separate them; in liquids much less 
effort, as the cohesion is weaker ; in gases much less, 
as the cohesion is the weakest. 

Having enquired" into the essence and nature of 
bodies, it passes on to investigate their properties, 
some of which, because found constantly in all bodies, 
it calls essential, such as extension, divisibility, im- 
penetrability, elasticity, mobility, inertia; others it 
finds only in some bodies, and it concludes to be acci- 
dental to bodies, such as solidity, fluidity, ductility, 
porosity, compressibility. 

Physics proceeds next to enquire into the causes of 
t\\es& phc7io}neiia, in order to understand them scientifi- 
cally. We say phenomena and not bodies, because to 
enquire into the cause of bodies belongs to cosmology. 
It discovers that the following are the causes for the 
phenomena of bodies: attraction, heat, light, mag- 
netism, and electricity. These are called physical agents 
or forces. After studying these causes the natural 
philosopher, by observing the constant relations be- 
tween the phenomenon of a body and its cause, dis- 
covers and assigns Avhat are called physical laws, and 
attains the object and use of this science. For in- 
stance, after studying attraction and finding it to be a 
force inherent in matter by which particles and masses 
of matter are drawn towards each other, and carefully 
observing that this force increases in proportion to the 
quantity of matter which the attracting body contains 
and in proportion to the diminishing of the distance be- 
tween the bodies, it establishes the law that the force of 
attraction in bodies is in proportion to the mass and to 
the greater or less distance, the attraction increasing 
as the mass increases and as the distance diminishes. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 235 

The student will here carefully remark how ontology, or 
the general science of being, has guided the natural 
philosopher to his science ; for as ontology enquires 
into the nature and essence of being, so the natural 
philosopher enquires into the essence and nature 
of bodies ; as the first enquires into the proper- 
ties of being, so does the second enquire into the 
properties of bodies ; as the first enquires into the 
causes of being, so does the latter seek into the 
causes of the phenomena of bodies; as the first 
investigates the most general division of being, so 
does the second enquire into the most general di- 
vision of bodies, which division gives rise to all 
natural sciences. 

Q. Give a brief idea of the different natural sci- 
ences. 

A. The body may be inorganic, living, and animal. 
This supreme division of general physics gives rise 
to a host of natural sciences. When natural science 
analyzes the inorganic body into its elements and its 
constituent principles it is called chemistry, which is 
the science of whatever has relation to the simple or 
elementary — that is, bodies which invariably present 
the same characteristics however they may be divided. 
On the contrary, those bodies which are composite 
are aggregations of several elements combined in 
a different way and united by their natural affinities. 
Now, these bodies present themselves to our observa- 
tion in different states — the gaseous, the liquid, and 
the solid. The science which investigates the nature, 
properties, causes, and action of gases, together with 
the laws which govern them, is called gasology. 
That which studies liquids is called hydrology. The 
science which studies the nature, properties, causes, 
action, laws of the solids is called mineralogy. With 



= 



6 Elements of hitelleciual Philosophy. 



regard to organic bodies, the science which studies the 
first organic bodies — that is, the plant — is botany. 
That which studies the organic Hfe of animal bodies is 
called zoology, which is divided into two sciences — 
anatomy and physiology ; the first is the study of the 
nature, properties, causes, functions, and use of the 
elementary parts of the animal body or of the skele- 
ton ; the second is the science of the nature, proper- 
ties, causes, functions, and uses of the organs of the 
animal body. Medicine, with all its subordinate sci- 
ences, is the science of the causes of the alterations 
produced in the animal organism and of the means of 
repairing them. 

The next grand division of bodies is that which 
separates them into celestial and terrestrial. The 
celestial bodies are the object of a particular science 
called astronomy, the object of which is to ex- 
plain the phenomena and to account for the move- 
ments of those huge bodies which gravitate in space. 
To this another science is allied, called cosmo- 
graphy, which teaches the structure, the form, the 
location, and the relations of the parts which com- 
pose the universe. 

The terrestrial body is the object of two other 
sciences, geography and geology. The first gives the 
description of the earth, its exterior figure, its division, 
and all those particulars presented by its surface. The 
second penetrates into the very bowels of the earth, 
and seeks to know its interior structure, the different 
materials of which it is composed, their formation, 
their relative location, and the different revolutions to 
which it has been subject. 

These divisions arise from considering bodies In their 
concreteness, but there is another branch of physical 
science which does not consider them In themselves 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 237 

and in their elements, but in the abstract as to their 
quantity, number, or extension. 

AritJnnetic and algebra consider quantity in its high- 
est abstraction, and treat of the combinations of 
quantities wiiich can be expressed by simple relations 
of number. But every specified quantity may be re- 
garded from a twofold relation — that of time and of 
space, because time and space are the necessary con- 
ditions of all reality which is capable of measure. The 
relation of a particular quantity to space expressed by 
a figure is the object oi geometry — a science Avhich has 
received such a name from the use to which it was 
formerly destined, that of measuring the earth, and 
which has retained its primitive name, though it has 
made such immense progress. 

The relation which a definite quantity bears to time 
is expressed by movement, because we may say that 
it is through movement that time is rendered visible 
in space. Now, movement cannot be conceived ex- 
cept as the product of a force. The science of the 
forces which cause movement is called mechanics. 
These forces may be considered under two aspects, in- 
asmuch as they neutralize each ether, and under this 
aspect they are the object oi statics ; inasmuch as they 
produce the movement, and then they are the object 
of dynamics. Of course the science of mechanics is 
subdivided into several branches, according to the na- 
ture of the bodies to which the moving forces are 
applied, such as hydraulics, which considers the move- 
ment of fluids ; hydrometry, Avhich hr.s for its object 
the weight, the force, the intensity of fluids, etc. 

The student will see by this brief sketch of natural 
sciences how they are nothing else than an application 
of ontology; how each studies first the nature of its 
object, its properties, its causes, and its laws. Onto- 



236 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

regard to organic bodies, the science which studies the 
first organic bodies — that is, the plant — is botany. 
That which studies the organic Hfe of animal bodies is 
called zoology, which is divided into two sciences — 
anatomy and physiology; the first is the study of the 
nature, properties, causes, functions, and use of the 
elementary parts of the animal body or of the skele- 
ton ; the second is the science of the nature, proper- 
ties, causes, functions, and uses of the organs of the 
animal body. Medicine, with all its subordinate sci- 
ences, is the science of the causes of the alterations 
produced in the animal organism and of the means of 
repairing them. 

The next grand division of bodies is that which 
separates them into celestial and terrestrial. The 
celestial bodies are the object of a particular science 
called astronomy, the object of which is to ex- 
plain the phenomena and to account for the move- 
ments of those huge bodies which gravitate in space. 
To this another science is allied, called cosmo- 
graphy, which teaches the structure, the form, the 
location, and the relations of the parts which com- 
pose the universe. 

The terrestrial body is the object of two other 
sciences, geography and geology. The first gives the 
description of the earth, its exterior figure, its division, 
and all those particulars presented by its surface. The 
second penetrates into the very bowels of the earth, 
and seeks to know its interior structure, the different 
materials of which it is composed, their formation, 
their relative location, and the different revolutions to 
which it has been subject. 

These divisions arise from considering bodies in their 
concreteness, but there is another branch of physical 
science which does not consider them in themselves 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 237 

and in their elements, but in the abstract as to their 
quantity, number, or extension. 

Arithmetic and algebra consider quantity in its high- 
est abstraction, and treat of the combinations of 
quantities which can be expressed by simple relations 
of number. But every specified quantity may be re- 
garded from a twofold relation — that of time and of 
space, because time and space are the necessary con- 
ditions of all reality which is capable of measure. The 
relation of a particular quantity to space expressed by 
a figure is the object o{ geometry — a science which has 
received such a name from the use to which it was 
formerly destined, that of measuring the earth, and 
which has retained its primitive name, though it has 
made such immense progress. 

The relation which a definite quantity bears to time 
is expressed by movement, because we may say that 
it is through movement that time is rendered visible 
in space. Now, movement cannot be conceived ex- 
cept as the product of a force. The science of the 
forces which cause movement is called mechanics. 
These forces may be considered under two aspects, in- 
asmuch as they neutralize each ether, and under this 
aspect they are the object oi statics ; inasmuch as they 
produce the movement, and then they are the object 
of dynamics. Of course the science of mechanics is 
subdivided into several branches, according to the na- 
ture of the bodies to which the moving forces are 
applied, such as hydraulics, which considers the move- 
ment of fluids; hydrometry, Avhich hr.s for its object 
the weight, the force, the intensity of fluids, etc. 

The student will see by this brief sketch of natural 
sciences how they are nothing else than an application 
of ontology; how each studies first the nature of its 
object, its properties, its causes, and its laws. Onto- 



23 S Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

logy, therefore, which teaches the native properties, 
causes, divisions, laws of being, is of the utmost im^ 
portance to all sciences which treat of a particular 
beinsf. 



ANTHROPOLOGY 



" Know then thyself; .... 
The proper study of mankind is man." — Pope. 
239 



ANTHROPOLOGY. 



IN TROD UCTION. 



Q. What is anthropology ? 

A. The science Avhich has for its object man. The 
science which treats of the human soul is called psy- 
chology ; but as in philosophy we cannot speak of the 
human soul without mentioning its union with the 
body, so we must treat of the whole man, and there- 
fore study anthropology, which means the science of 
man ; yet we shall principally occupy ourselves about 
the soul. 

O. What method shall we follow in speaking of 
man, and principally of his soul? 

A. We shall follow the method of St. Thomas, who 

says : " In every spiritual substance three things are 

to be remarked — the essence, the faculties, and the 

operations." Hence he concludes, with regard to the 

soul, that three things are to be remarked in it — its 

essence, its faculties, and its operations. We shall 

follow this method, and shall enquire into these three 

things: What is the nature of the human soul? what 

are its faculties ? and what are its operations ? This 

method and order will render the things to be treated 

clearer and more easy of comprehension. 

S41 



CHAPTER I. 

ON THE NA TV RE OF MAN IN GENERAL. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

TJiat Man is not Body alone, but is made up of another 
Principle called the Soul. 

O. What is the definition of man? 

A. Man is defined to be a reasonable animal, be- 
cause he not only lives and feels but reasons. In call- 
ing him an animal we determine his proximate genus, 
in which he agrees with all those beings which have 
souls. In calling him reasonable we define the specific 
difference of man which distinguishes him from all 
other animals. Hence man must result from two 
elements^-a body and a reasonable soul — both of 
which make one substantial whole. 

Q. Is this admitted by all ? 

A. No. In Germany, in England, France, and our 
own country some would-be philosophers have held 
that man is nothing more than a well-organized body. 
But, because there are certain operations in man 
which seem to suppose another principle in him be- 
sides the body, these philosophers, in order to ac- 
count for such operations, and unwilling to admit a 
reasonable soul in man, have been forced to invent 
different systems. Some have said that these opera- 
tions — such as the act of judgment, of reasoning, and 
so forth — can be easily accounted for by means of 
chemical forces and laws. Others, following the prin- 
ciple of Descartes, that whatever happens in the body 



Elements of Intellectual PJiilosophy. 243 

is the result of mechanical laws, have held that all 
the operations of man can be easily explained by 
means of the laws of movement. Others, finally, see- 
ing that these operations of man cannot be accounted 
for by means either of chemical or mechanical laws, 
have invented certain forces which they call Ditat, 
different from physical properties, but, like these, in- 
herent in the very matter of the organs. To these 
vital forces they attribute all the distinctive opera- 
tions of man. The first system has been called chenii- 
calisjii, the other tnecJianicism, and the last organicism. 

We shall prove first in general that in man, besides 
the body, there is another principle distinct from the 
body; that the simplest operations of the mind can- 
not be explained without this principle. Next we 
shall say a word on each system in particular. 

Proof I. The human body holds the first and most 
perfect rank among living bodies. But such a body 
cannot exist by itself alone, but must have another 
principle ; therefore there must be another principle 
in man besides his body. The minor is proved : if a 
body is living, there must necessarily be some princi- 
ple which gives it life. Now, this principle must be 
either the body itself or something distinct from the 
bod^^ But it cannot be the body itself, because, as 
St. Thomas remarks, it is evident that to be the 
principle of life does not become the body as body, 
otherwise all bodies would be living, which is contrary 
to experience ; therefore in living bodies life must 
arise from a principle other than the body. 

2. It is evident that we have ideas or forms of many 
things in our mind. VVe have the forms or ideas of 
the firmament, of the sun, the stars, the sky, the 
forms of mountains, of the boundless ocean, and so 
forth. But this would be utterly impossible if in man 



244 Blemenis of Intellecttial PhilosopJiy. 

there were nothing more than the body ; therefore, 
etc. 

The minor is proved from the principle and the ex- 
perience that it is impossible for a body to have more 
than one form at a time. No mechanical or chemical 
process can make a body take two different forms at the 
same time, A sculptor, for instance, cannot by any 
mechanical skill make a block of wood take the form of 
a man and a serpent at the same time ; a chemist by 
no chemical skill can make a body take the solid, the 
liquid, and gaseous forms at the same time. Conse- 
quently, if man were nothing more than a body, he 
could only have the form of one thing at a time ; but 
man has the ideas or forms of different things at the 
same time ; therefore there must be in him another 
principle besides the body. 

" No body can at once two forms admit 
Except the one the other do deface ; 
But in the soul ten thousand forms do sit, 

And none intrudes into her neighbor's place."* 

3. It is a principle of reason as well as experience 
that a thing which is received into another must take 
the shape and the form of the recipient. This princi- 
ple was expressed by the schoolmen as follows : 
Oimie quod rccipitiir ad modmn recipieiitis recipitiir ; 
and by the poet : 

" All things received do such proportions take 
As those things wherein they are received ; 
So little glasses little faces make, 
And narrow webs on narrow frames are weaved." f 

Now, in consequence of this principle, if man were 
only a body the forms of things which he apprehends 

* Davies's Poems. + Ibid. 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 245 

should take the form, shape, and .size of the body. 
But this is contrary to experience, because we have 
ideas of all things conformable to their actual reality ; 
for we are those 

" Wherein are men, beasts, trees, seas, and lands, 
And yet each thing a proper place doth find, 
And each thing in the due proportion stands." * 

O. Say something of each system in particular. 

A. Having proved that man could not perform the 
simplest operation of the mind, which is apprehension, 
if he were only a body, we proceed to make some re- 
marks on each system, and first against those who ex- 
plain the operations of man by means of chemical forces 
and the laws of movement, i. We know by experience 
that oftentimes we are undecided which operation to 
choose ; we discuss the question with ourselves to see 
which we should choose ; and finally, we know that we 
choose that which seems to us best, or, in fact, which 
we wish to choose. 

But the freedom of doubting, consulting, and choos- 
ing cannot possibly belong to chemical forces, or be 
done by mechanical laws, for all these acts are done 
necessarily ; therefore all these operations of man can- 
not be explained by those forces. 

2. We know also by experience that after having 
commenced a certain action we can upon the instant 
stop it and begin another, and drop it again to under- 
take a new one. But this would be impossible under 
the laws of movement and mechanical forces. How 
often, for instance, would the engineer wish to possess 
this power of instantly stopping the engine he is guid- 
ing, and cannot under the laws of movement, but 
must let it go on to carry death and desolation to 
hundreds I 

* Davies. 



246 Elements of Iniellectual Philosophy. 

Finally, we remark against the third system that 
to have recourse to vital properties to explain the 
operations of man is only confounding the question 
more and more, because a property is not a principle, 
but the consequence of some vital principle ; therefore 
that from which property originates, and not property 
itself, must be the principle of life. But these philoso- 
phers contend that these properties are properties of 
organic bodies ; they come to admit, then, that, after 
all, the body is the principle of life. But we have 
shown, with the clearest evidence, that a body cannot 
be the principle of life ; therefore we must admit an- 
other principle in man besides the body. This is 
called the soul, which, as far as we have described it, 
may be defined as tJie first principle of life in things to 
which we attribute life. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 

This Principle called the Soul is One, bnt does not Form 
the Whole Man. 

Q. Is the soul a single principle or multiple ? 

A. Some philosophers, having admitted in man, 
besides the body, another principle which causes 
him to move and to act, and having examined these 
operations and found them different in nature, have 
come to the conclusion that the principle which 
causes man to perform all these operations must 
be more than one. Some have admitted a dou- 
ble principle — one which performs intellectual ope- 
rations, another which feels and vegetates. Others 
have admitted three — one the principle of intel- 
lectual operations, another the principle of sensa- 
tion, the last the principle of vegetation. But these 
opinions are false, and we must admit only one 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 247 

principle of all these operations and prove it as fol- 
lows : 

I. Because we know by experience that an opera- 
tion of the soul, when it is too intensely attended to, 
hinders other operations. For instance, when a man 
is absorbed in an intense intellectual work the opera- 
tions of the sensitive and vegetative life are either 
suspended or imperfectly carried on ; and, contrariwise, 
when a man is plunged into some sensible operation 
he is unfit for intellectual work. This principle ex- 
plains all those anecdotes of absent-minded persons, 
of which we have so many examples.* Now, this 
would be impossible if the principles of action in man 
were multiple, because in that case each one would 
attend to its own department without any trouble or 
hindrance — one could attend to thought, another to 
sensation, and another to vegetation and locomotion ; 
therefore there must be one principle in man. 

The common sense of mankind rejects such an 
opinion of more than one principle, because all men in 
speaking not only say, I understand, but also, I feel, I 
live, I move, I grow, and such like expressions, attri- 
buting all these different operations to one subject, the 
me. Now, this they could not do if they were not con- 
scious that the principle of all these operations is the 
same and identical ; therefore we must admit one prin- 
ciple in man. 

" And these three powers f three sorts of men do make ; 
For some, like plants, their veins do onl}' fill : 
And some, like beasts, their senses' pleasure tak^ ; 
And some, like angels, do contemplate still. 

* That, for instance, of the man who, passing by a toll-gate, cried out to the 
keeper, " What's to pay?" The man at the gate replied, " For what ?"' " How for 
what ?" replied the traveller ; " for my horse." " What horse ?'' rejoined the keeper. 
Whereupon the traveller, looking at his legs, exclaimed : "Excuse me, I thought I 
was on horseback." 

t Intellectual, sen.sitive, and vegetative. 



248 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Therefore the fables turned some men to fiowers, 

And others did with brutish forms invest. 
And did of others malce celestial powers, 

Like angels, which still travel, yet still rest. 
Yet these three powers are not three souls but ojie, 

As one and two are both contained in three. 
Three being one number by itself alone 

A shadow of the Blessed Trinity." 

— Davies. 

But as some of the operations which man performs 
cannot be accounted for by the soul alone, but require 
the body also, such as sensation, so we must admit 
that man consists of a body and a soul united to- 
gether. 



ARTICLE THIRD. 

Man results from the Substantial Union of Body and 

Sont. 

Q. Is this union between the body and soul of man 
accidental or substantial ? 

A. Plato, who held that the soul is the whole man, 
and who could not deny that there is a certain union 
between the soul and the body, contended that this 
union was merely accidental and exterior — the same 
union, for instance, which exists between our bodies 
and the clothes we put on, between the engineer and 
the locomotive which he runs, or between the pilot 
and his ship. 

The true opinion is that the union between the soul 
and the body is intrinsic and substantial. 

O. What do you mean by substantial union ? 

A. To explain this we must recall some points of 
ontology. I. Subsistence is that last complement 
of a substance by which it obtains the mastery over 
itself and its own acts, becomes responsible for its 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 249 

actions, and is incommunicable to all others. This is 
called a complete substance or suppositum. 

2. Every substance existing in nature is a supposi- 
tum. 

3. The subsistence of a created substance is neces- 
sary only in this sense : that no substance can possibly 
exist without a subsistence. But it is not necessary 
in the sense that every substance should have a sub- 
sistence of its own nature and species, because it may 
happen to subsist of the subsistence of another. 

4. This happens when a substance is intended to 
form such an intimate union with another substance 
of a superior nature as both to form a complete subject 
and individual. Because in this case, as nature in- 
tends to form of two substances one complete indi- 
vidual, it is evident that both substances cannot be 
each one an entity perfectly complete, having the 
mastery and attribution of its own acts, and exclusive 
and incommunicable ; because in that case there would 
be two perfect individuals, which is against the sup- 
position, as we are speaking of a case where nature 
intends to form one individual of two substances. 

5. We understand also in this case which of the two 
substances would have to yield its own subsistence. 
It must be the substance of the superior nature — that 
is, the inferior nature must have no last complement 
of its own, but must be completed by the last comple- 
ment of the superior nature ; so that the superior na- 
ture's subsistence is that which completes both and 
forms the in.Iividual. This is called substantial union, 
which may be defined : the union of two substances 
both made to subsist by a single subsistence, that of 
one of the substances united. 

The substantial union of the body and the soul in 
man means that, so long as the body is actually united 



250 Elemetits of Intellectual Philosophy 

to the soul, it has no subsistence of its own, but sub- 
sists on the substance of the soul ; that the soul gives 
its own complement to the body, and has the owner- 
ship of both, and of the acts of both, is responsible for 
them, and is exclusive and incommunicable to all 
others. 

The proof of this truth lies in the fact that man is 
considered by all as one individual. We do not say 
the hand of Raphael painted that Madonna, the hand 
of Apelles made that statue, the hand of Homer 
wrote the Iliad and the hand of Pope translated it, 
but Raphael made that Madonna, Apelles made that 
statue. Homer wrote the Iliad and Pope translated 
it ; because, although these actions were done im- 
mediately by their hands, guided by their mind, which 
conceived their masterpieces, yet tlie actions of either 
are and must be attributed to one individuality, be- 
cause both the body and the soul of those geniuses 
subsisted in one subsistence, that of the highest prin- 
ciple in them — the soul. 

We conclude, therefore, with the poet : 

" Then dwelleth she not therein as in a tent, 
Nor as a pilot in his ship doth sit, 
Nor as the spider in his web is pent, 
Nor as the wax retains the print in it," 

but IS substantially united to the body, inasmuch as 
it causes it to subsist of its own subsistence, so that 
both form one individuality and one person. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 

Of Maris Esseiue. 

Q. V/hat is man's essence ? 

A. The essence of man consists in those elements 
which are absolutely necessary actually to constitute 



Elements of Intc'llcctiLal PhilosopJiy. 251 

man. But for this three things are necessary : an in- 
telligent soul, a body, and a substantial union between 
them in the sense just explained. By these three 
constituents of his essence is man distinguished from 
all other animals, to which he seems to bear a certain 
likeness. Inasmuch as he has a body he is like to 
animals, but is distinguished from them inasmuch as 
he is endowed with a rational soul. Again, inasmuch 
as he is a rational substance he agrees with all intelli- 
gent substances, and differs from them in consequence 
of his possessing a body ; hence by his essence man is 
placed as a link between the pure, intelligent sub- 
stances and the sensitive substances, thus binding to- 
gether the chain of beings which the Creator has 
made. 

" How poor, how rich, how abject, how august, 
How complicate, how wonderful is man ! 
How passing wonder He who made him such ! 
Who centred in our make such slrdn;^e extremes, 
From different natures marvellously mixt, 
Connection exquisite of distant worlds ! 
Distinguished link in being's endless chain ! 
Midway from nothing to the Deit)' ! 
A beam ethereal, sully'd, and absorpt ! 
Tho' sull)''d and dishonored, still divine ! 
Dim miniature of greatness absolute ! 
An heir of glorj- ! a frail child of dust ! 
Helpless immortal ! insect infinite ! 
A worm ! a god ! " 

— Young. 

It is clear from all we have said that the genetic 
definition of man may be the following: An indi- 
viduality resulting from two substances, a body and a 
rational soul. 

We say genetic, because this definition gives the 
genesis according to which man is formed, yet we 
shall retain the more common definition, that of 
rational animal. 



CHAPTER II. 

ON THE PRINCIPLES FROM WHICH THE NATURE OF MAN 
RESULTS— SOUL AND BODY— AND, FIRST, OF THE SOUL. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

The Soul is not a Material but a Simple Being: 

Q. How shall we proceed in the knowledge of the 
soul? 

A. Having seen that there are two principles which 
form man, and beginning to treat of the soul as the 
principal part of man, we must remark that we are so 
made by nature that, when we cannot perceive things 
directly in themselves, we endeavor to become ac- 
quainted with them by removing things from them 
and by comparing them with other objects — that is to 
say, by investigating which things agree with those 
we want to know and which things do not. Now, it 
is certain that the soul is in the body, and that it is 
distinct from it, and yet we cannot perceive it directly 
in itself and know that it is there, in consequence of 
observing certain operations which the body could 
not perform ; therefore the most natural method of 
coming to the knowledge of the soul, as we cannot 
perceive it in itself, is to remove from it certain things 
which cannot possibly agree with its operations. 

The first of these things which cannot agree with 
the operations of the soul is materiality; hence Ave 
must say that it is simple. 

Q. What do you mean by material, simple, and 
spiritual? 

A, Material is that which is composed of parts 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 253 

which are divisible, as bodies. Simple is that whicli 
has no parts, and which is incapable of separation, 
division, increase, or diminution. If a being not only- 
does not result from parts, but is independent of the 
body for its specific and distinctive operations, then 
it is called spiritual. 

Before proving that the soul is not material, we 
must remark that although we have proved it to be 
distinct from the body, yet this question must not be 
confounded with the present, which enquires whether 
this principle is of the same nature as the body, 
since some philosophers have admitted that the soul, 
though a distinct principle from the body, is yet 
of the same nature as the body. Democritus and 
Leucippus contended that it is a little globe of fire. 
The Pythagoreans held that it is formed from atoms 
floating in the air, and which, differently united, take 
different shapes. The materialists are those who 
mamtain that the soul is composed of parts. 

Q. Show the simplicity of the soul. 

A. The soul perceives, judges, reasons, and has the 
consciousness of itself and of its acts. But these 
operations would be impossible if the soul were ma- 
terial. 

Therefore the soul is not material but simple. The 
major is admitted by all ; the minor must be proved 
And first, the soul could not perceive if it were ma- 
terial. Because all things which may be perceived 
are either corporal or simple substances. But if the 
soul were material it could perceive neither; there- 
tore 11 the soul were material it could not perceive at 
ail. It could not perceive material substances ; be- 
cause If It could perceive them, being itself material, 
two suppositions could be made, either that each part 
of the soul perceives each part of the object appre- 



254 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

hended, or that each part of the soul perceives it whole 
and entire. If the first supposition is admitted we 
could never have an entire perception of the object. 
But we do have entire perceptions of objects ; there- 
fore the first supposition is inadmissible. The second 
supposition cannot be made, because in that case we 
would have as many entire perceptions of the object 
as there would be parts of the soul, the same as a 
glass broken in a hundred fragments ; each fragment 
represents the same object whole and entire. But 
this is contrary to experience, as we are conscious 
that we have only one entire perception of each object 
we apprehend. Therefore, if the soul were material, 
it could not perceive material substances. 

It could not perceive simple substances, because a 
material thing, being composed of parts, could not per- 
ceive that which is indivisible, except the latter could 
be cut up into parts. But this is impossible, as that 
which is naturally indivisible cannot be divided with- 
out changing its nature ; therefore, if the soul were 
material, it could not apprehend simple substances. 

2. If the soul were material it could not form judg- 
ments. I. Because judgment is made up of percep- 
tions and ideas. But Ave have shown that if the soul 
were material it could not perceive at all ; therefore 
it could not form judgments. 

2. Judgment requires that two ideas, that of the 
subject and the predicate, should be compared to- 
gether, put face to face, to discover whether they 
agree or disagree. 

But this comparison would be impossible if the soul 
were material. 

Therefore, if the soul were material, it could not 
judge. 

The minor is proved from the principle that a com- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 255 

parison between two things cannot be made unless 
both things exist simultaneously in the same subject, 
else how could the subject compare the two together, 
put them face to face, if both did not exist in it at the 
same time ? But if the substance forming the subject 
were material and composed of parts, the idea of the 
subject and the predicate could not be found in the 
same subject, but one part would perceive one term, 
the other the second term. Therefore, if the soul 
were material, it could not judge. 

3. It could not reason, because in reasoning it is 
necessary that the same subject which perceives the 
premises should draw the conclusion. But the same 
subject could not be had in a material substance, as 
w^e have proved ; therefore, if the soul were material, it 
could not reason. 

4. It could not have consciousness of itself and its 
acts, because consciousness is a reflex operation and 
takes place when the soul turns in upon itself to in- 
vestigate its own actions. But matter, which has one 
part outside the other, could not return upon itself; 
therefore, if the soul were material, it could not have 
the consciousness of itself and its actions. 

Second Demonstration. . 

If the soul were corporal, all its operations would 
be so many movements, because all the operations of 
bodies can be reduced to movement. But the ope- 
rations of the soul cannot be explained by means of 
movement ; therefore the soul is not material. 

That the operations of the soul cannot be explained 
by means of movement is clear: i. Because no body 
by means of motion moves itself, but must be moved 
by another ; but the soul moves and determines itself, 
as we know by experience. 2. Because the acts of 



256 Elemejzts of Intellectual Philosophy 

thinking and of knowing are immanent and terminate 
in the soul, whereas movement is a transient act, pass- 
ing from one body into another ; therefore the act of 
knowing is not movement. 

3. The power of movement in material substances 
becomes by use weaker and weaker until it ceases al- 
together ; whereas the intellective faculties are per- 
fected more and more by exercise. 

*' If she the body's nature did partake, 

Her strength would with the body's strength decay; 
But when the body's strong sinews slake 
The soul is most active, quick, and gay." 

— Davies. 

4. The soul can perceive contrary things at the same 
time, so much so that by means of the knowledge of 
one it comes to know the other. For instance, we ac- 
quire the idea of eternity by the ideas of time and of 
succession, the idea of the most perfect by that which 
is imperfect, the idea of the absolute by the idea of 
the contingent, etc. 

But the same parts of the body cannot receive con- 
trary movements ; therefore the operations of the soul 
cannot be explained by movement. 

Q. What answer would you give to a materialist 
who should object to this doctrine thus : The soul is 
in the body, but there can be nothing in the body ex- 
cept a material thing ; therefore the soul is material ? 

A. The soul is in the body as a body, each part of 
which touches the corresponding parts of the body, 
just as putting one hand against the other, or as fill- 
ing a pitcher with water, we deny ; because if the 
soul were in the body in this manner it would be ma- 
terial. The soul is in the body inasmuch as it acts in 
and upon it, we grant ; and this is the manner accord- 



Eleme7its of Intellectual Philosophy. 257 

ing to which immaterial things are in space and 
matter. 



Secojid Objection. 

The soul is subject to the same vicissitudes as the 
body, and the faculty of intelligence is developed in 
man according to the age, sex, temperament, and dis- 
position of the individual ; therefore it is clear that 
the soul must be of the same nature as the body. 

A. As we shall see by and by, in consequence of 
the union between the body and the soul the latter 
must depend upon the body as the instrument which 
furnishes the materials for its operations. Therefore, 
it the body is tiny and weak, old and faulty, the 
instrument also which furnishes the materials for the 
soul's operation is tiny, weak, old, and faulty; and 
hence the operations of the soul cannot be performed 
at all, or performed imperfectly, not because the 
soul is the same as the body or of the same nature, 
but because the body in those conditions cannot fur- 
nish the proper materials to the soul. Deprive 
Raphael, for instance, of canvas and pencil and col- 
ors, or give him the worst canvas and pencil and 
colors you could find, and, no matter how grand 
his conceptions might be in his mind, he could 
not carry them out or express them. Likewise, 
great as the native power of intelligence may be, yet, 
if to come from the power to the act, it needs ma- 
terials administered to it by the body ; if the body is 
in such a state as to be unable to furnish those ma- 
terials, the power will remain power and never come 
to the act, not for want of native force or because it is 
of a material nature, but because the material is want- 
ing in consequence of the want in the instrument. 



258 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

"These imperfections, then, we must impute 

Not to the agent but to the instrument ; 
We must not blame Apollo, but his lute, 

If false accords from false strings be sent. 
The soul in all hath one intelligence, 

Though too much moisture in an infant's brain, 
And too much dryness in an old man's sense. 

Cannot the prints of outward things retain. 
Then doth the soul want work and idle sit : 

And this we childness and dotage call , 
Yet hath she then a quiet and active wit, 

If she had stuff and tools to work withal." 

— Davies. 



ARTICLE THIRD. 

On the Spirituality of the Soul. 

0. If the soul is not material, can you say, at least, 
that it depends on the body for its being and its spe- 
cific operations ? 

A. No ; but we must hold that the human soul has 
a subsistence of its own independent of the body, 
and, therefore, is spiritual. Proof: 

1. That which acts by itself subsists by itself. But 
the soul has operations which it performs independent- 
ly of the body — the operation of intelligence ; there- 
fore the soul subsists by itself.. The minor is proven, 
because, from the objects perceived, it is certain that 
the soul can understand the nature of all bodies. But 
if the soul were a body, and used bodily organs, it 
could not perform such operations ; therefore in 
these operations the soul does not depend upon the 
body. In fact, as St. Thomas remarks, that subject 
which can know something must not contain in its 
nature any element of those things it wants to know, 
otherwise that element which would naturally be 
found in it would hinder the knowledsre of other 



Elements of Intcllcctiial Philosophy. 259 

things, as we see in the tongues of sick people, covered 
with bitter coating: they cannot taste anything 
sweet, but everything tastes bitter. If, therefore, the 
intellectual principle had the nature of a body it could 
not know the nature of all bodies. 

Again, how can she several bodies know 

If in herself a body's form siie bear? 
.How can a mirror sundry faces show, 
■ If from all shapes and forms it be not clear ? 
Nor could we by our eyes all colors learn, 

Except our eyes were of all colors void ; 
Nor sundry tastes can any tongue discern 

Which is with gross and bitter humors cloy'd." 

— Davies. 

2. If our souls were not independent of the body in 
their operations they could not have universal per- 
ceptions. But they do have universal perceptions ; 
therefore they do not depend upon the body for 
their operations. The major is proven : That which 
is received into any recipient must take the form of 
the recipient. But matter is contracted and particu- 
lar ; therefore whatever is received in it must take a 
contracted and particular form. If, therefore, the 
soul depended upon matter for its operation, all the 
forms it could take would be contracted and particular. 

3. The will has a tendency after intellectual and in- 
corporeal good, and is not confined to this or that par- 
ticular good, but is drawn towards good in general or 
to whatever object in which it can see an element or 
feature of goodness. But if the soul depended upon 
the organs of the body for its operations, this would be 
impossible, because bodily organs always tend toward 
some individual object, and never toward general and 
abstract objects ; therefore the soul is independent of 
the bodily organs in its operations. 



26o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

4. We oftentimes are conscious of a hard struggle 
going on between the body and the soul, and observe 
that when it wishes the soul can repress, and does in 
fact repress, the movements of the body. Now, this 
is a clear sign that the soul can act independently of 
the body; therefore the soul is spiritual. 

Q. What remarks are to be made upon what has 
been said ? 

A. I. That opinion of Locke, Hume, Condillac, 
which holds that a soul is not a substance by itself, 
but an aggregate of modifications, is false ; because 
we have proved that the soul is a substance, as it has a 
subsistence of its own independent of the body. 

2. That the opinion of Locke, who doubted whether 
it would not be possible for matter to think, is absurd, 
because to know and to understand is the act of an 
immaterial subject exclusively ; consequently, not even 
God Almighty, as Locke thought, can cause matter to 
think, because God cannot effect a contradiction. 

3. The human soul has an existence independent 
of the body ; but it has also sensitive faculties. Now, 
as these stand in need of the body to perform their 
functions, it follows that the soul in man, inasmuch as 
it is sensitive, is dependent upon the body in the 
sense that it must be united to corporal organs and 
stands in need of them to experience sensibility. 

"Mysterious thought, swift angel of the mind ! 
B}^ space unbounded, though to space confin'd. 
How dost thou glow with just disdain, how scora 
That thought could ever think thee earthly born ! 
Thou who canst distance motion in thy flight, 
Wing with aspiring plume the wondrous height, 
Swifter than light outspeed the flame of day, 
Pierce through dark profound and shame the darting ray , 
Throughout the universal systems range, 
New form old s)'^stems, and new systems change ; 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 261 

Through nature traffic on, from pole to pole, 
And stamp new worlds on thy dilated soul ; 
(By time unlimited, unbounded by space,) 
Sure demonstration of thy heavenly race ; 
Deriv'd from that which is derived from none. 
Which ever is but of Himself alone." 

— Brooke, Universal Beauty, 

ARTICLE THIRD. 
Hoiv the Human Soul Originates, 

Q. How does man's soul originate ? 

A. The soul being a spiritual substance, entirely 
different from the body, wc may ask, How does it ori- 
ginate? Is it produced in the same manner as the 
body, and by the same principles ? 

There have been several answers to this question. 
Omitting that of the Emanatists, who held that the 
soul emanated from the divine substance, as we shall 
refute this opinion when speaking against pantheism, 
we mention the opinion of the Traducians and that of 
some Catholic philosophers. The Traducians main- 
tained that the soul of a child is transmitted to him 
from the body of the parents ; and others, from the 
soul. Rosmini holds that the soul of a child, inasmuch 
as it is a sensitive substance, is transmitted by genera- 
tion, and that it becomes afterward rational and intel- 
lective b}^ the apparition of the idea of being which 
God exhibits before it. Now, all these opinions are 
false. 

The first is false because bodies cannot give that 
which they have not — a thing transcending their na- 
ture. But such would be the case if souls were trans- 
mitted from the parents' bodies, because souls are 
spiritual, the body is material. The body, therefore, 
would give that which it has not — that which trans- 
cends its own nature and power. It would produce 



262 Eleijzents of Intellectual Philosophy. 

an effect inferior to its cause ; therefore it is absurd to 
hold that souls could be transmitted from the body. 

The second opinion, which holds that souls are 
transmitted from the parents' soul, is also false. 
I. Because the parents' souls are spiritual ; but a spir- 
itual substance cannot generate — that is, be divided 
and corrupted — as it has no parts ; therefore, etc. 

2. If we do not admit that they are generated from 
the parents' souls as parts detached- from them, we 
can make two suppositions : They must either be cre- 
ated from nothing by the parents' soul (an opinion 
which has been recently broached by Dr. Frohscam- 
mer), or we must say that the soul of the parent must 
draw them out from some existing matter. But nei- 
ther supposition is possible. Not the first, because 
creation from nothin"- belon^rs to God alone: 

o o 

" For all things made are either made of naught 
Or made of stuff that read3--made doth stand ; 
Of naught no creature ever formed aught, 
For that is proper to the Almighty hand." 

The second supposition cannot be admitted, because 
forms drawn out from matter are always depending 
upon it and accidental, not self-subsisting, as the soul. 
The opinion of Rosmini is also false, because, i. It 
is impossible that the sensitive soul should be derived 
from the parents' by way of generation. The nature 
of the human soul is one intellectual, sensitive, and 
vegetative. But it is proper to every being to be pro- 
duced in the same manner as its being becornes it ; 
therefore for one being it is becoming to be produced 
by one agent, especially when this one being is simple 
and cannot be divided into parts nor produced suc- 
cessively — that is, first one part and then another; 
therefore the same principle which produces the intel- 
ligent must produce the sensitive and vegetative soul. 



Elements of hitcllcdual Philosophy. 26 



o 



2. Either the sensitive soul, which becomes rational 
by the apparition of being, is destroyed when it be- 
comes rational or it is not destroyed. If it is de- 
stroyed, then God creates a new soul ; if it is not 
destroyed, then we may enquire How is it that it be- 
comes, along with the rational soul, one simple and 
spiritual being? Does it change its essence? In 
fact, it changes and it does not change its essence. It 
changes, inasmuch as the sensitive soul in the suppo- 
sition would have another essence and would belong 
to another species ; it does not change it, inasmuch 
as the sensitive soul would not be destroyed. In that 
case it would and would not be. But this is a con- 
tradiction ; therefore the opinion of Rosmini is false. 

Having excluded all possible suppositions Avhich 
might be supposed to account for the origin of the 
soul, we must conclude that it is created by God. 

" Then if her heavenly form do not agree 

With any matter which the world contains, 
Then she of nothing must created be ; 
And to create to God alone pertains." 

— Davies. 

Objection : If the parent were not the originator of 
both body and soul, he could not be said to be the 
father of the child, but only the father of the body of 
the child. 

In answering we distinguish : If the soul were not 
united to the body at the moment of generation — a 
union which causes the action of the father to ter- 
minate in a human person — it is granted ; otherwise it 
is denied. If the father generated the body of the 
child first, and this existed by itself as a distinct indi- 
viduality for some time, then the objection would 
stand ; but the case is otherwise. At the same mo- 
m.ent that the father generates, at that very same in- 



264 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

stant what is being generated is united substantially 
to a spiritual soul created by God, so that what the 
father generates is not an individuality apart from 
the soul, but is an individuality, because the soul 
makes it subsist of its own subsistence. Therefore 
the objection does not stand, because the father's ac- 
tion terminates in one individuality and personality 
by the union with the soul, and therefore must he be 
called the father of the child and not of his body. 

ARTICLE FOURTH. 
When docs the Soul Begin to be ? 

Q. What are the opinions of philosophers as to the 
time when the soul takes its origin ? 

A. Pythagoras and Plato maintained that human 
souls, before they were imited to a body, lived a bet- 
ter life in the stars, and that they would be there still 
were it not that some of them became guilt}^ of a 
grave crime, and Avere in consequence cast away from 
heaven and condemned to be enclosed in the body as 
in a dark dungeon, with the additional penalty of 
losing all remembrance of their former state. 

Leibnitz held that all the souls of men who were to 
be born were created by God since the beginning of the 
world and were enclosed in so many tiny bodies, which 
were the germs of their own bodies contained in 
Adam, which germs, evolving in the course of time 
and acquiring the proper size, constitute men's bodies. 

Q. What are we to think of these opinions? 

A. That both are false. As to the first, it is evi- 
dent that according to this opinion the union of the 
soul and body would be against nature. Now, this 
is false, because the union of the soul and body is 
intended by nature as the object of generation. But 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 265 

what is intended as the object of a natural action can- 
not be unnatural ; therefore the union of the soul and 
bod}' must be natural. 

2. It follows from this opinion that the union of 
the soul and body is accidental ; but we have shown 
that it is a substantial union. 

3. As there are no proofs alleged in confirmation of 
this opinion as to the pre-existence of soul, since, 
according to these philosophers, we have lost all 
memory of such a state, we have reason to reject it 
as a fiction or dream. 

Against the second opinion we observe : 

1. The animal is said to be engendered when the 
soul is united to the body, but, according to the 
opinion of Leibnitz, this could not be in the case of 
man, because the animal in his case would already 
exist ; therefore in this case we cannot say that the 
animal is generated. 

2. The principle of sufficient reason has a great 
weight with Leibnitz, but no sufficient reason can be 
produced why the sOul of men should be created be- 
fore man's generation — there is no sufficient reason 
why the soul should exist without action for so long a 
time ; therefore the opinion of Leibnitz is false. 

3. We observe also that it is a mere hypothesis, 
without any foundation in reality. 

Q. What is the true opinion? 

A. That the soul is created by God at tJie vionient 
when the matter which is to form the body is fit to 
receive it. But there are two opinions about this pre- 
cise moment. Some, like the ancients, have said that 
that moment means when the body is fully organized, 
which they suppose to be forty days after the concep- 
tion for males and eighty days for females. 

Others — and this opinion is held by all modern phy- 



266 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

siologists and metaphysicians — say that that moment 
is when the germ administered by the female is fecun- 
dated by the male. 

The .reasons for this opinion are most convincing: 
I. It is impossible that the matter administered by 
the female and fecundated by the male could begin to 
be organized without an interior living principle. 
" Opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrin- 
sico sicut sentiri, nutriri et augeri " (St. Thomas, qu. 
cxviii. art. 2). The acts of life, such as to feel, to be 
nourished, and to grow, cannot originate in an extrinsic 
principle. Therefore, in order to obtain the process 
of organization, we may admit a twofold hypothesis, 
either that the soul is there at the moment of the 
conception to begin as the interior principle the pro- 
cess of organization, or that another internal principle 
effects this process and makes way for the soul when 
the organization is completed. But the second hypo- 
thesis is absurd ; therefore the soul is there at the 
moment of the conception. 2. If the soul were united 
to the body at any other moment than that of the fecun- 
dation, then the parents could not be called the gene- 
rators of a human person, but only of a body destined 
to be united to a soul and to form a person after the 
union, because it is evident that the generative action 
of the parents would not terminate in a human person 
so long as the soul is not there contemporaneously with 
the action. But this is against the common sense of 
mankind, who feel and hold firmly that the parents of 
a man are the parents of his personality and not of his 
body only ; therefore, etc. 



Elements of IntellectzLal Philosophy. 267 

ARTICLE FIFTH. 
0)1 the Iinviortatity of the SotiL 

Q. What remarks ought to be made before proving 
the immortality of the soul? 

A. The following: i. That a living being which 
lias no end to its duration is called immortal, and this 
property immortality. 

2. Immortality may become a living being either 
essentially or naturally or by grace. It becomes es- 
sentially only that being who exists by necessity of 
his nature, and whose existence is identical with his 
essence, so that his non-existence would be a contra- 
diction. This being is God. It becomes naturally 
that being which, though not existing by necessity 
of nature, is yet so constituted that it cannot cease to 
be except by annihilation effected by almighty power. 
It becomes by grace that being which God by His 
own grace maintains in existence, though naturally 
prone to dissolution. 

The second manner of immortality becomes the 
soul. To demonstrate, therefore, the immortality of 
the soul Ave have to show three things: i, that it is 
naturally indestructible ; 2, that it continues to act 
even after its separation from the body; 3, that it 
cannot be annihilated by any external cause. 

As to the first, a thing may be intrinsically de- 
stroyed for two reasons — either because it is composed 
of parts distinct from each other, which, once discon- 
nected and separated, the thing perishes; or because, 
though not composed of parts, it may depend like the 
accident on something else, which being destroyed, 
it is itself destroyed. 

But the human soul is neither of these things: 
therefore it is intrinsically indestructible. 



268 Elements of Intellectttal Philosophy. 

The minor has to prove that the human soul is not 
composed of parts and that it is not an accident. 

1. That which is simple is not composed of parts ; 
but the soul is simple, therefore it is not composed of 
parts. 

2. That which subsists of itself is not an accident 
dependent upon any other object in order to exist. 
But the soul subsists in itself. 

Therefore it is not an accident dependent upon the 
body in order to exist. 

As to the second, that the soul separated from the 
body continues to act : 

Operation is the action of a substance. 

But the soul is a substance, and continues to exist 
after the body has been destroyed. 

Therefore the soul, . after the dissolution of the 
body, continues to act. 

But action follows the nature of a being. ''^ 

Therefore the soul continues the actions, after the 
dissolution of the body, agreeably to its nature as a 
rational substance, which are acts of intelligence and 
will. 

" But (as the body living) wit and will 

Can judge and clioose without the body's aid, 
Though on such objects they are working still 

As through the body's organs.are convey'd, 
So when the body serves her turn no more. 
And all her senses are extinct and gone. 
She can discourse of what she learned before, 
In heavenly contemplation all alone." 

— Davies. 

Thirdly, we have to prove that the soul is extrin- 
sically immortal — that there is no exterior cause which 
may destroy it. 

* Ojieratio sequitur esse. 



Eleinents of hitcllectual Philosophy. 269 

The extrinsical cause which might annihilate the 
soul may be either a creature or God. 

But the creature cannot, and God will not, annihi- 
late the soul. 

Therefore no exterior cause can destroy the soul. 

The first part of the minor is clear. 

The destructive force of a creature is of a piece with 
its productive force. 

But the creature cannot produce anything out of 
nothing; therefore it cannot reduce anything to no- 
thing. 

That God will not annihilate the soul is also evi- 
dent ; for if we regard the power of God in itself, 
without reference to His other attributes, God could 
annihilate souls as well as other creatures, because a 
finite being is in itself indifferent to be and not to be, 
and that which fixes it in being is the creative act of 
God, and it continues to exist as long as the creative 
act continues to determine it to existence. If that 
act were withdrawn the creature would immediately 
cease to exist. 

But looking at the power of God in relation to His 
other attributes, we deny that He could annihilate the 
soul. 

Proof: To annihilate the soul would be contrary to 
His providence, wisdom, goodness, and justice; but 
God cannot do anything contrary to these attributes, 
therefore God cannot annihilate the soul. 

Proofs of the major : i. It is contrary to providence 
and wisdom. It behooves the providence and wisdom 
of God not to destroy those natural qualities which He 
Himself has given to beings, nor deprive essences of 
those properties which become them. But immortal- 
ity becomes the soul and all other spiritual substances ; 



270 Elements of hitellectual Philosophy. 

therefore to annihilate the soul would be against the 
wisdom and providence of God. 

It would be contrary to His goodness. 

We have an imperative, ardent, continual desire 
after happiness- — a desire which cannot be said to be 
found only in this or that man, at this or that time, 
in this or that place, but is found in all men,- at 
all times, and in all places. This desire, therefore, 
being so universal in time and space, must be said to 
have been implanted in man's nature by the Creator's 
hand, because whatever is universal in all times and 
places is natural and must come from nature's Author. 

But this craving after happiness could not be satis- 
fied without the soul's immortality ; it behooves, 
therefore, God's goodness to keep the soul immortal. 

That the craving after happiness could not be satis- 
fied without immortality is proved from two reasons : 
I. Because happiness is the perfect fulness of inter- 
minable life, and if one could entertain the thought 
for a moment that this fulness of life could after cer- 
tain time cease even for a day, the joy resulting from 
that exuberant overflow and fulness of life would be 
marred and be overcome by the unutterable pain of 
having to lose it, and thus it would cease to be hap- 
piness. 

2. We have an imperative, insatiable craving after 
truth and perfection. 

"Dive into the bottom of the soul, the base 

Sustaining all ; what find we ? Knowledge and love. 

As light and heat essential to the smt, 

These to the soul ; and why, if souls expire?" 

— Young. 

But if the soul is not immortal this craving could 
not be satisfied, as nothing in this world can appease 



Eleiue7ifs of Intellectual Philosophy. 271 

it. One thing can fill up that void, and one thing 
onl}-: it is the contemplation of infinite truth, of im- 
mense beauty, and the possession of infinite and most 
enticing loveliness — that is, the vision and the posses- 
sion of God. 

" How little lovely here ! How little known ! 
Small knowledge we dig up with endless toil, 
And love unfeigned may purchase perfect hate ; 
Why starved on earth our angel appetites 
While brutal are indulged their fulsome fill ? 
Were their capacities divine conferred, 
As mock diadem in savage sport? 
Rank insult of our ^om^pous poverty, 
Which reaps but pain from seeming claims so fair? 
In future ages lies no redress ? And shuts 
Eternity the door on our complaint ? 
This cannot be. To iove and kiiozv in man 
Is boundless appetite and boundless power, 
And these demonstrate boundless powers, too. 
Objects, power, appetites — Heaven suits all." 

— Young. 

It is contrary to justice. 

It is an established fact that on earth there are 
good and wicked men ; it is also certain that Divine 
justice must give a fitting reward to virtue and due 
punishment to vice. But we do not observe this just 
and equitable distribution of rewards and punish- 
ments, because too often we see the wicked prosper and 
enjoy the fruits of their iniquities, whilst frequently 
we see the just oppressed and down-trodden by the 
M'icked. There must be, therefore, another life after 
the body is dissolved, where the accounts will be 
balanced, where the rewards and punishments will be 
distributed equitably according to the good and evil 
which men have done. But if the soul Avere not im- 
mortal this future life would be impossible ; there- 
fore it behooves the justice of God to keep the soul 
immortal. 



272 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

It will not do to say that a fitting reward of the just 
is the peace and tranquillity of conscience and the 
satisfaction and pleasure which accompany the doing 
of good, and, on the contrary, that the fitting punish- 
ment of vice is the remorse of conscience which follows 
crime; because this reward and punishment would be 
reduced to very small proportions. Besides, we know 
by experience that the more the wicked man plunges 
into vice the less he feels the pangs of conscience, and 
we know also that it is not always true that the just 
feels peace and tranquillity ; he is too often agitated 
by doubts, perplexities, and scruples suggested to his 
mind by his over-delicate conscience, and is tossed to 
and fro by a variety of conflicting emotions, so as to 
feel very little peace. In this case where would his 
reward be? And when the just has to suffer death 
for the sake of his principles, what would then be his 
reward ? It is clear, therefore, that the pleasure of 
doing good is not a fitting reward of virtue, nor the 
remorse of conscience a proportionate doom for vice. 

" The soul, of origin divine, 

God's glorious image freed from clay, 
In heaven's eternal sphere shall shine, 
A star of day. 

" The sun is but a spark of fire, 

A transient meteor in the sky ; 

The soul, immortal as its sire. 

Shall never die." 

■ — Montgomery. 

Q. Give the definition of the soul. 

A. We may define the soul in general to be that first 
principle of life in those things which by experience we 
know to be living. To illustrate this definition we must 
remark first that of bodies some are living and some 
are not living. Those are called /zz^w^ which move 



Ele7Jie7its of Intellectual PIi ilosophy. 273 

themselves in force of an interior principle ; not living 
are those which are moved by an exterior principle. 
Now, this principle of life interior to living bodies is 
called by a general name, soul. But not every princi- 
ple of life may be called soul, because, though some 
other part of the body may be a principle of life, such 
as the heart in man, yet that part would not be called 
soul. The soul must be the first principle of life. We 
have said, finally, in tJiose things which zve know by ex- 
perience to live, because God also lives ; spiritual sub- 
stances entirely separated from matter live, yet they 
are not called souls, because we do not know them 
by experience. From the definition of soul in 
general we may frame the definition of the human 
soul. If the soul be the first principle of life, it is 
clear that this life is different in different animals in 
proportion as life is manifested in them. But in 
man all kinds of life are manifested, vegetative, sen- 
sitive, and intellectual ; therefore the human soul 
must be the principle of these three kinds of life, and 
may be defined that first principle by which man vege- 
tates, feels, ajzd reasons. Or it maybe defined in the 
words of St. Augustine, which amount to the same : 
" A certain substance endowed with reason and fit to 
govern a body." "" It is called substance to show that 
it is not an aggregate of qualities or modifications; 
endowed zuith reason, by which it is to be understood 
that it is simple, spiritual, ingenerable, incorrnptible, 
and immortal ; fit to govern a. body, because the 
human soul is destined to form a whole with the body 
which it animates. 



* " Substantia qusedam rationis particeps regendo corpori accommodata." — De 
Quantitate AniTtta^ ch. iii. n. 22. 



CHAPTER III. 

OF THE HUAIAN BODY. 

Q. How must we treat of the body in philosophy? 

A. Various sciences treat of the human body, such 
as anatomy, physiology, etc. ; but in philosophy we 
must treat of the human body in relation to that 
which is first and supreme in it, because philosophy 
treats of things according to their supreme causes. 
Now, that which is supreme in the body is its relation 
to the soul with which it is united and which it serves; 
hence we shall say a few things respecting this rela- 
tion and aptitude, i. The hiunan body is the most per- 
fect of all living bodies in consequence of this relation to 
the soul. In the universe there is a wonderful con- 
nection among beings. We find always that that which 
is the least and most inferior element of a supreme 
genus touches the boundaries of that which is the su- 
preme part of an inferior genus. This is clearly seen in 
the genus animal. The least of this genus, like the 
mollusks, Avhich have barely the sense of touch and are 
affixed to the earth like plants, touch the confines of 
the supreme one of the inferior genus, living ox plant, 
such as the polypus and the corals. According to this 
theory, therefore, we must admit, in the genus of cor- 
poral things, bodies superior to all others and more 
noble, such as touch on the boundaries of the least 
among spiritual things, and that is the human body ; 
therefore the human body is the most perfect and 

noble of all living bodies. 

274 



Elements of Intellechtal Ph ilosophy. 275 

" Look nature through ; 'tis neat gradation all. 
By what minute degrees her scale ascends! 
Each middle nature joined at each extreme. 
To that above joined, to that beneath : 
Parts into parts reciprocally shot 
Abhor divorce ; what love of union reigns ! 
Here dormant matter waits a call to life ; 
Half life, half death, joined there. Here life and sense ; 
There sense from reason steals a glimmering ray: 
Reason shines in man." 

—Young. 

O. In what does this perfection consist ? 

A. In the greatest possible variety of organs. Be- 
cause the body is made for the soul. Now, the soul 
stands in need of the body for this reason, that, not 
possessing truth in itself, it must acquire it from sensi- 
ble objects ; hence the necessity of the senses and of 
the faculty of feeling. But the operation of feeling 
cannot be performed without corporal organs ; hence 
the need of corporal organs ; and as the faculty of 
feeling is manifold, various, therefore must be the 
organs of feeling. But all these organs must be sub- 
ject to a general organ most exquisitely made, in 
order that it may feel different and contrary sensa- 
tions and bring them to unity. This common and 
general sense is the touch. Of these senses, and espe- 
cially of the touch, we shall speak in the second part of 
Anthropology. We conclude for the present that the 
human body is superior to all living bodies, because 
no other can feel so exquisitely and so delicately as 
the human body, and because of the variety of its 
organs, superior in their nature, structure, uses, and 
functions to those of all other living bodies. 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF THE M ANNE J? ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SOUL AND 
THE BODY ARE UNITED TOGETHER AND CONSPIRE TO 

FORM MAN. 

ARTICLE FIRST. 

Union of the Body and Soul as to Being — Seat of the 

Soul. 

Q. Under how many aspects may we consider the 
union of the soul and the body? 

A. Under two aspects : the soul is united to the 
body as to deijtg and as to action. As to being, we 
have seen that both soul and body form one complete 
substance, that both substances, the body and the 
soul, meet together in one single subsistence — that 
of the soul — so that the soul causes the body to have 
actual reality and existence. Hence the soul has 
been called the living and substantial form, or the 
actuality of the body. Of this we have spoken before, 
but closely connected with the present topic is the 
question of the seat of the soul. Since the soul is the 
living form of the body, it must be somewhere in the 
body. But where ? Philosophers have answered this 
question in different ways. Descartes held that the 
seat of the soul was in the pineal gland, whence, as 
upon a throne, it gives direction and movement to the 
whole machine. A poet has wittily expressed this 
opinion as follows : 

" Ah7ia, they strenuously maintain, 

Sits cock-horse on her throne, the brain, 

276 



Elements of Intelledttal Philosophy. 277 

And from that seat of thought dispenses 

Her sovereign pleasure to the senses. 

Two optic nerves they say she ties 

Like spectacles across the eyes, 

By which the spirits bring her word 

Whene'er the balls are fixed or stirred. . . 

Wise nature likewise, they suppose, 

Has drawn two conduits down our nose ; 

Could Alma else with judgment tell 

When cabbage stinks or roses smell? 

By nerves about our palate placed 

She likewise judges of the taste ; 

Else (dismal thought !) our warlike men 

Might drink thick port for fine champagne. 

Hence, too, that she might better hear, 

She sets a drum at either ear. 

And loud or gentle, harsh or sweet, 

Are but th' alarums which they beat. 

Last, to enjoy her sense of feeling 

(A thing she most delights to deal in), 

A thousand little nerves she sends 

Quite to our toes and fingers' ends ; 

And these in gratitude again 

Return their spirits to the brain, 

In which their figure being printed 

(As just before I think I hinted), 

Alma informed can try the case, 

As she had been upon the place." 

— Prior, Alma. 

Others maintain that the soul is in the heart, and 
others in some other part of the body. 

Now, all these opinions which locate the soul in a 
particular part of the body are necessarily false, be- 
cause you can locate, enclose, surround, circumscribe, 
bound off only that which is extended, as that which 
is extended, having parts, can be surrounded by cor- 
respondirig parts of another body. That which is 
simple cannot be surrounded, not having parts which 
can be circumscribed by parts of a body. Hence 
those who locate the soul in a particular part of the 



278 Elernejtts of Intellectual Philosophy. 

body and enclose it therein have been rightly accused 
of making the soul material. 

The true opinion is that the soul is whole and en- 
tire in the whole body, and whole and entire in each 
part of the body. This doctrine of the Christian 
schools of the Middle Ages has been cried down by 
modern wiseacres ; but reason is on the side of the 
Christian schools. In order t6 illustrate and prove 
the scholastic doctrine we must recall a few princi- 
ples : 

1. That the soul is simple and cannot be divided 
into parts. 

2. That simple things abide in a place not by con- 
tact of extension but contact of action.* We say 
that a thing is in space by contact of extension when 
the parts of this thing are located in, and put in jux- 
taposition with, the corresponding part of space. If I 
lay a book on the table, the different parts forming 
the extension of the book touch the corresponding 
parts of the table. The book, therefore, is on the 
table by contact of extension. Now, when a thing 
is simple and has no parts, it is evident that it can- 
not be in a place by contact of extension, when this 
very extension is wanting to it ; it can only be in a 
place by acting upon or in it. Having recalled these 
principles, it is easy to demonstrate our thesis. 

1. Incorporal things are said to be in space not by 
contact of extension but by contact of action. But 
the soul acts in the whole body ; therefore the soul is 
in the whole body. 

2. The soul is the substantial form of the body, in- 
asmuch as it makes it real and living ; therefore the 
soul is in the whole body. 

* " Incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum quantitatis, sed per contactiim vir- 
tutis." — St. Thomas. 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 279 

3. Demonstration that the soul is whole and entire 
in each part of the body. 

The soul acts not only in the whole body but also 
in each part of the body. Now, if it were not whole 
and entire in each part of the body, it would have to 
divide itself and be part in one part of the body and 
part in another. But this is impossible, because the 
soul is simple ; therefore the soul is whole and entire 
in each part of the body. 

O. Please to illustrate this point by analogy. 

A. Great opposition has been raised against this 
doctrine because persons want to see this truth by 
imagination ; by figuring to themselves how can it be 
that a being is whole and entire in the whole and in 
each part of the body, forgetting that we cannot form 
any sensible image of a spiritual fact. Yet, to en- 
able the student to perceive this truth, we shall make 
use of some comparisons. Take, for instance, light. 
Light, apparently, is in the air in the same manner 
as the soul is in the body. First, it penetrates the 
whole air through and impregnates it with its beams ; 
secondly, it seems to be whole and entire in each par- 
ticle of air. This is gathered from two facts : first, 
when air is divided light remains whole and entire, as 
in each particle of air the same amount of light is 
seen ; secondly, when air becomes foul and corrupted 
light continues always pure. 



" But as the fair and cheerful morning light 

Doth here and there her silver beams impart. 
And in an instant doth herself unite 

To the transparent air in all and every part — 
Still resting whole when blows the air divide, 

Abiding pure when th' air is most corrupted ; 
Throughout the air her beams dispersing wide, 

And when the air is tossed not interrupted — 



28o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

So doth the piercing soul the body fill, 
Being all in all, and all in part diffus'd ; 

Indivisible, incorruptible still, 

Nor forc'd, encounter'd, troubled, or confused." 

— Davies. 

Take another instance. An orator is speaking be- 
fore a large audience ; he develops his subject with 
the greatest force and earnestness, and his audience 
are enlightened and carried away with enthusiasm. His 
voice, which is but a sound, is divided, each one of the 
audience receiving more or less ; those who are nearest 
to the orator receiving a stronger sound, those furthest 
from him the least sound — each, in one word, receiving 
a varied quantity of sound. But thought is indivisible, 
and each one of the hearers receives it whole and 
entire, all equally, those who sit near as well as those 
who are afar. Because thought — that is, that which is 
spiritual — is indivisible ; wherever it penetrates it must 
penetrate whole and entire ; wherever a spirit exists it 
must exist whole and entire. It is the same of the soul, 
which is a spirit. It communicates itself to all the 
parts of the body, it lives in each of them, and 
wherever it is it must be whole and entire. 

Take another example. My mind develops a 
thought, and after this one another thought, and then 
another, and so on, a great number of thoughts follow- 
ing one another, agreeing with one another or clashing 
with one another. In each of these thoughts, in each 
of these intellectual acts, my mind is whole and 
entire ; and yet it differs in each one of them, being 
sometimes right, sometimes wrong, sometimes false, 
other times true; in other words, my intelligence 
manifests itself in different ways, though it is whole 
and entire in each. Now, the same must be said of the 
soul. It acts in one way in one organ, and in another 



Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 281 

organ in another way, but in every act and in every 
mode of acting it is itself which acts, and itself whole 
and entire ; it is its activity which appears in all these 
different modes. 

ARTICLE SECOND. 
Of the Union of the Soul and Body as to Action. 

Q. Is there a union of the body and soul as to 
action ? 

A. That there should be a union and a mutual cor- 
respondence of action between two beings, one of 
which subsists on the subsistence of the other, is evi- 
dent from reason and is confirmed by experience. 
For we know by experience that, given certain 
thoughts and feelings of the soul, certain correspond- 
ing movements result in the body; and, vice versa, 
given a certain state of the body, a corresponding state 
manifests itself in the soul. This mutual correspon- 
dence between the soul and the body as to their 
action has been called communication or covimercium. 

O. How is this communication between the soul 
and the body explained? 

A. Various systems have been invented to explain 
this mutual influence of the soul over the body, and 
vice versa, but they may be reduced to five : occa- 
sionalism, pre-established harmony, plastic mediatorship, 
pJiysical influx, and substantial union. 

O. Explain and give your opinion of the first system. 

A. It was taught by Malebranche, who started from 
a principle of his own, that in the universe there are 
no efficient causes and that God alone does every- 
thing. From this principle he concluded that neither 
the soul can really act upon the body nor the latter 
on the soul, as neither of them can be real agents. 



282 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

Against this doctrine the opponents of Malebranche 
said : If what you say is true, if God alone acts in 
every being, and consequently neither the soul can 
act upon the body nor the body upon the soul, how- 
do you explain that harmony and correspondence 
which exists between the soul and the body ? — for when 
certain thoughts and feelings arise in the soul, a cor- 
responding movement succeeds in the body, and vice 
versa. Suppose a man has received an insult, which 
just at this moment has come to his knowledge, and 
which has put his soul in a fierce rage ; do we not see 
corresponding movements in the body, the eye shoot- 
ing fire, the face becoming first blanched and then 
crimson, the lips compressed, the hand clenched, and 
the utterance interrupted? How do you explain this? 
How do I explain it ? says our philosopher. Nothing 
easier. I have said that God is the sole agent, and I 
cling to that, and explain that correspondence of 
thoughts and movements by saying that God takes 
occasion from that modification of the soul to ex- 
cite a corresponding movement in the body. Hence 
the thoughts and feelings of the soul are mere occa- 
sions which God takes to act upon the body, and vice 
versa. This system is therefore called occasionalism, 
or the system of occasional causes. 

Now, we may remark upon this system : i. That it 
is founded on the assumption that there can be no real 
efficient causes in the universe besides God, from 
which principle Malebranche deduces that whatever 
happens either in the soul or in the body must be 
effected by God. But we have shown in Ontology 
that this principle is false. Therefore the system 
raised upon it is false. 

2. This system destroys the substantial union be- 
tween the soul and the body. Because what kind of 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 283 

union can there exist between two machines, if the en- 
gineer alone is the agent who produces similar move- 
ments in both independently of either, and without 
the least communication between them ? 

Q, Explain the second system. 

A. Leibnitz admitted that finite beings can be real 
agents, but denied that the action can pass from one to 
another, and therefore arrived by another road at the 
same conclusion as Malebranche. The latter denied 
that the soul and the body could act upon each other, 
on the principle that they are not real agents. Leib- 
nitz denied that they can act upon each other, be- 
cause the action of one cannot pass over to the other. 
Hence the same objection was made against Leibnitz: 
How do you account for the harmony between the 
actions of the soul and the movements of the body, 
and vice versa ? How do I account for it ? Thus : 
All you have to do is to suppose that each being of 
the universe is a simple substance called a monad, and 
that each of these monads is a representative force and 
can represent all that which happens in the universe; 
that God has established among all these monads a 
parallelism of perceptions, of wishes, of actions, and 
motions in such a manner that without communicating 
anything to each other they all move in a most per- 
fect harmony, each one representing what the other 
does and suffers. So that in our case, the soul being a 
representative force, and the body being also a repre- 
sentative force, God has established such a parallel- 
ism between them that in proportion as perceptions, 
wishes, and actions are developed in the soul they 
are immediately represented by corresponding move- 
ments in the body, and vice versa. This system is 
called pre-established harmony. 

Now, we observe that this system, though eminently 



284 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 

ingenious, is false for the following reasons: i. Be- 
cause it is founded on the principle that transient 
actions are impossible. For this is the fundamental 
principle of the whole system of Leibnitz : as the 
action of one agent cannot be communicated to an- 
other, it follows that the interchange of modifications 
between the body and the soul are effected by a pre- 
established harmony of affections and movements. 
Now, we have shown this principle to be false ; false, 
therefore, is the system which rests upon it. 

2. This system destroys altogether the substantial 
union which Ave have proved to exist between the 
body and the soul. But this substantial union is ad- 
mitted even by Leibnitz ; therefore his system is false. 
That Leibnitz admits a substantial union between the 
body and the soul is evident from these words of his 
Theodicea : " There exists between the soul and the 
body a true union, from which results the suppositum." 
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the 
system of Leibnitz destroys the substantial union be- 
tween the body and the soul. Because whence would 
this union result, if the soul cannot act upon the body, 
nor the body upon the soul ? Nay, instead of finding 
any substantial union between the soul and the body 
in the system we are refuting, we could not even dis- 
cover between these two terms a collective union 
such as would exist between the different parts of 
a machine. The system of Leibnitz, therefore, is 
false. 

Finally, in this system and in the other God would 
be the author of all the errors, crimes, and disorders 
which occur and are perpetrated among men. 

Q. What is the third system ? 

A. To obviate the difficulties which are brought 
forward against occasionalism and pre-established har- 



Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 285 

mony, John Clerc hit upon a new expedient : You 
say the body cannot act upon the soul ; I grant that. 
You insist that the soul cannot have any influence 
upon the body; I admit that also. Therefore to 
render possible this apparent mutual communication 
and interchange of actions between the soul and the 
body, all you have to do is to suppose a third sub- 
stance intermediate between the soul and the body. 
The soul gives its commands to this intermediate 
substance, and this transmits them to the body ; the 
body communicates its sensations to this medium, and 
it humbly transfers them to the soul. This interme- 
diate substance between the soul and the body was 
called the plastic mediator. 

Q. What do you think of this system ? 

A. That it is even more absurd than the two former 
ones. I. What is this third substance ? Is it a spirit 
or a body } If it be said that it is neither the one nor 
the other, but something partaking of both natures — 
something between the spiritual and the corporal — we 
say that such a thing is a contradiction. 

2, This system destroys also the substantial union 
between the body and the soul ; for in what does this 
union consist ? It does not consist in two things 
being brought together by means of a third, but its 
nature lies exactly in the fact that two substances 
meet together directly, touching each other, so to 
speak, by means of the subsistence of one of those 
substances. Now, if we explained the communication 
of the body and the soul by means of a third sub- 
stance, partaking of the nature of both, we should 
have to suppose that the body and soul do not meet 
directly together, that the two substances do not 
touch each other; therefore, by admitting a plastic 
mediator to explain the communication between the 



286 Elements of Intellectual PJi ilosophy. 

soul and the body, we would destroy their substantial 
union. 

0. What is the next system ? 

A. Physical influx, invented by Eulerus and held 
by all the followers of Locke. This system explains 
the union between the soul and the body by means of 
the mutual action of one upon the other. The body 
incites and induces the soul to choose those percep- 
tions and those acts which correspond to its organic 
movements, and on the other hand the soul moves and 
induces the body to make such movements as are 
agreeable and befitting to the soul's perceptions and 
acts. In this real and mutual influence of the soul 
upon the body, and of the body upon the soul, lie 
the union and communication between the two ; hence 
the system is called physical influx. 

Q. What do you think of such a system ? 

A. Though this system avoids the error of Male- 
branche that there are no efficient causes besides God, 
and that of Leibnitz that an action cannot pass from 
an agent to an object acted upon, and though it rejects 
the plastic mediator, yet we cannot admit it for the 
following reasons : 

1. Because it destroys the substantial union be- 
tween the soul and the body. F'or, according to this 
system, the union between the soul and the body is 
explained as follows : the body acts upon the soul and 
incites it to have perceptions and to elicit acts, and 
the soul, in its turn, incites the body to movement; 
therefore in this system the body and the soul are 
two separate beings, and do not form one complete 
substance, but are two complete substances accident- 
ally united in order that one may act upon the other. 
But this implies that there is no substantial union be- 
tween the soul and the body ; therefore this system 



Eltuicnts of lyitcllcctital PJiilosophy. 287 

destroys the substantial union between the soul and 
the body. 

2. In this system it is said that the body acts upon 
the soul. Then it acts without the soul ; because how 
could it otherwise be said that it acts upon the soul? 
But if it acts without the soul, then what gives it 
movement, since no body can produce movement ex- 
cept it be moved by some other agent? Therefore 
this system leads to absurdities. 

In one word, in the examination of all these sys- 
tems we ought to keep carefully in view the theories 
already established. Man's nature results from the 
substantial union between the body and the soul. If 
we deny this union, or do not carefully describe its 
exact nature, we destroy man's nature and necessarily 
fall into absurdities. Now, in all the aforesaid systems 
we fail to observe that this substantial union between 
the soul and the body is maintained. Therefore they 
destroy man's nature and lead to many errors. 

Q. What is the true system about the union be- 
tween the soul and the body? 

A. The system of the schoolmen, which may be 
formulated in a few words, as follows: If the soul be 
the subsisting principle of the body, as we have de- 
monstrated, or, in other words, if the soul be the 
living, substantial form of the body, it follows that 
the soul must necessarily act upon the body, and that 
the movements of the body should be felt in the 
soul. 

We prove this system as follows : 

The operation of anything emanates from its sub- 
sistence. But the body receives its subsistence from 
the soul ; therefore it must receive from the soul the 
power of acting. Now, if the soul be the principle 
from which the body derives the power of acting, it 



288 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 

is necessary also that the soul, along with the body, 
should be the subject of those powers by means of 
which the body acts. And if.not the body alone, but 
the whole composite — that is, the bodyand the soul — 
is the subject of all the bodily powers, it follows 
necessarily that not only the soul should be able to 
incite the members of the body to operation, but also 
that the operations of the body should be felt in the 
soul. 

For the sake of clearness we shall put the same 
argument in another form. We have proved that the 
body subsists on the subsistence of the soul. Now, 
what does this imply ? Does it imply that the body 
has no radical power to act without the soul? Cer- 
tainly not ; the body is a substance, and, as such, has 
a natural radical power of acting. But, admitting this 
radical natural power of acting, does it follow that 
the body can actually and really act without the soul? 
Certainly not ; because actioiies sunt sitppositorum. 
Action implies subsistence, which is that last comple- 
ment of a being which causes it to be distinct from 
others, independent of and incommunicable to others. 
Without that a substance is an abstract thing and 
not a reality — a potentiality, but not an actual exist- 
ence. Now, the body has no subsistence of its own, 
but subsists on the subsistence of the soul ; therefore 
it really receives the power of acting from the soul. 
The soul, then, is the principle from which the body 
derives the power to act. Now, the consequence which 
results from this truth is that the soul, along with the 
body, must be the subject of those powers by means 
of which the body acts, because originally the power 
emianates from the soul; those powers, therefore, by 
which the body acts must be in both. But if the 
whole composite — that is, the body and the soul — is 



Elements of Iniellectttal PkilosopJiy. 289 

the subject of those powers by which the body acts, 
who can fail to see the consequence that not only the 
soul must be able to move the body to act, but that 
the movements of the body should be felt in the soul? 
In one word, the body subsists on the subsistence of 
the soul; therefore it receives the power to act from 
the soul. If this power of the body is received from 
the soul, it follows that it must be found in both con- 
jointly, and that, consequently, not only the soul 
must be able to move the body, but it must feel 
somewhat the movements of the body. 

Q. Give a resume of all we have said in this first 
part of Anthropology. 

A. We have treated of man's nature, and to treat 
of it accurately we have considered it first in general, 
and then we have distinguished those elements from 
which it results — soul and body ; then we have con- 
sidered each element in particular ; and, finally, we 
have investigated the manner in which these elements 
are united together. In other words : Two things are 
necessary to constitute man— i, body and soul: 2, a 
substantial union between the two; therefore, to 
speak of man properly, it was necessary to consider 
two things — his body and soul, and the substantial 
union of both. This we have done in two ways, first 
in general, and then in particular. And with this we 
end the first part of Anthropology. 

" O ignorant man ! what dost thou bear 

Lock'd up within the casket of thy breast? 
What jewels and what riches hast thou there, 

What heavenly treasures in so weak a chest? 
Look in th}- soul, and thou shalt benuties find 

Like those which drown'd Narcissus in the flood : 
Honor and pleasure both are in the mind, 

And all that in the world is counted grood. 



290 Elemenis of Intelleciital Philosophy. 

Think of her worth, and think that God did mean 

This worthy mind should worthy things embrace. 
Blot not her beauties with thy thoughts unclean, 

Nor her dishonor with thy passions base. 
And when thou thinkest of her eternity, 

Think not that death against her nature is, 
Think it a birth ; and, when thou go'st to die, 

Sing like a man as if thou went'st to bliss." 

— Davies. 






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